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Numerous studies have shown dramatic variations in the rates that immigration judges
grant asylum. What these studies have failed to adequately explain as of yet is why? In
attempting to understand the behavior of immigration judges in asylum cases, scholars have
generally taken one of two approaches, either examining immigration judge behavior through
top-down bureaucratic models or with models developed through the study of the judiciary.
From these studies we have learned that similarly situated asylum applicants have different
chances of success based merely on the ideological leanings of the judge who decides their case.
We also have learned that judges respond to top down extraneous pressures by granting more or
fewer asylum petitions. What we don’t know is how the individual preferences of immigration
judges are affected by extraneous factors. I believe that the primary reason previous studies have
been deficient is their failure to adequately consider how immigration judges’ decisions are
influenced by their status as administrative law judges who are tasked with making hundreds of
verdicts a year. As administrative law judges, immigration judges sit within a web of oversight
that is unlike any other judiciary. They have a caseload that is more akin to a street-level
bureaucrat than most members of the judiciary. However, as members of the judiciary they are
different from the type of agents who are the subject of most top-down studies of bureaucracies.
I hypothesize that in order to fully understand the behavior of immigration judges in asylum

cases, any model must contain a combination of attitudinal, institutional, legal and exogenous
variables which influence immigration judges in their decisions to grant or deny asylum.

Recognizing that immigration judges sit within a rather unique context, a multiinstitutional approach examining immigration judges as both administrative law judges as well as
street level bureaucrats working within a legal context provides the best explanation for why
these judges behave so differently. The results confirm a number of previous findings.
Immigration judge ideology does influence the rate that they grant asylum. Political, economic
and social factors also influence whether immigration judges grant asylum. The results also point
to a number of new conclusions that can be drawn about the behavior of immigration judges in
particular as well as administrative law judges in general. Like street level bureaucrats, as
caseload increases, the influence of individual ideology in the decision process also increases.
Moreover, the results reveal that judges with different ideological leanings respond to the same
variables differently. Factors that might increase the likelihood that a liberal judge will grant
asylum, actually decrease the likelihood that a conservative judge would grant asylum. These
results have important policy as well as legal ramifications. Furthermore, they call into question
generally held notions of both judicial and bureaucratic behavior and, as such, provide an
important contribution to the discipline.

© 2016 Mark Richard Beougher

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The first people that I need to thank are my family. My mother who has always shown
more faith and confidence in me than I deserve and whose support is the primary reason that I
completed my dissertation. You have always been my rock mom. My father, who has been my
moral and intellectual compass. My interest in asylum and refugee issues largely comes from
watching you work to protect the children of Michigan and Maine for your entire career. I have
always hoped to live up to your example. My sister who has been instrumental in me making it
this far, academically. Whether it was the help in editing this dissertation (and countless other
papers) or letting me crash on your floor, I have known that I can always count on you. My
children, Claire and Simon, who inspire me to work to make the world a better place and whose
love and affection I have leaned on during the darkest of times. You are my entire world.
I also need to thank all of the members of my dissertation committee and in particular my
advisor, Mark Hurwitz. Mark, thank you so much for providing the steady encouragement that I
needed throughout this too long process. It means a great deal that you never gave up on me.
Kevin Corder, I do not know how I would have been able to handle the myriad of statistical and
structural issues of this dissertation without your thoughtful and consistent assistance. Robert
Howard, I owe two levels of gratitude. First for your work on Administrative Law Judges that
inspired the model that I used in this dissertation and second for your willingness to participate
on a committee for a graduate student you did not know. Ashlyn Kuersten, thank you so much
for all that you have done for me since I first entered the program. Your commitment to teaching
and work on social justice issues has been an inspiration to me.
I must also thank several people who lead me to explore asylum and refugee issues.
Professor James Hathaway, whose class on asylum law first sparked this interest. The
Archdiocese of Detroit’s Immigration and Asylum Clinic which gave me my first opportunity to
work with people seeking refuge. Zef Pergega, my first client, whose integrity and courage won
out in the end.
ii

Acknowledgements – Continued

I would also like to acknowledge that I am completing this dissertation at an extremely
dark and terrifying time for immigrants in the United States. I am writing this acknowledgement
three days after Donald Trump has been elected as president of the United States. His antiimmigrant rhetoric, promises to deport millions of undocumented residents and plans to deny the
protections of asylum to those of the Muslim faith are antithetical to this country’s legal and
moral obligations. I decided to write my dissertation on the asylum process because I believed
that it is one of the noblest experiments in the history of the modern world. To think that a vast
majority of the countries in the world have signed onto an agreement that requires them to
provide protection to the neediest who reach their shores is almost incomprehensible in today’s
environment. This is an incredible example of the good that can be achieved through global
cooperation. Unfortunately, across the world, countries are reneging on this obligation. A
growing anti-immigrant wave is rising in the developed world. Rather than be a bastion against
this wave, we have decided to bolster its force with the election of Mr. Trump. It is my intent to
apply whatever skill and knowledge I have obtained to oppose the efforts of Mr. Trump and the
forces of intolerance in the world.

Mark Richard Beougher

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... xiii
CHAPTER
I - INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
Immigration Judges And Asylum .......................................................................................... 2
Why The Romeike’s Decision Was Such A Surprise............................................................ 4
How Does One Explain The Behavior Of Judge Burman? ................................................... 6
What Is Behind The Variance In Asylum Grant Rates Between Immigration Judges? ........ 9
Developing A Better Model Of Asylum Adjudication ........................................................ 10
Administrative Law Court Models ...................................................................................... 11
Street Level Bureaucracy Models ........................................................................................ 12
Towards A Multifaceted Approach To The Study Of Immigration Judge Behavior .......... 13
Why This Research Is Important ......................................................................................... 13
Order And Substance Of Chapters....................................................................................... 14
II - IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND ASYLUM DECISIONS .................................................. 17
The Two Edged Sword Of Asylum Protection .................................................................... 19
The Use Of Asylum To Serve Us Political Interests ........................................................... 20
Refugee Act Of 1980 And Changes To Asylum Adjudication ........................................... 22

iv

Table of Contents - Continued
Chapter
Post Cold War Asylum Adjudication: The End To Politically Based
Asylum Decisions? .............................................................................................................. 24
Adjudication Of Asylum After 9/11: Attempts To Reign In Immigration
Judge Discretion................................................................................................................... 25
Variance Between Judges In The Grant Of Asylum............................................................ 26
Asylum In The Age Of Obama ............................................................................................ 27
The Role Of Institutions In Curbing Immigration Judge Behavior ..................................... 28
Executive Branch Influence Over IJ Behavior ........................................................... 28
Legislative Influence over Immigration Judge Behavior............................................ 29
Judicial Influence over Immigration Judge Behavior ................................................. 30
How Constrained Are Immigration Judges In The Adjudication Of Asylum Claims ......... 30
III: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: BUREAUCRATS OR JUDGES?............................. 32
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 32
Judges and Bureaucrats as Cornerstones of Liberal Democracy ................................ 33
The Need for Non-Elected Decision Makers .............................................................. 34
Independence as Blessing and Curse .......................................................................... 35
Policy Decisions Based upon Personal Preferences Rather than Expertise ................ 37
Understanding Immigration Judge Behavior through the Lens of Previous
Studies of Judicial Behavior ................................................................................................ 37
Legal vs. Attitudinal Models of Judicial Behavior ..................................................... 37
Applying the Attitudinal Model to Lower Courts....................................................... 39

v

Table of Contents - Continued
Chapter
Constraints to Attitudinal Behavior: Strategic Decision Making ............................... 40
Constraints on application of the Attitudinal Model: The Influence of
Legal and Political Factors on Judicial Decision Making .......................................... 41
Applying the Literature of Judicial Politics to Immigration Judges ........................... 42
Understanding Immigration Judge Behavior through the Lens of
Bureaucratic Behavior Scholarship...................................................................................... 45
Top Down Studies: Principal Agent Relations and Bureaucratic Behavior ............... 46
The Role of the Presidency and Congress in Controlling the Actions of Agents ....... 47
Influence of the Judiciary in Bureaucratic Decision Making ..................................... 48
Interest Group Influence on the Behavior of Agents .................................................. 49
How the Political Environment Affects Principal Agent Relations............................ 49
Top Down Approaches to the Study of Immigration Judge Behavior........................ 50
Problems with Applying the Top Down Approach to the Study of
Immigration Judge Behavior....................................................................................... 51
Bottom Up Studies: Street Level Bureaucrats and Discretion .................................... 52
How Agency Characteristics Influence Street-Level Exercise of Discretion ............. 53
How Personal Characteristics of Bureaucrats Influence the Type and Level of
Discretion they Exercise ............................................................................................. 54
How Personal Characteristics of Clients Influence the Exercise of Discretion .......... 55
Immigration Courts as Street Level Bureaucrats ........................................................ 55
Examining the Behavior of Immigration Judges Through the Lens of
Administrative Court Models .............................................................................................. 56
Conclusion: Lessons Learned from Judicial, Bureaucratic and
Administrative Law Court Literature................................................................................... 59
vi

Table of Contents - Continued

IV -THEORIES AND APPROACHES ........................................................................................ 61
The Use of Rational Choice Models in the Study of Judges and Bureaucrats .................... 62
Institutional Constraints Still Matter.................................................................................... 63
A Neo-Institutionalist Approach to Understanding Judicial Behavior ................................ 64
V - RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................................ 67
Data and Methods ................................................................................................................ 67
Control Variables ................................................................................................................. 68
Individual Control Variables ............................................................................................... 68
General Control Variables ................................................................................................... 69
Operant Variables ................................................................................................................ 70
Human Rights Variable ....................................................................................................... 70
Political Variables ................................................................................................................ 70
Models ................................................................................................................................. 73
VI - A COMPARISON OF MODELS OF IMMIGRATION
JUDGE BEHAVIOR IN ASYLUM CASES ................................................................................ 77
Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................... 77
Judicial Ideology ......................................................................................................... 77
Home Country Factors ................................................................................................ 78
Judicial Oversight ....................................................................................................... 79
Executive & Congressional Oversight ........................................................................ 80

vii

Table of Contents - Continued
Chapter
VI HYPOTHESES
Panel/Agency Effects .................................................................................................. 81
Case Load.................................................................................................................... 82
Results .................................................................................................................................. 85
Control Variables ................................................................................................................. 87
Operant Variables ................................................................................................................ 88
Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 90
VII -INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS ON
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BEHAVIOR ....................................................................................... 95
Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................... 98
Congressional Oversight ............................................................................................. 98
Public Opinion ..................................................................................................................... 98
Models ................................................................................................................................. 99
The Effect of Congressional Attention Towards Asylum Related Issues ........................... 99
The Effect of Congressional Attention Towards
Immigration Enforcement Related Issues .......................................................................... 100
Public Attention Toward Asylum Related Issues .............................................................. 101
Results ................................................................................................................................ 102
Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 116
VIII: THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON IMMIGRATION JUDGE BEHAVIOR ............................ 122
The Effect of 9/11 .............................................................................................................. 123
viii

Table of Contents - Continued
Chapter
Models ............................................................................................................................... 123
Results ................................................................................................................................ 124
Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 135
IX - EXAMINING IMMIGRATION JUDGE BEHAVIOR BY JUDGE TYPE ...................... 139
Case Load .......................................................................................................................... 142
Institutional Ideology ......................................................................................................... 143
Models ............................................................................................................................... 145
Results ................................................................................................................................ 147
Results for Model O: Interaction of Judicial Type and the total number of cases
in a particular immigration court on probability of asylum success ......................... 147
Results for Model P: Interaction of Judicial Type and presidential ideology on
probability of asylum success. .................................................................................. 149
Results for Model Q: Interaction of Judicial Type and Congressional ideology on
probability of asylum success. .................................................................................. 151
Results for Model R: Interaction of Judicial Type and mean immigration court
ideology on probability of asylum success. .............................................................. 153
Results for Model S: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring whether
country of origin received military aid from the United States on probability of
asylum success. ......................................................................................................... 155
Results for Model T: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring
whether country of origin was a communist state on
probability of asylum success. .................................................................................. 156
Results for Model U: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring
extent of trade between petitioner’s country of origin and the
United States on probability of asylum success. ....................................................... 158

ix

Table of Contents - Continued
Chapter
IX Results
Results for Model V: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring
whether petitioner’s country of origin is a top ten producer of fraudulent
asylum claims on probability of asylum success. ..................................................... 160
Results for Model W: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring the
human rights record of. petitioner’s country of origin on probability of asylum
success....................................................................................................................... 162
Results for Model X: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring
the number of Congressional hearings regarding enforcement related issues on
probability of asylum success ................................................................................... 163
Results for Model Y: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring
the number of Congressional hearings regarding human rights related issues on
probability of asylum success. .................................................................................. 165
Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 166
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 170
Summary of Results ........................................................................................................... 171
Chapter VI: A Comparison of Models of Immigration Judge Behavior
in Asylum Cases ....................................................................................................... 171
Chapter VII: Influence of Political and Social Factors on Immigration
Judge Behavior.......................................................................................................... 173
Chapter VIII: The Effects of 9/11 on Immigration Judge Behavior ......................... 175
X - EXAMINING IMMIGRATION JUDGE BEHAVIOR BY JUDGE TYPE ........................ 177
Policy Implications ............................................................................................................ 178
Future Areas of Inquiry...................................................................................................... 180
Concluding Remarks.......................................................................................................... 181
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................183
x

LIST OF TABLES
1: List of Variables included in Each Model ................................................................................ 83
2: Results for Attitudinal, Top-down Bureaucratic and Multi-Institutional Models .................... 86
3: Model D: Human Rights Hearings/Human Rights Score ...................................................... 102
4: Model E: Enforcement Hearings by Military Aid .................................................................. 105
5: Model F: Enforcement Hearings by Commie ......................................................................... 108
6: Model G: Enforcement Hearings by Trade............................................................................. 110
6: Model H: Enforcement Hearings by Top Ten Immigration ................................................... 111
8: Model I: Times Count by Human Rights Terror Score .......................................................... 114
9: Comparison Of Marginal Effects Of Most Significant Variables Between
Interaction Models And The Basic Multi-Institutional Model ............................................... 116
10: 9/11 by Human Rights Terror ............................................................................................... 125
11: Model K: 9/11 by Commie No Commie .............................................................................. 128
12: Model L: 9/11 by Trade ........................................................................................................ 130
13: Model M: Nine Eleven by Military Aid ............................................................................... 132
14: Model N: 9/11 by Top Ten Fraud ......................................................................................... 134
15: Comparison Of Marginal Effects Of Most Significant Variables Between
Interaction Models J-N And The Basic Multi-Institutional Model ..................................... 137
16: Model O: Judicial Type by Total Case ................................................................................. 147
17: Model P: Judicial Type by Presidential Ideology ................................................................. 149
18: Model Q: Judicial Type by Congressional Ideology ............................................................ 151
19: Model R: Judicial Type by Mean Ideology .......................................................................... 153
20: Model S: Judicial Type by Military ID ................................................................................. 155

xi

List of Tables - Continued

21: Model T: Judicial Type by Communist ................................................................................ 156
22: Model U: Judicial Type by Trade ......................................................................................... 158
23: Model V: Judicial Type by Top Ten ..................................................................................... 160
24: Model W: Judicial Type by Human Rights Terror ............................................................... 162
25: Model X: Judicial Type by Enforcement Hearings .............................................................. 163
26: Model Y: Judicial Type by Human Rights Hearings ............................................................ 165

xii

LIST OF FIGURES

1: Effect On Probability Of Asylum Success By Human Rights Hearings/ Human Rights
Record Interaction With All Other Variables At Mean. ................................................................ 104
2: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Enforcement Hearings/
Military Aid Interaction ............................................................................................................................ 107
3: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Enforcement Hearings/
Communist Interaction ............................................................................................................................ 109
4: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Enforcement Hearings/ Top Ten Fraud
Interaction all other variable at mean. ............................................................................................... 113
5: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Timescount/ Human Rights Record
Interaction ..................................................................................................................................................... 115

6: Model J: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by 9/11 Human Rights Record
Interaction ..................................................................................................................................................... 127
7: Model K: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by
Communist Ideology Interaction .......................................................................................................... 129
8: Model L: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by 9/11/ Trade Interaction ................. 131
9: Model M: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by 9/11 Military Aid Interaction ...... 133

10: Model N: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by 9/11 /
Top-Ten Fraud Interaction .................................................................................................................. 135
11: Model O: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/
Total Case Interaction .......................................................................................................................... 148
12: Model P: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Presidential Ideology
Interaction ................................................................................................................................................. 150
13: Model Q: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Congressional
Ideology Interaction ............................................................................................................................... 152
14: Model R: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Mean Immigration
Court Ideology Interaction .................................................................................................................. 154
15: Model T: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Communist
Interaction ................................................................................................................................................. 157
xiii

List of Figures - Continued

16: Model U: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/
Trade Interaction .................................................................................................................................... 159
17: Model V: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Top Ten
Fraud Interaction .................................................................................................................................... 161

18: Model X: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Number of
Enforcement Hearings Interaction................................................................................................... 164
19: Model Y: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/
Human rts hearings Interaction ........................................................................................................ 166

xiv

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
In 2006 the Romeike family removed their children from public school in Germany
(Romeike v. Holder, 718 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2013)),. As devout Christians they believed that the
secular nature of German public education undermined their children’s faith. It was the
Romeike’s hope that they could home school their children in accordance with their religious
faith. Unfortunately for them, German law prohibits home schooling. 1. In the ensuing months the
local government attempted a number of methods in an attempt to get the Romeikes to follow
German law. These included levying significant fines, physically forcing the children to attend
school and threatening to remove the children from their home. Facing mounting financial
hardship and fearing that their children would be taken from them; the Romeikes decided to
leave their home.
In August of 2008 the Romeike family left Germany to come to the United States (718
F.3d at 530). Upon arrival, the Romeikes asserted that they were entitled to protection under the
asylum laws of the United States based upon claims that the German government had targeted
them for punishment because of their religious faith. Specifically, they claimed that in seeking to
enforce the law banning homeschooling, the German government was targeting them because of
their conservative religious views. 2 On January 26, 2010 they were granted asylum by
immigration judge Lawrence Burman in Tennessee.
On its face the Romeike case might seem unremarkable. Just like thousands of other
petitioners whose cases are heard every year, in immigration courts around the country, the
Romeikes were seeking the protection afforded by asylum. Judge Burman, like dozens of other
1

German officials claim that the law promotes integration into society.
The Romeikes had faced mounting fines as well as at least two attempts to physically force the
children to attend school.
2

1

immigration judges handing down decisions on that particular day was tasked with the job of
determining whether the petitioners before him qualified for this protection. Although the
persecution faced by the Romeikes differs from torture or the threat of death that is
stereotypically associated with the grant of asylum, the image of a government taking away
someone’s children is similarly chilling. However, despite the apparent normalcy of the Romeike
case, if you take the time to examine its facts, it is apparent that judge Burman’s decision was far
from ordinary. Petitioners like the Romeikes had been denied asylum repeatedly in immigration
courts across the United States. What then can explain the actions of judge Burman? Was this
simply a case of a judge basing his decision on personal preferences or attitudes? Was he
responding to political pressure from Congress or the Department of Homeland Security? Did
public support for the Romeikes influence his decision? Is he simply a rogue judge who is no
way indicative of the behavior of other immigration judges? Despite a number of efforts to
explain what factors influence the behavior of immigration judges in asylum cases, no model has
adequately explained the factors that influence this important decision. This dissertation offers a
unified model of administrative lawmaking which reveals that a multitude of factors come into
play when an immigration judge makes a decision to grant or deny asylum.

Immigration Judges and Asylum
Each year tens of thousands of people like the Romeikes, petition for the protections
afforded by asylum law in the United States. These petitioners come from countries all over the
world. Some of them merely apply for asylum to prolong the time period before they are forced
to leave. Many others are fleeing tragic circumstances in their home countries. In order to obtain
asylum protections in the United States an applicant must convince an immigration judge that
he/she is:
2

unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion (US 27 Jan. 2006, 3; US n.d.g;
US May 2006, 1).
While the determination whether someone meets this definition might at first appear to be based
upon a relatively straightforward legal analysis, the unique position of immigration judges within
the federal bureaucracy complicates matters significantly.
Unlike federal district and appellate judges, who are governed by Article III of the US
Constitution, immigration judges belong to a subset of the judiciary who work within the federal
bureaucracy as administrative law judges (ALJs). 3. Because of their position within the federal
bureaucracy, ALJs must deal with an array of constraints unheard of by Article III judges. One of
the primary differences is that as federal bureaucrats, ALJs are under the control and supervision
of the executive branch. As such their direct supervisors are the officials of the agency whose
actions they adjudicate. Because of this position, administrative law courts are often referred to
as “quasi-judicial,” in that they lack the freedom from direct influence that characterizes federal
district and appellate courts (Marshall, Merrill, Shane, 1992).
Immigration judges serve as the primary adjudicators of immigration claims brought in
the United States. As such their principal role is in helping to fulfill the immigration based policy
goals of the agency they work for, the Department of Homeland Security. 4. Immigration policy
in United States is based upon the central goal of controlling who can legally reside in the
country. Who gets in is as much a practical as it is a political question. It must be practical
3

Article III of the Constitution states “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”. Article III federal courts below the Supreme Court are established by Congress
but operate without direct interference by the executive or legislative branches.
4
Following 9/11, control over immigration decisions was placed under the Department of
Homeland Security.
3

because of the need of US businesses for foreign labor and because there are many more people
who want to come than who we want to take. It is political in that different domestic and foreign
policy interests are served or thwarted by these decisions. Asylum applicants like the Romeikes
have the potential to cause both practical and political problems for immigration policy makers.
This potential to turn immigration policy on its ear is one of factors that makes the adjudication
of asylum cases more complicated than what it would initially appear.

Why the Romeike’s Decision Was Such a Surprise
If the decision whether to grant asylum to the Romeikes was based entirely on legal
considerations, it would have been a relatively easy one. Immigration judges are supposed to
follow precedent when making their decisions. 5 In the Romeike case, a review of the applicable
precedent should have lead immigration judge Burman to deny their claim. Up to the point that
the Romeikes applied for asylum, all similarly situated asylum seekers from Germany had been
denied protection. (718 F.3d at 530). The reasoning behind these previous decisions focused on
the nature of the German law requiring students to attend school outside their homes. Because
this law applied to everyone equally, did not have a discriminatory intent and served a rational
policy goal, previous immigration judges had refused to grant asylum to previous petitioners
with similar stories as the Romeikes. When judge Burmon granted asylum to the Romeikes he
ignored these previous decisions.
The Romeikes appear to have been on the wrong side of practical considerations of
immigration policy as well. Granting asylum to the Romeike family had the potential to open the
5

A branch of judicial political science scholars as well as the legal profession argue that judicial
behavior can be explained through an understanding of precedent as it applies to the factual
scenario of a particular case. This has been labeled the Legal Model of judicial behavior. If this
model holds true the judge assigned to the Romeike case would only have to examine how
judges decided similar cases in the past and make the same decision. The relevance of the legal
model to asylum decisions will be discussed in later chapters.
4

door for asylum to all similarly situated people in the world. If one can get asylum merely by
trying to home school one’s child in a country that has restrictive homeschooling rules, it is
possible to imagine that tens of thousands of people will be applying for it in the future. Since
such people would not necessarily fill the job vacancies that immigration policy is designed to
deal with, there is the possibility that a mass of Romeike like immigrants would leave no room
for the types of immigrants our economy needs. 6 While officially such considerations should not
play into decisions to grant asylum it is difficult to see how those in charge of making
immigration policy would not be aware of the possible effect of providing the Romeike family
asylum.
The Romeike case also had the potential to cast one of our closest allies in a less than
favorable light. If the United States grants asylum to the Romeikes it is essentially stating that
Germany, one of the most progressive countries in the world, is engaging in systematic
persecution of some of its citizens because of their religious beliefs. Not only would such a
decision fly in the face of any number of human rights organizations’ evaluations of the German
government, there would also be real foreign policy ramifications for the United States. 7 It would
be naïve to believe that such considerations do not occur to the immigration judges as well as
their superiors when deciding whether to grant or deny asylum.
Ideological factors also did not appear to bode well for the Romeikes. The ideology of the
current president and the officials he appointed to supervise immigration judges might result in
some types of cases being given priority while others are ignored. Similarly, the ideology of the
6

Although the United States places caps on the total number of asyllees it will accept each year,
such caps have no practical effect on persons who are present in the United States at the time that
they file for asylum,
7
One need only look at the recent uproar in the United States over Russia’s decision to provide
refuge to Edward Snowden for an example of how asylum decisions carry real world political
consequences.
5

current legislative committees which are charged with overseeing immigration issues might play
a role. Although, several groups within the United States believe that the ability to home school
is a human right that the US government should protect, this does not necessarily mean that the
Obama administration shares these views. Exacerbating the problem for the Romeikes is the fact
that a vast majority of homeschoolers in the United States are religious conservatives who do not
make up a key constituency of the Democratic party. While such political considerations are not
supposed to be relevant in decision to grant or deny asylum, the fact that immigration judge
Burman’s bosses work for president Obama makes it difficult to see how they would not.
Thus, based upon several factors, it appears that the Romeikes should not have been
granted asylum. Legal precedent supported denying them asylum. The close ties between the
United States and Germany seemed to make it unlikely that they would be granted protection.
Germany has a very good human rights record and asylum petitioners from countries with very
good human rights records rarely are granted asylum. The current US administration is not
particularly close to the home schooling community and thus has little incentive to intervene. All
this should have created a very easy decision for the immigration judge. However, when the case
was brought before Judge Burman, he appeared to buck precedent and policy concerns in
granting the Romeikes asylum.

How Does one Explain the Behavior of Judge Burman?
Although precedent and an array of political forces seemed to push for a denial of the
Romeike’s claim, a judge sitting in Tennessee decided to provide them protection. Judge Burman
claimed that the Romeikes were eligible for asylum because, (1) they had a well-founded fear of
future persecution on account of religion, and (2) they were members of a particular social
group, namely German parents who homeschool for religious reasons (718 F.3d at 531). The fact
6

that the Department of Justice took the unusual step of appealing a grant of asylum reveals that
Judge Burman’s superiors within the executive branch were not in favor of the decision. 8.
Additionally, although the decision was well reasoned, it was not well supported by existing case
law. In fact, it was eventually overturned by first the Board of Immigration Appeals and then the
6th Circuit court of Appeals. 9. If the judge was not following precedent or the apparent desires of
his superiors, how can we explain his actions?
The answer appears to be that Judge Burman was not as constrained by precedent or
institutional constraints as his position as an ALJ would lead one to believe. An examination of
his record on asylum cases conducted by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC 2012) reveals that he is consistently sympathetic to a wide range of petitioners. He has
granted asylum to 64.7% of the asylum petitioners who have been in front of him in the last. 5
years (TRAC 2012). This is a significantly higher rate than the national average of around 50%
denial. One might be tempted to explain judge Burman’s behavior in this case as merely the
actions of an outlier with sympathies towards asylum applicants. However, a comparison of his
grant rates to the immigration judges in his same jurisdiction as well as other jurisdictions across
the country reveals a surprising level of variation.
Immigration judges, whether they preside over cases in the same court or across the
country, grant asylum to petitioners at surprisingly divergent rates (TRAC 2012). The average
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Since DOJ attorneys are forced to respond to tens of thousands of appeals from denial of relief
in immigration courts, they rarely devote the resources necessary to appeal cases here relief is
granted.
9 The BIA decision and the subsequent decision of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold
the BIA decision denying the Romeike’s asylum claim, has lead to the belief that an animus
towards religious conservatives forms the back bone of the government’s efforts to deny
protection to the Romeikes. This is despite the fact that two of the three judges 6th Circuit
judges who unanimously upheld the decision of the BIA were nominated by George W.
Bush.
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grant rate for asylum applicants in Memphis, where Judge Burman presides is less than 45%
(TRAC 2012). The average grant rate for New York City is over 60%. Even within jurisdictions
one can see huge variations. For example, in New York City, Judge Alan Vomacka grants
asylum to 33.4% of the petitioners whose cases he hears, while judge Terry Bain, who hears
cases in the same court house, grants asylum to 94.8% of the claims she adjudicates. Given that
these cases are assigned randomly, it is impossible to conclude that the variation is based solely
on the merits of the cases presented to these judges (Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag
2008). Nor could one argue that judges presiding over cases in the same court during the same
time period would face significantly different political or social pressures. Based upon these
dramatic variations, it is apparent that at least one of the primary factors that determine whether
an asylum applicant obtains protection is the judge deciding the case
Reexamining the Romeike case in light of the divergent grant rates of immigration judges
around the country reveals that they were extremely lucky to have their case before a judge who
was sympathetic to their plight. Their case also presents a number of troubling questions about
the behavior of immigration judges. Immigration judges exist in an environment in which they
should face any number of political and social pressures yet they appear to respond to these
pressures differently. We know that similarly situated petitioners have different chances of
success based solely on whose court they are assigned to. We also know that these judges
respond to extraneous pressures by granting more or fewer asylum petitions. What we don’t
know is how the individual preferences of immigration judges are effected by extraneous factors.
Would Judge Burman have decided the Romeike case differently during the Bush as opposed to
the Obama administrations? What would have happened if the Romeikes were from Canada
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rather than Germany? In essence this dissertation seeks to examine how the interplay of personal
and external factors influences how immigration judges make their decisions.

What is Behind the Variance in Asylum Grant Rates
Between Immigration Judges?
In attempting to understand the behavior of immigration judges in asylum cases, scholars
have generally taken one of three approaches. The first is through the use of principal agent
theories developed in the study of bureaucracies (See e.g. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and
Schrag 2007). In the months following 9/11 for example, success rates for asylum applicants
plummeted as security fears gripped the country (Lipko 2002). This applied to both the
sympathetic as well as the more hardline immigration judges (TRAC 2002). Similar changes to
individual immigration judge behavior can be seen after the switch from the Bush to the Obama
administration. The national average grant rate in 2008, the last year of President Bush’s term in
office was less than 40%. In the first four years of President Obama’s administration the grant
rate has risen to 50% (TRAC 2013). Studies of asylum decisions in immigration courts have also
revealed that the behavior of immigration judges is often constrained by domestic and
international policy concerns (Saleyhan & Rosenblum 2008). Using principal agent models,
developed in the study of bureaucracies, scholars have shown that officials within the executive
and legislative branches are able to promote policy goals through exerting influence on how
asylum decisions are made.
The second approach that has been used to attempt to explain the variance in immigration
judge decisions in asylum cases is to examine the decisions of immigration judges using models
formed through the study of the judiciary ( See e.g. Keith, Holmes, and Miller, 2013). Scholars
applying attitudinal approaches to the study of immigration judge behavior have concluded that
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the variation in grant rates between judges can be explained by the personal preferences of
judges (Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag 2007). In these studies, immigration judges who
are appointed during democratic regimes, or who had backgrounds in representing immigrants,
are more likely to grant asylum than those appointed during Republican regimes or with
backgrounds in enforcement. While these studies reveal a connection between personal
characteristics and likelihood to grant asylum, they do not adequately explain why the
acceptance rate of individual immigration judges fluctuate over time.
The third approach taken in previous studies has examined the role of legal factors on a
petitioner’s chance to receive a positive decision from an immigration judge. Factors such as the
human rights record of a petitioner’s country and whether the petitioner was represented by
counsel can play as important a role in determining the chance that an immigration judge grants
asylum as his or her personal characteristics (TRAC 2013).

Developing a Better Model of Asylum Adjudication
Since the personal characteristics of the judges, the policy goals of legislative and
executive officials and legal factors all appear to affect the chances that a petitioner is granted
asylum, any attempt to truly understand their behavior requires a more complex model than those
previously used. I believe that the failings of previous studies of immigration judge behavior in
asylum cases are based upon the failure to develop a model which takes into account the fact that
immigration courts operate under both judicial and bureaucratic rules. Thus in order to
understand their behavior we need to apply models developed to understand similar institutions.
Fortunately such models have been developed in the study of street level bureaucracies and
administrative law courts.
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Administrative Law Court Models
Administrative law judges hand down literally thousands of decisions ranging from clean
air to labor regulations every year. These decisions occur almost completely outside the scope of
public inquiry yet have large effects on how many of us lead our lives. Little is known of the
background of most of the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) who preside over these courts nor
has much study gone into the factors that shape their decisions. This lack of understanding is
based largely upon the unique characteristics of these institutions. Embodying characteristics of
both bureaucracies and the federal judiciary, these courts operate in arenas that do not receive
much public attention. Immigration courts are considered to be part of the administrative law
court system.
Until relatively recently, research into ALJ behavior has suffered from the same
limitations that currently plague the study of immigration judge behavior. Scholars have
generally focused on judicially centered or bureaucratically centered models to explain the
behavior of administrative law judges in a myriad of policy areas. Just as with the studies of
immigration judge behavior previous ALJ focused research failed to integrate the two strains of
research into models that can adequately explain behavior. To a large extent this failure has been
addressed by Taratoot and Howard (2011) in their work “The Labor of Judging: Examining
Administrative Law Judge Decisions.” Through an analysis of Administrative Law Judge
decisions as they relate to the National Labor Relations Board, Taratoot and Howard find that
policy preferences, while playing a large role in determining decisions, do not explain
everything. They examine the behavior of ALJs as being somewhat akin to that of Federal
District Judges who, because of their place in the bureaucracy, also face additional political
constraints that do not generally control judicial behavior. According to their research, the
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unique position of ALJ’s as quasi-judicial bodies within a bureaucratic structure both allow for a
large amount of attitudinally based discretion but also temper the exercise of that discretion
based upon a range of legislative, executive and judicial factors. In addition, they found that
exogenous factors such as unemployment rates and public opinions towards unions also play
significant roles in the behavior of these judges.

Street Level Bureaucracy Models
While the work of Taratoot and Howard provides a valuable template to model
immigration judge behavior, I question whether the model will adequately explain how these
judges handle asylum claims. Whereas most ALJs handle relatively small case loads,
immigration judges in certain jurisdictions handle hundreds of cases each year. For example, the
37 National Labor Relations Board ALJs that Taratoot and Howard tested their model on issued
207 decisions in 2012 (NLRB Fact Sheet 2012). This averages out to fewer than seven cases per
judge. Immigration judges in the busiest jurisdictions often issue dozens times that number in
asylum cases alone each year. 10. Add to that their other immigration cases and it will become
apparent that these judges are performing tasks in drastically different environments. I theorize
that in order to understand the behavior of immigration judges I will need to incorporate models
developed to explain the behavior of street-level bureaucrats into the models of Taratoot and
Howard. Studies have shown that factors such as work load and agency culture influence the
exercise of discretion by street level bureaucrats (See eg. Prottas 1979). I intend to model such
factors as they apply to immigration judge behavior in the handling of asylum cases.
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For example in 2012, Judge Van Dyke in New York handled over 1500 asylum cases in a five
year period.
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Towards a Multifaceted Approach to the Study of Immigration Judge
Behavior
A multi-institutional approach examining administrative law judges as street level
bureaucrats working within a legal context forms the framework of the research design for this
dissertation. I hypothesize that a combination of attitudinal, institutional, legal, and exogenous
factors influence Immigration judges in their decisions to grant or deny asylum. By combining
aspects of models developed in the research of various levels of the judiciary, bureaucracies and
administrative courts my hope is to be able to explain the tremendous levels of variation in the
behavior of immigration judges in the adjudication of asylum cases.

Why this Research is Important
Gaining a greater understanding of ALJs behavior in general and the behavior of
immigration judges in particular is of great importance for a number of reasons. The extent,
nature and effectiveness of the constraints placed upon these judges by the executive, judicial
and legislative branches are important within the context of the study of the scholars concerned
with bureaucracies, the judiciary and political institutions in general.
Additionally, this research has the potential to provide greater insight into the behavior of
immigration courts which have not received a great deal of scholarly attention. It is apparent
from the above discussion that there are gaps in our understanding of the nature of judicial
behavior in the asylum decision process. Previous research has been either primarily descriptive
or has failed to examine the entirety of factors which could potentially influence immigration
judges behavior. Furthermore, since previous studies of immigration judge behavior have failed
to include years following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and/or failed to consider decisions across
administrations, there exists a hole in our understanding of how these events affected judicial
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behavior. I intend to fill this gap by presenting a systematic analysis of immigration judge
decisions through the application of models used in the study of other administrative law courts
as well as bureaucracies and courts.
More broadly, this research has the potential to examine the behavior of individuals,
whether they be judges, bureaucrats or both, who make decisions outside the public eye but
whose behavior is ostensibly controlled by an array of formal and informal institutional and
societal constraints. Based upon the rather unique situation faced by immigration judges in the
asylum process, it is possible to examine the behavior of a lower level agent in a manner that
previous studies have heretofore been unable to accomplish. This research seeks not only to
determine whether some institutions have control over the behavior of a judge or bureaucrat, but
also examine the extent to which this control varies in the face of historical and political forces.

Order and Substance of Chapters
Chapter Two will be used to describe the context under which immigration judges make
decisions in general. This will include the various institutional actors that may influence
immigration judge behavior in general and asylum decisions in particular. It will also present a
historical discussion of asylum policy in the United States including a. discussion of the United
State’s obligations under international treaties. In particular it will focus on the tension between
the forces attempting to influence the United States to honor its obligations under international
refugee agreements with the desire of the United States government to use the asylum process to
further political goals.
Chapter Three of the dissertation will involve a broad literature review of the research
concerning bureaucratic and judicial behavior. It will also include a review of the literature
concerning administrative law courts and the behavior of the judges who preside over them. It
14

will conclude with a discussion of how a study of immigration judge behavior will not only
increase general understanding of ALJ behavior but also bridge a gap in the literature concerning
the behavior of judges in asylum proceedings.
Chapter Four will establish the theoretical foundation for my dissertation. It will involve
a discussion of rational choice as well as other theoretical approaches to the study of
bureaucracies, courts as well as the hybrid institutional arrangement of administrative courts.
Based upon these proposed theoretical relationships, testable hypotheses will be derived and
tested in subsequent chapters.
Chapter Five Sets forth the design of my research. It includes a discussion of the methods
used as well as setting forth the rational behind the variables that will be examined.
Chapter Six will commence the empirical testing of these hypotheses with an eye towards
comparing the accuracy of models of bureaucratic behavior and judicial behavior to a multiinstitutional approach based on the work of Taratoot and Howard (2012). I will examine the
same data set covering asylum claims for the 16 years from 1997-2013. The dependent variable
will be the decision to grant or deny protection.
In chapter Seven I intend to extend upon the work of Saleyhan and Rosenblum (2008) in
order to determine whether immigration judges change the way that they make decisions when
faced with political or societal factors. They found evidence that when Congress and the public
focus on different aspects of the immigration issue, immigration judges give more weight
towards either political or human rights variables. Because of the nature of their research,
Saleyhan and Rosenblum did not include variables which examined the characteristics of either
the immigration judges making each decision or the individual petitioners. My research will be
the first to include these variables in a study that examines how political and social factors
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influence the behavior of immigration judges.
Chapter Eight will examine how the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed
how immigration judges made their decisions. I intend to show that not only did the events of
9/11 change the rates of success of asylum applicants, but also that it changed which factors
immigration judges relied upon in making their decisions.
Chapter Nine will examine the extent that judges with different ideological backgrounds
respond differently to the same political and social influences. I intend to show that judicial
ideology not only influences the likelihood of a petitioner obtaining asylum, but also that
ideology can predict which variables a judge most focuses on in making that decision.
Chapter Ten will conclude the dissertation. It will present a summary of the findings,
discuss the policy implications of the findings as well as give ideas about possible future courses
of research.
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CHAPTER II - IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND
ASYLUM DECISIONS
Immigration judges are a type of ALJ, working within the Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR), whose principal purpose is adjudication of immigration cases
(Executive Office of Immigration Review, Information Page, 2013). The primary function of the
EOIR and immigration judges is to conduct administrative proceedings to determine the
removability of individuals in the United States.
Persons claiming asylum in the United States generally apply in one of two ways. Either
they make a claim of asylum upon entering the country or they claim the right to asylum after
they have been ordered to leave. In either situation they first present their claim to asylum
officers of the Department of Homeland Security. If a petitioner’s asylum application is denied
by one of these officers, their case is brought before an immigration judge. It is the task of
immigration judges to determine whether petitioners qualify for the protections afforded by
asylum. If an immigration judge denies a petitioner asylum the case can be appealed to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 11. Appeals of BIA decisions are brought to the federal circuit
court that has jurisdiction over the location of the immigration court.
Pursuant to the International Covenant on Refugees, the United States has an obligation
to provide refuge and/or asylum to all people who upon arrival on our shores prove that they
meet certain criteria. 12. Since the grant of asylum is dependent upon a petitioner showing that
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The BIA examines all appeals from immigration courts. On September 25, 2002, the reforms
were instituted which allowed the BIA to affirm immigration judge decisions without issuing an
opinion
12
Refugee law provides protection for persons who are outside their country of nationality
whose government is engaged in or unable to protect them from persecution based upon race,
religion, ethnicity or political opinion. (Convention on Refugee Status 1951)
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she/he was fleeing from persecution that their own state was unwilling or unable to protect them
from, it would seem natural that asylum petitioners from those countries with the worst human
rights records would have the greatest chance of success. However, decisions of who should be
granted asylum have historically been much more complex than simply adjudicating whether a
petitioner faced persecution in their home country. As with many other aspects of immigration
policy, decisions whether to grant or deny asylum often involve a number of political and social
factors which muddy an otherwise relatively straight forward process.
The ability to choose who can and who cannot legally reside within a country is central to
modern notions of state sovereignty. 13. Decisions of who can and cannot legally enter one’s
country have been the subject of political contention in the United States since the late 19th
century. 14. Modern immigration law in the United States involves a complex balancing of
political, economic and social goals. Traditionally immigration policy has focused largely upon
meeting certain economic, primarily the provision of labor. At times it has also served political
goals through the grant or denial of entrance to groups of people who are fleeing countries that
are opposed to the United States. The asylum process has the potential to undermine the
achievement of each of these goals because the decision to grant or deny asylum is not supposed
to be a political one. Whether a person is granted asylum should be based upon whether that
person meets the legal criteria set forth through international agreements. If a person from a
country that has close economic and political ties with the United States meets these criteria, the
United States must accept them even though this might cause political problems with the
petitioner’s home country. Additionally, since asylum petitioners are generally fleeing extreme
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See U.S. vs Lem Moon Sing (1895), establishing the right of the US to decide who can enter
and stay in the United States.
14
See for example the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.
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hardship, they do not necessarily come to the United States with the skills or abilities to fill
needed labor requirements. Thus, rather than helping to bolster the economy, they have the
potential to be a drain upon resources.
In essence the history of the asylum process has largely been one of tension between the
humanitarian ideals of protecting the persecuted and the political, economic and societal goals
that immigration policy seeks to obtain. This tension places immigration judges in a position
where they are tasked with making decisions based purely on the law while facing pressure from
forces who often see the law as contrary to their overall goals. In general the literature
concerning the asylum process in the United States reflects this tension. In this chapter I will
present a chronology of major changes in the use and function of asylum from the 1940s through
2011 and a description of the major channels that actors in the White House, Congress and the
courts use to influence the use of asylum and the outcomes of asylum cases.

The Two Edged Sword of Asylum Protection
The provision of protection to asylum and refugee applicants has historically presented
both a problem and a potential opportunity to the state. Asylum is a problem in that it has the
potential to essentially circumvent established immigration policy as well as cast potential allies
in a negative light. People fleeing persecution are more likely to need assistance than they are to
fill employment vacancies in the US work force. Also, a policy that provides protection based
upon a neutral set of criteria makes no differentiation between applicants from friendly countries
and those that are enemies. Because the international community looks critically upon those
states that either persecute their own citizens or fail to protect their citizens from persecution, the
provision of asylum has foreign policy implications. When the United States grants asylum to
someone fleeing persecution from one of its allies, it has the potential to cause real foreign and
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domestic problems. Casting the ally as a persecutor does not aid the relationship between both
countries. Additionally, domestic human rights groups might raise questions about why the
United States has close ties with countries that persecute their own citizens.

The Use of Asylum to Serve US Political Interests
While the provision of asylum has the potential to complicate domestic and foreign policy
decisions, it has also proven to be a valuable tool for the United States. What better way to
highlight the failings of an ideological adversary than to grant asylum to dissidents fleeing that
country? In fact for decades the asylum system provided the United States with a propaganda
tool against the Soviet Union. Beginning with the adoption of formal asylum procedures in the
1940’s and for the next four decades the United States used the grant or denial of asylum for
primarily political ends. During this period the United States made decisions regarding the grant
or denial of asylum almost completely through the lens of the Cold War (Gross 1980). Those
asylum applicants who were fleeing alleged persecution in countries that were ideologically and
politically aligned with the Soviet Union were usually granted protection, while those that fled
persecution from governments that were aligned with our interests were often turned away (Bon
Tempo 2008). Asylum in the Cold War era was largely a political tool used to call attention to
the abuses inflicted upon citizens of Communist controlled countries while at the same time
shielding friendly but often worse human rights abusing allies from condemnation (McBride
1999).
Thus asylum applicants from Communist states were granted protection as an off shoot of
the ideological battle of the Cold War, while petitioners fleeing US client states such as El
Salvador were denied protections. During the early portion of this period the United States did
not establish an official asylum policy, but rather relied on a provision of the Immigration and
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Nationality Act, to grant “parole” to anyone who the attorney general wanted. This parole power
was used to grant protections to a series of groups of people fleeing communist states, from
Hungarians to Indochinese to Cubans (Bon Tempo 2008).
In 1965 the Immigration and Nationalization Act was amended to specifically define who
qualified as a refugee as well as establish a quota for certain types of refugees. The only persons
considered refugees under this definition were those who had fled a communist country or the
Middle East because of fear of persecution. 15 Under the 1965 definition, a refugee was a person
that fit into explicit geographic and ideological bounds; he or she must have fled a communistdominated country, or the Middle East based on persecution or fear of persecution. From the end
of World War II to 1979, the U.S. accepted close to 2 million refugees under this definition. 16
During this time, officials in charge of making asylum decisions had little to no discretion
in choosing whether to extend protection to persons fleeing persecution from countries with
close ties to the United States. Rather than being centered around the provision of protection for
the most needy and desperate people in the world, U.S. asylum policy from the end of the
Second World War until the passage of the Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1980 was
explicitly designed to serve political objectives (Helton 1984). During this time period, of the 2.0
million people granted asylum by the United States, all but two thousand were from communist
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Refugees, defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended as: aliens... "(A) that
(i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion
they have fled (I) from any Communist of Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from
any country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return
to such country or area on account of race, religion or political opinion, and (iii) are not nationals
of the countries or areas in which their application for conditional entry is made; or (B) that they
are persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity as defined by the President who are unable
to return to their usual place of abode...." (Section 203(a) (7))
16
Congressional Research Service, Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies:
A Report Prepared at the Request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Washington: Library of
Congress, U.S. GPO, 1980), 131.
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states (Bockley 1995).

Refugee Act of 1980 and Changes to Asylum Adjudication
Following the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, many refugee advocates believed
that a new era had begun. The act brought a number of positive changes. By adopting the United
Nations definition of a refugee and removing any references to communism or geographic origin,
it potentially created a system in which the merits of a petitioner’s case determined likelihood of
gaining protection rather than relying on the politics of her/his home country. The act established
formal procedures whereby asylum cases would be adjudicated in immigration judges. It also
established procedures for Congressional oversight. Additionally, the 1980 Act established a
formal differentiation between refugees and asyllees. Refugees were those people granted
protection while they were still outside US jurisdiction. Asyllees were those who were granted
protection once they arrived in the United States. Up until this point, the vast majority of those
provided protection were outside the United States. Once the 1980 Act was signed this would
change dramatically as the existence of a formal process coupled with political and other crises
in neighboring states lead to a mass influx of people seeking asylum (Bockley 1995).
The 1980 reforms placed Immigration Judges in charge of making asylum decisions based
upon objective criteria. Many scholars believed that the changes in policy would succeed in
removing the political pressures on immigration judges to administer asylum in a manner that
was complimentary to US foreign policy. (See e.g. Gilbert 1998). The belief was that if
immigration judges were allowed to base their decisions on objective criteria, politics would no
longer play any part in asylum decisions, which would in turn bring the United States more in
line with the spirit of its obligations under international law. The results have been mixed.
While it is clear that the reforms succeeded in placing human rights concerns at the
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forefront of most asylum decisions, it still has failed to remove all foreign policy considerations
from the asylum process. Petitioners from countries with close ties to the United States still have
a significantly lesser chance of obtaining asylum than petitioners from countries with strained
relations. A 1988 study comparing asylum grant rates to Freedom House human rights scores
found petitioners from countries with relatively modest human rights violations were receiving
asylum at a higher rate than petitioners from countries with dreadful human rights records.
(Gibney1988). This discrepancy was based upon the inordinate success rates for petitioners from
Eastern European communist states which had relatively good human rights scores and the
extremely low rates of acceptance of petitioners from U.S. allies, such as El Salvador, that had
atrocious human rights records. During this period, U.S. immigration officials based their asylum
decisions on the belief that accepting large numbers of asylum petitions from an ally would call
attention to the fact that we were supporting a brutal dictatorship. At the same time, giving
asylum to those who fled a communist state reinforced the Cold War narrative.
In addition to the failure to remove political considerations, the discretion afforded to
immigration judges in making these decisions has created its own problems. Studies have
revealed wide variation in asylum grant rates between immigration judges (TRAC 2013). This
variation appears to be at least partly based upon the political ideology of the judge rather than
the merits of the case (Salehyan and Rosenblum 2004). Thus it appears that by insulating asylum
adjudicators from some of foreign policy pressure that characterized pre-1980 asylum policy,
what has resulted was a situation where Immigration Judges have substituted their own policy
preferences for that of the executive or Congress.
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Post Cold War Asylum Adjudication: The End to
Politically Based Asylum Decisions?
Many asylum advocates assumed that, with the end of the Cold War, asylum would no
longer be used primarily as a political tool. Gilbert (1983) argued that “the end of bi-polarism
has led to a decrease in asylum seeker’s strategic and political value to States who had been
eager to use their ‘persecution’ as a justification for confrontation.” While Gilbert made this
argument with the aim of creating a more comprehensive set of laws to provide protection to
those seeking asylum, his premise, that the end of the Cold War will limit the role of politics in
the asylum process, was based more on hope than any empirical. evidence. Gilbert never
engaged in the type of analysis necessary to determine whether changes to the law of asylum
actually resulted in substantive changes to the way asylum was adjudicated within the United
States.
Subsequent quantitative examination of this subject has revealed that Gilbert’s
predictions regarding the end of politics in the asylum process were premature. A number of
studies examining the grant of asylum following the end of the Cold War have found that politics
political factors still play an important role in asylum decisions. Asylum petitioners from
countries with close economic ties to the United States and those that receive its military support
are granted asylum at a lower rate than similarly situated petitioners from countries that do not
have these ties. (Salehyan and Rosenblum (2004). Conversely, petitioners from countries that
have ideological differences with the United States are more likely to obtain asylum than
petitioners from ideological allies.
Studies have also shown that the domestic political and social climate in the United States
also affects how immigration judges behave in asylum cases. (Salehyan & Rosenblum 2008).
These studies have shown that media and congressional attention to asylum issues has a range of
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effects on judicial behavior depending upon the type of attention. When the media focused on
asylum issues, asylum judges pay more attention to the humanitarian records of the applicants
home country when making decisions as opposed to the policy goals of the executive.
Congressional attention on the issue of asylum has two possible effects. If the attention is
focused on enforcement, immigration judges focus more on the policy goals of the executive.
When Congressional attention is focused on humanitarian issues then the human rights record of
the petitioner’s country of origin plays a greater role.

Adjudication of Asylum After 9/11: Attempts to Reign in
Immigration Judge Discretion
The central gate keeping role of immigration judges reached public consciousness almost
immediately following the fall of the twin towers (Greenhouse 2011). These attacks galvanized
public opinion in the United States to an extent that had not been seen since the start of the
Second World War. During the weeks and months following these events, Congress quickly
passed a number of laws which expanded federal power and transformed how intelligence,
defense and immigration were administered. Since all of the hijackers were legally within the
United States, and since most of them had overstayed their visas, attention was immediately
focused on perceived loopholes within the immigration system. To a very real extent, the
problems within the immigration system were seen as significant factors in the failure to protect
the United States from terrorist attack.
Several wide ranging reforms were quickly adopted in response to this assumed
deficiency in immigration policy (Rosenblum & Kandel 2011). Included in these changes was
the merging of the Immigration and Nationalization Service into the newly created Department
of Homeland Security. Furthermore, in an effort to streamline the appellate process and reduce
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the backlog of cases that was allowing thousands of immigrants to remain in the United States
after their visas expired, changes were made to the Board of Immigration Appeals to allow for
summary affirmations (Rosenblum 2011).
The Real ID Act, passed by Congress in 2005, was another example how security
concerns could influence the behavior of immigration judges in asylum cases. This law placed
additional requirements on petitioners to provide evidence that they feared persecution should
they be forced to return to their home countries.
The effects of these changes have been widespread and significant. A number of studies
have examined how immigration judge’s decisions on asylum have been influenced by these
reforms (TRAC 2013). Several have focused on changes in the ability of the executive branch to
influence immigration judge’s decisions (Salehyan et al. 2008, Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and
Philip G. Schrag 2008, Schoenholtz 2005). These studies have shown that following the events
of 9/11, U.S. policy towards overseas refugees has changed. Not only have the success rates of
asylum applicants reduced but also the total numbers of overseas grants of asylum. The wars in
response to 9/11 have also resulted in shifts in asylum policy. Despite the terrible human rights
conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, political concerns surrounding the war on terror have
prevented the United States from granting overseas asylum to people from those countries
(Waibsnaider 2006).

Variance Between Judges in the Grant of Asylum
As scholars have applied more advanced and rigorous quantitative approaches to the
study of immigration judge behavior, they have found that in addition to the role of political and
social factors in asylum decisions, there also is a wide variance in success rates between judges.
These studies have found that petitioners in the same immigration court can see their probability
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of success vary from 10% to 90% merely based upon which judge they are in front of (RamjiNogales, Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag 2008, TRAC 2013)
A number of other studies have examined whether the events of 9/11 have resulted in
lower rates of success for asylum applicants from Muslim majority countries. In his note,
“Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11”, Schoenholtz (2005) describes a
significant decline in rates of asylum success in two major immigration courts, Houston and Los
Angeles. Amnesty International has also documented a “significant backlash against refugees
and asylum seekers due to their national or ethnic or religious beliefs.” 17

Asylum in the Age of Obama
In their most recent study of immigration judge asylum decisions, Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) found a significant change in the rates that immigration judges
are granting asylum (TRAC 2013). TRAC has been examining the record of every immigration
judge who handles at least one hundred asylum claims a year since 1994. Results for 2010 and
2011 revealed a substantial change in rates that immigration judges granted asylum. On average,
judges in every court granted asylum at dramatically higher rates in those years than in previous
years of the study. The only significant difference that the study revealed was an increase in the
success rate of those asylum applicants who were represented by counsel during these years as
opposed to previous years under study. The TRAC study does not include any variables related
to congressional, executive or judicial changes which might have contributed to this change in
immigration judge behavior.
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The Role of Institutions in Curbing Immigration Judge Behavior
Since asylum decisions have foreign policy consequences and often involve issues that
have domestic parallels, there has always been a political element to the decision and the
potential for interference from all three branches of government. Immigration judges make
decisions amidst a complex web of political institutions. As employees of the Department of
Justice the President is essentially their boss. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives
have committees that exercise oversight functions over their actions. Additionally, all of their
decisions are subject to judicial review.
Executive Branch Influence Over IJ Behavior
Through the control of the executive branch, presidents have the ability to attempt to
influence all members of the bureaucracy. Different executive regimes have different domestic
and foreign policy goals. As agents of an executive branch, one of the primary job
responsibilities of immigration judges is to help meet these goals. Political appointees at the top
of these agencies have every incentive to try to influence the decisions of immigration judges.
While the Asylum Act of 1980 forbids direct political involvement in decisions to grant asylum
there are a number of indirect ways that the executive might be able to manipulate the process.
One of the ways that the executive might be able to influence how IJs make their
decisions is through the manipulation of State Department Country Reports. Previous studies
have revealed how State Department Country reports are influenced by political factors
(DeNeufville 1986). Since decisions to grant asylum are often based upon the human rights
record of the petitioner’s country of origin, and since most immigration judges rely upon State
Department country reports for this human rights record, the executive has the capacity to
influence decisions by influencing these country reports.
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Additionally, the executive can potentially influence immigration judge behavior through
the manipulation of advisory opinions of the Bureau of Democracy, Human rights and Labor. Up
until 2012, this bureau within the State Department was required to issue an advisory opinion on
each asylum applicant. There is at least anecdotal evidence that these recommendations are
almost always followed by immigration judges. The ability to influence these recommendations
would provide the executive with an even more direct route to influence asylum decisions.
At times the executive has taken direct steps to influence the behavior of immigration
judges who were exercising their discretion in an egregious manner. Following 9/11 many
immigration judges handed down blatantly biased decisions denying asylum. Responding to
pressure from immigration rights advocates, attorney general Alberto Gonzales issued a harsh
rebuke of immigration judges’ treatment of asylum applicants (Liptak 2006).
Legislative Influence over Immigration Judge Behavior
Not to be left out, the Congress has often stepped in to attempt to control the behavior of
immigration judges. Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to
regulate immigration. Since asylum issues are a part of overall immigration into the United
States, policies related to the grant or denial of asylum are often included in overall efforts to
reform immigration. Depending upon the impetus of the reform effort, immigration reform is
generally focused either on enforcement or humanitarian concerns. In those circumstances where
legislative attention is drawn towards curbing the flow of illegal immigration, asylum regulations
are often tightened as well (Saleyhan et al. 2002). In those periods where the legislature is
focused on human rights issues, asylum regulations are sometimes modified to allow greater
chances of success. Although the trickle of immigrants who arrive through the asylum process is
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dwarfed by other avenues of entry, legislative attempts to reform immigration invariably have
real impacts success rates of those seeking protection.
Judicial Influence over Immigration Judge Behavior
Federal courts have also attempted to reign in the behavior of immigration judges who
stray too far from international and domestic obligations under the Refugee Treaty and the 1980
Asylum Act (Floss 2006). 18 Circuit courts have provided some of the most vocal criticism of the
behavior of immigration judges in the years following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Liptak 2005).
In an almost unprecedented decision, the Second Circuit. court of appeals removed. immigration
judges in two separate cases following particularly egregious actions towards asylum applicants
(Hurwitz 2010). While the sheer number of asylum cases being brought to the federal courts of
appeals has often limited the ability of these courts to overturn every erroneous decision,
appellate courts have often been instrumental in checking the politically motivated interventions
of the legislative and executive branches (Floss 2006).

How Constrained are Immigration Judges in the
Adjudication of Asylum Claims
Based upon the above discussion, it appears that a large number of forces potentially
constrain immigration judges’ ability to exercise their discretion in the grant or denial of asylum.
The literature on IJ behavior in asylum decisions presents a rather complex web. At different
times, institutional structures have either limited or increased the ability of these judges to act
independently. Historical events appear to play a role as well. Both the executive and legislative
branch appear to have at different times taken actions which can alter the manner in which
immigration judges can exercise their discretion. Where then does this leave us in creating a
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model that will explain the how immigration judges make decisions? The apparent influence of
political institutions on their decisions as well as their position within the federal bureaucratic
system might lead one to believe that models formed through the study of bureaucracies would
provide the best fit. However, the evidence of ideologically based decisions as well as the nature
of their jobs as adjudicators suggests that models developed to study the judiciary. In order to
develop a model that properly fits these uniquely situated actors it is first necessary to examine
the relevant judicial and bureaucratic literature. This examination is undertaken in chapter 3.
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CHAPTER III: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
BUREAUCRATS OR JUDGES?
Introduction
A central problem in representative democracy is how to ensure that policy decisions are
responsive to the interests or preferences of citizens (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987 p. 243)
when administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not
political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to
manipulate its offices (Wilson 1887 p. 210)
When examining the problems associated with modern representative Democracy one is
often faced with the contradiction ensconced within these two quotes. It is frequently opined that
the problem with our current political system is that it is not responsive enough. One need only
examine the discrepancy between public opinion polls in favor of issues such as same sex
marriage or legalization of cannabis and laws and law makers who oppose these issues to
provide evidence that our political decisions do not always appear to mirror the preferences of
the public. 19 However, one need only look at the success of constitutional challenges to then
popular Jim Crow laws in the American south during the 1960’s to provide support for the
conclusion that sometimes the desires of the majority should not always govern policy. The
United States Constitution sets forth the institutional structure that is designed to provide a
balance between popular control of policy decisions and the protection of certain minority rights
from the politically powerful. In reality the balance has been extremely difficult to manage.
Where this system becomes particularly muddled is in those situations where elected officials
delegate policy decisions to unelected agents. To what extent are these agents supposed to act in
accordance with the will of the people? To what extent are they supposed to protect minority
interests?
19

An April 4, 2013 Pew Research poll showed that for the first time a majority of Americans
support legalizing Cannabis. A May 2013 Pew Research Poll showed for the first time that a
majority of Americans favor same sex marriage rights.
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Judges and Bureaucrats as Cornerstones of Liberal Democracy
In essence federal bureaucratic and judicial systems were established to address the
fundamental flaw of modern liberal democratic governments, namely the potential that the
politically powerful will dominate the politically weak. While the assumption of early
democratic scholars was that by limiting the power of the government one could protect minority
interests from the tyranny of the majority, history has also taught us that limits to the power of
government can also protect majority interests from the economic and politically powerful elites
who might exert inordinate influence in even democratic states 20 (See eg. Adams 1788). Our
founders recognized that a truly democratic system, with no institutional constraints upon the
power of the government, would result in a form of government in which the politically powerful
can persecute the politically weak.
If the core of modern liberal democracies is limited government, the question then arises
as to who will limit the government. It is naive to assume that the politically powerful will limit
themselves. This is true whether political power rests in the majority or with the elite. In true
democracies the majority believes it has the right to determine the fate of the minority because
that is the basic definition of representative democracy. In aristocracies the elite believe that they
know what is best for the masses because they are smarter and more accomplished. Our system
of representative democracy combines the deficiencies of both of these forms of government as it
relates to the protection of the politically weak.
Whereas Madison believed that by electing representatives the country could, “Refine
and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
20

Fear of “tyranny of the majority” has been part of political discourse in the United States since
the late 18th century. However, scholars such as Olson(1965) have found that well organized
minority interests often have greater ability to achieve their desired results than majority
populations which oppose them.
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whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.” (Madison, Federalist Paper
No. 10) He also recognized that the transfer of control from the many to the few did little on its
own to ensure that the interests of the politically powerless are protected. The need to protect
against “the aggressions of interested majorities on the rights of minorities and of individuals,”
formed the basis of Madison’s support for a Bill of Rights which would limit governmental
power. Unfortunately, even the great accomplishment of getting these rights added to the
Constitution did little to guarantee that the rights of the politically weak would be respected. So
long as decisions as to whether a governmental action violated the Constitution was in the hands
of elected officials, the concerns of those who did not hold political power would not be
protected. When majorities take over the legislative and executive branches, their concern is
primarily for the maintenance of the majority, not the protection of the minority. Similarly, when
groups representing the politically powerful gain control over aspects of the state, their actions
are centered around exploiting this control for themselves rather than the masses.
The Need for Non-Elected Decision Makers
Thus, history has taught us that since the political process cannot guarantee limited
government, those guarantees must be outside of the political realm. In the form of the federal
judiciary we accomplish this through nominations rather than elections. 21. In the form of the
bureaucracy we accomplish this through reliance on professional hiring requirements based upon
expertise rather than appeal at the ballot box. We attempt to limit our concerns over the antidemocratic nature of these powerful institutions through our faith in expertise as a source of
wisdom. The idea that wisdom often comes not from the masses but from the educated elite is
thus enshrined in modern democracy. As a result we have placed our faith in unelected experts as
21

The wisdom of this faith in the objectivity of the judiciary will be considered in subsequent
discussions of judicial behavior framed by the work of Segal and Spaeth (1993)
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last lines of defense to ensure that the politically powerful respect the limits of government and
the minority interests the Constitution enshrines.
In both cases, independent judges and a professionalized bureaucracy are given the power
and discretion to make decisions in a sphere at least ostensibly separated from the demands of
the political process. By insulating both bureaucrats and judges from the demands of getting
elected, it is believed that they will be free to make decisions based upon rationally sound
principles, rather than the irrational desires of the populace. In this idealized vision, judges are
seen to be driven by the presence of centuries of precedent encapsulating the wisdom of
generations of legal experts. Professional bureaucrats, protected from political meddling, are
specialists who make decisions based upon sound, scientific analysis as opposed to the demands
of an ill-informed citizenry. Based upon this vision of the role of bureaucracies and the judiciary,
the power of the modern state cannot be left solely in the hands of politicians, precisely because
these politicians are too accountable to the people.
Independence as Blessing and Curse
From this basic idea of these institutional arrangements we see both the blessing and
curse of placing power in the hands of individuals who are not accountable to the people. By
allowing these actors the space to make decisions without facing political repercussions, we hope
to create a situation where well-educated and experienced people can make the type of rational
yet unpopular decisions that are too risky for politicians to make. In this approach judges and
bureaucrats are provided the discretion to make decisions that are guided by professional norms
rather than political concerns. Judges are tasked with the fundamental job of interpreting the
constitution, a job that is difficult to accomplish for people whose primary goal is to get
reelected. The US Constitution protects minority interests from the majority, while politicians
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need to make the majority happy in order to win elections. Thus we have developed, at least on
the federal level, a system whereby extremely qualified. people are sheltered from concern over
the next election and given the task of interpreting laws and the Constitution according to
impartial legal principles.
Similarly, as the power of government increased throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, it
became apparent that the instruments of this state power were too often used to serve the
purposes of the political parties in power. The excesses of Tammany Hall and scandal plagued
administrations of Harding and Grant, revealed that the spoils system, wherein jobs within the
government were given to political supporters of the party in power, lead to incredible levels of
waste, corruption and unequal distribution of state resources. An independent professional
bureaucratic work force, protected from politically motivated reprisals, was designed to remedy
such excesses.
The problem with both of these arrangements is that the politically powerful want to have
policy reflect their preferences. Whether the politically powerful are the majority or those who
use wealth or other sources exert disproportionate control over political resources, they still
demand that the political process produce results that are in keeping with their desires. When this
does not occur, political pressure rises to reign in the discretion of the judiciary and the
bureaucracy. Unfortunately political pressure which attempts to make these institutions more
accountable to the politically powerful undermines the professionalism which forms the
foundations of these institutions. This debate between reliance on the professionals to make
decisions or allowing decisions to be controlled through the political process shapes much of the
scholarship involving bureaucracies and the judiciary.
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Policy Decisions Based upon Personal Preferences Rather than Expertise
A troubling third option also emerges that complicates the professional versus political
debate. What if removing outside political pressure from judges and bureaucrats does not lead to
decisions based upon the objectively rational standards of their profession but rather just allows
the bureaucrat or judge to substitute his or her political preferences for that of the majority? This
is problematic in that instead of insulating important decisions from political pressure, it merely
replaces the political process with the policy preferences of unelected individuals. If by
providing the level of autonomy needed to exercise discretion we are giving these actors the
ability to make decisions based upon their own preferences, we have created a system of petty
dictatorships amidst our democracy. As scholars of the judiciary and bureaucracy have examined
the behavior of these institutions it has become apparent that the attitudes of the actors more so
than politics or professionalism influence their decisions (Segal & Spaeth 1993).
The primary goal of this chapter is to examine how theories developed to explain the
behavior of judges and bureaucrats can help to understand the behavior of ALJs in general and
immigration judges in particular. Since ALJs occupy positions that straddle the bureaucratic and
judicial worlds, any study of their behavior must examine research from both of these worlds.
From this literature review I will build my model of ALJ behavior.

Understanding Immigration Judge Behavior through the Lens of Previous
Studies of Judicial Behavior
Legal vs. Attitudinal Models of Judicial Behavior
Judicial scholars have recognized that judges are far from the neutral arbiters of justice
they are so commonly mythologized as. Rather, they have policy goals which they seek to meet
within the context of the institution in which they work. The first and most influential work on
the effects of policy goals on judicial behavior was conducted by Jeffrey Segal and Harold
37

Spaeth (1993). Their work presented testable empirical evidence that judicial behavior on the
United States Supreme Court is a reflection of the policy preferences of the justices. They were
able to show that at least in regards to highly politically salient cases on the US. Supreme Court,
policy preferences explained judicial behavior more so than precedent. In other words, liberal
judges voted more liberally than conservative judges on a range of issues. While this study was
ground breaking it had a number of limitations. It was limited as to how the ideology of justices
was determined, largely relying on secondary sources to estimate preferences. Additionally it
was limited due to the extremely narrow range of situations that it applied to. The attitudinal
model as laid out by Segal and Spaeth only applied to a small sub set of the judicial system, the
Supreme Court, only on certain salient issues, and only on final votes on the merits.
Although limited in some ways, Segal and Spaeth (1993) spurred an incredible wave of
research into how scientific approaches in general and rational choice in particular could shed
light into the study of the courts. Although Segal and Spaeth do not refer to their study as being
based in this theory, it is apparent that the attitudinal model is a simple rational choice model.. 22
As with Downs (1957), they sought and found what they determined to be a unifying goal which
motivated the behavior of Supreme Court justices, namely the desire to achieve preferred policy
outcomes. Also like both Downs and Olson (1965), they largely ignored the role of institutional
constraints in their model. Segal and Spaeth argued that they could do this because Supreme
Court justices have life tenure, do not seek higher office, cannot be removed (essentially) and
have virtually no chance of being overturned and set the Court’s agenda. While subsequent
studies generally have failed to refute Segal and Spaeth’s findings regarding Supreme Court
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But see Rohde & Spaeth (1976), which poses an attitudinal approach based upon rational
choice theory.
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votes on the merits, interesting questions remained regarding other aspects of judicial decision
making where institutional constraints may be more present such as in other courts.
One of the central assumptions that forms the basis of the attitudinal model of judicial
behavior is the belief that at the level of the Supreme Court of the United States, institutional
constraints are so diminished that judges are essentially free to vote based upon their sincere
preferences. From this central idea of judicial behavior developed an essential corollary, if
Supreme Court Justices are free to behave in accordance with their preferences because they are
largely free from institutional constraints, other levels of the judiciary will be increasingly less
free to act in accordance with their preferences as the level of institutional constraints upon them
increases. A number of scholars have examined this assumption.
Applying the Attitudinal Model to Lower Courts
Studies have shown judicial behavior below the level of the US Supreme Court also have
shown both the prevalence of attitudinally based behavior and the influence of institutions in
constraining this behavior. State Supreme Court justices make decisions based upon their
ideological preferences even in the presence of institutional constraints. (Langer 2002).
However, because state supreme court justices are most often elected, because it is easier for
state constitutions to be changed, and because legislators and governors have some control over
retention, justices on those courts are much more limited in how they can express their
preferences. Studies have shown that the amount of influence exercised by legislators and
governors was proportional to the saliency of the issues. When institutional rules, such as method
of retention, and political conditions, such as ease in amendment passage, facilitate retaliation,
justices are expected to engage in strategic behavior, namely voting against their first preference.
This does not mean that these judges are not behaving in a rational manner but rather that the
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extent to which they are able to achieve their first preferences are based upon institutional
constraints.
Despite several studies that have shown that lower courts are not as constrained as the
attitudinal model initially might have predicted, it is still widely assumed that the ability of
judges to act according to their sincere political beliefs is effectively controlled by the
institutional limitations inherent in the hierarchical nature of the judicial system. (See eg.
Hettinger, Lindquist & Martinek 2004; Segal & Spaeth 1993 and 2002; Songer, Cameron, and
Segal 1994). In particular, scholars have determined that even where there is little to no risk of
reversal, lower court judges follow precedent of higher courts in making their decisions. (Songer,
Ginn and Sarver 2003)
Constraints to Attitudinal Behavior: Strategic Decision Making
Following the publishing of Segal and Spaeth’s work, several scholars of the US
Supreme Court attacked the assumption that Supreme Court justices are able to make decisions
in an arena devoid of institutional constraints. Research examined the extent to which justices are
free to act according to their sincere preferences. After close examination of records concerning
the inner workings of the Supreme Court, scholars determined that the attitudinal model did not
always explain the behavior of justices. At certain times it appeared that justices would vote
against their first preference as a strategy in order to achieve success at a later date. From this
research emerged the parameters of the Strategic Model. Justices act strategically when they take
positions on issues that are different from their ideal positions out of a desire to get a better result
than would have occurred if they held strictly to their convictions. (Maltzman, Spriggs and
Wahlbeck 2000). A justice might modify his or her stance on an issue in order to obtain support
from a justice who is on the fence. Additionally, the position of the Chief Justice (or the most
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senior member of the majority when the Chief Justice is in the minority) in determining who
drafts the majority opinion allows for strategic behavior in that he is much more likely to give
this assignment to a justice who holds the most similar views on the issue.
It is important to note that studies based upon the strategic model still relied upon the
basic assumptions of the rational choice model in that they assume that judges will seek to
maximize their policy preferences. What is revealed, however, is that even the judges who
appear to have the least institutional constraints are limited in the extent that they can behave as a
pure rational choice model would predict. In other words, institutions mater, and they matter no
matter what level of the judicial hierarchy one presides over (Hall 1992, Epstein and Knight
2000, Hall and Brace 1985).
Constraints on application of the Attitudinal Model: The Influence of Legal and
Political Factors on Judicial Decision Making
The influence of legal and political institutions also appears to limit the application of the
attitudinal model to the Supreme Court as well as lower courts. Studies have found that
precedent as well as political influence from the legislative and executive branches affect judicial
decision making (Bailey and Maltzman 2011). All levels of federal courts show increased levels
of deference in regards to political questions and the act of state doctrine. during times of
national security crises. (Fix and Randazzo) Scholars have been unable, however, to directly link
changes in federal judicial behavior to political changes in the executive and legislative branches.
(Revesz 2001)
Studies of federal circuit courts have also shown that judges have a number of often
conflicting goals: (1) promote policies consistent with their policy preferences; (2) reach
decisions that are legally sound; (3)maintain coherence in existing law and (4)limit the time
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spent deciding any one case. (Klein 2002) The extent to which judges are able to accomplish
these goals are constrained by case facts and precedent.
Scholars have also found that federal judges respond to characteristics of the petitioners
before them in making their decisions. The Solicitor General enjoys tremendous success in front
of the Supreme Court. (See eg. Bailey, Kamoie and Maltzman 2005). Petitioners with greater
resources enjoy greater levels of success in federal courts of appeals,(Songer and Sheehan 1992).
and even in state supreme courts (Brace and Hall 2001).
Applying the Literature of Judicial Politics to Immigration Judges
In examining the literature surrounding judicial behavior we are left with a more
complicated picture than that laid out by scholars of either the legal or attitudinal models. While
it appears that the proclivity of judges to act in accordance with their policy preferences extends
beyond the level of the Supreme Court to lower federal and state courts, there exist a number of
constraints that potentially limit the ability/willingness of judges to sincerely act in accordance
with their preferences. Interestingly, these factors do not seem to be constant. It appears that
although attitudes matter, they are not the determining factor at all times. In other words,
sometimes judges are more free to behave attitudinally than others. Thus, the pertinent question
when examining the behavior of judges within any court is to determine what factors limit the
judge from behaving sincerely according to his/her preferences, and then determine when or
where these factors come into play.
In the study of immigration judge behavior, the complexity of judicial behavior is
compounded by the fact that these judges are also bureaucrats. Despite several studies that have
shown that lower courts are not as constrained as the attitudinal model initially might have
predicted, it is still widely assumed that the ability of judges to act according to their sincere
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political beliefs is effectively controlled by the institutional limitations inherent in the
hierarchical nature of the judicial system. (See eg. Hettinger, Lindquist & Martinek 2004; Segal
& Spaeth 1993 and 2002; Songer, Cameron, and Segal 1994; Songer, Ginn and Sarver 2003).
Based upon these assumptions the level of the judiciary that would appear to have the least
amount of ability to act attitudinally would be administrative law judges.. Possessing virtually
none of the characteristics that allow the Supreme Court justices to act in accordance with their
policy preferences, ALJs to some extent represent a least likely case study of the attitudinal
model. In particular, the position of immigration judges within the federal bureaucracy would
seem to further limit the ability of these judges to act in accordance with this preferences.
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag (2008) applied lessons learned
through the judicial literature to determine that a number of political , economic and social
factors influence relative grant rates of asylum between various immigration courts, the Board of
Immigration Appeals and the courts of appeals. Although they are more concerned with
determining what individual immigration judge characteristics influence likelihood to grant
asylum than characteristics of the countries of origin of the petitioners, the study provides useful
insight into the possibility that factors outside of the facts of the cases potentially play a role in
the asylum decisions. In the years since this study was initially conducted we have seen dramatic
fluctuations in the success rates of asylum applicants from year to year (TRAC 2013).
A number of other studies have examined whether the events of 9/11 have resulted in
lower rates of success for asylum applicants. Schoenholtz (2005) describes a significant decline
in rates of asylum success in two major immigration courts, Houston and Los Angeles. Amnesty
International has also documented a “significant backlash against refugees and asylum seekers
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due to their national or ethnic or religious beliefs.” 23
In their most recent study of immigration judge asylum decisions, the Transactional
Records Clearinghouse (TRAC) found a significant change in the rates that immigration judges
are granting asylum (TRAC 2013). TRAC has been examining the record of every immigration
judge who handles at least one hundred asylum claims a year since 1994. Results for 2010 and
2011 revealed a substantial change in rates that immigration judges granted asylum. On average,
judges in every court granted asylum at dramatically higher rates in those years than in previous
years of the study. The only significant difference that the study revealed was an increase in the
success rate of those asylum applicants who were represented by counsel during these years as
opposed to previous years under study. The TRAC study does not include any variables related
to congressional, executive or judicial changes which might have contributed to this change in
immigration judge behavior.
The TRAC study, combined with the other research that has been conducted concerning
immigration judge behavior in asylum cases presents an interesting puzzle. If the behavior of
these judges can best be explained through the attitudinal model, it is difficult to understand how
success rates have fluctuated so often with exogenous factors. Keith, Holmes and Miller (2013)
developed a cognitive theory of judicial behavior which helps to address some of these
discrepancies. They argue that the policy preferences of immigration judges act as a lens through
which a petitioner’s application is examined. Some facts, such as the human rights record of the
petitioner’s home country are viewed objectively. Other facts, such as whether the petitioner is
from a country that produces high numbers of fraudulent cases or whether the country has close
economic or military ties with the United States, are viewed subjectively. Their work however,
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does not consider possible influence from the executive or legislative forces who have incentives
to manipulate the grant or denial of asylum for political reasons. What they fail to address is that
immigration judges work within a bureaucratic structure in which a myriad of forces attempt to
constrain their exercise of discretion.

Understanding Immigration Judge Behavior through the Lens of
Bureaucratic Behavior Scholarship
As employees of the executive branch, immigration judges are bureaucrats. In attempting
to understand the behavior of bureaucracies, scholars have most often taken either a top-down
approach, focusing on the factors that influence the highest level appointees of an agency, or a
bottom-up approach focusing on the behavior of “street level” bureaucrats. (Wilson 1989) The
distinction between these approaches closely resembles some of the distinctions that separate
scholars of the judiciary. Top down approaches focus on the institutional structures of the
bureaucracy in attempting to understand its outputs. This institutionally centric approach in many
ways follows similar rationale of the legal model used by many judicial scholars. It assumes that
bureaucratic behavior is so sharply constrained by the structure of the institution and the
professional norms of the agency that individual choice plays little part in the outputs of the
agency.
Bottom-up approaches to the study of bureaucracies center upon the behavior and
preferences of the individuals who work within the bureaucracy. Beginning with Lipsky (1980) a
number of scholars have examined the behavior of bureaucracies not entirely as a function of the
policy preferences of the president, congress or the judiciary but more as a reflection of the
policy preferences of the various people who make the day to day street level decisions in a
bureaucracy. In this manner they have mirrored approaches to the study of courts by judicial
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scholars following the attitudinal model. Building upon the basic assumptions of the attitudinal
model, especially as it has been applied to lower courts, bureaucratic scholars have started with
the assumption that all actors have policy preferences. From this assumption one builds a model
in which bureaucratic discretion provides an opportunity to seek the furtherance of the
individual’s policy goals as opposed to the goals of the principals. To the extent that institutions
are examined in bottom-up studies the focus is on how these institutions limit the ability of street
level bureaucrats to act sincerely based upon their own preferences.
Top Down Studies: Principal Agent Relations and Bureaucratic Behavior
At their core, top-down studies rely upon aggregate data to explain the behavior of
agencies as a whole. (See eg. Lowi 1979, Niskenan 1971). When the aggregate output of an
agency changes, scholars look to see if any political changes occurred around the same time that
the agencies actions changed. If there appears to be a temporal connection, scholars hypothesize
that the action is in response to the political factor. (See eg. Wood and Waterman 1994)
The principal agent model of bureaucratic behavior is perhaps the most influential area of
top-down scholarship. Principal agent models imagine the behavior of individuals within a
bureaucracy as being driven by a contractual relationship. The principal in this relationship
controls the behavior of its agent through traditional carrot or the stick methods of reward or
sanctions. Principals in these models can include institutions such as Congress, the president or
the courts or outside factors such as interest groups. The important aspect of the relationship is
that principals attempt to control the actions of their bureaucratic agents. (Moe 1982; Wingast
and Moran, 1983). When the agent does not perform in concert with the desires of the principal,
principal agent models argue that there exists a failure in the reward/sanction apparatus available
to the principal. Proponents of this line of research often view the failure of agents to follow the
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dictates of their principal as “shirking.”. Often it is assumed that agents shirk because the
institutions that are supposed to regulate their behavior have failed.
The Role of the Presidency and Congress in Controlling the
Actions of Agents
Most early work using the Principal-Agent model found that the presidency, Congress
and the Judiciary had little to no influence on the behavior of their ostensible bureaucratic agents.
(See eg. Rossiter 1963, Cronin 1980, Noll 1971) However, beginning in the 1980’s scholars
applied more sophisticated analytical tools to find that principals indeed had some control over
their agents. Studies showed that the actions of bureaucracies from the Federal Trade
Commission to the National Labor Relations Board were influenced by the Presidency, Congress
and Courts. (See eg. Miller and Moe, 1982; Stewart and Cromartie, 1982; Weingast and Moran,
1983).
What is interesting in these principal agent studies is that the relationship between
different institutions and the same agent change over time. At some times agencies may be more
under the influence of Congress, (See eg. Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989; McCubbins
andSchwartz 1984), at others the executive appears to control (Moe, 1982,1985; Wood and
Waterman, 1994), and at other times the courts (See eg. Canes-Wrones, 2006; Howard and
Nixon, 2002, 2003; Moe, 1985; Snyder and Weingart, 2000). Studies also identified the
mechanism through which agents exercised this control, including presidential appointments,
budget threats, reorganizations and sanctions from courts. (See eg. Wood 1988; Wood and
Waterman 1991)
Hammond and Knott (1996) produced a model of multi-institutional policy-making
which shows that there are conditions under which an agency will have considerable autonomy
and conditions under which it will have virtually none. As constraints are increased the ability of
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bureaucrats to express their policy preferences through their decisions decreases. The authors
found that during the times that an agency lacks autonomy, control of the agency usually cannot
be attributed to just one institution.
Additional studies have found that the process of nominating and confirming members of
the National Labor Relations Board provided both the president and Congress with the ability to
influence agency behavior (Snyder and Weingart 2000). This brought about a plethora of
scholarly works showing how different institutional principals were able to exercise control over
bureaucracies. Shipan (2004) argued that the presidency has the most power to influence the
behavior of agencies because presidents are in the position to set an agencies ideal point and
thereby establish the policy preferences of the agency.
Influence of the Judiciary in Bureaucratic Decision Making
Studies have also shown that the judiciary has the potential to exercise control over
agency behavior. Howard and Nixon (2002) found that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
modified decisions to audit taxes based upon the ideology of the federal court which had
jurisdiction over that particular branch of the IRS. It was shown that as the judicial ideology of
an appellate court shifted along a liberal/conservative spectrum, the types of audits conducted
changed. IRS offices in areas with liberal courts of appeals would be more likely to focus on the
equitable aspects of tax policy by auditing the taxes of more rich filers. In offices that were under
the jurisdiction of conservative courts of appeals, IRS agents tended to audit larger numbers of
less affluent tax returns while reducing the number brought against wealthier tax filers.
In her 2003 study of the behavior of Army Corps of Engineers, Canes-Wrone (2003)
found a similar relationship between judicial philosophy and bureaucratic behavior. She found
that the ideology of the lower federal courts influenced the behavior of the corps in relation to
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the grant of permits to develop wetlands. Subsequent research into the behavior of the Army
Corps of Engineers revealed that Congress has an even greater influence in agency actions than
the judiciary. (Canes-Wrone 2006)
Interest Group Influence on the Behavior of Agents
In addition to influence from federal institutions, scholars have examined the extent that
interest groups and industries have in influencing bureaucratic behavior. From these approaches
scholars have found instances where bureaucracies are essentially captured by the interests it was
designed to regulate. (Stigler 1971). More complex interactions have been explained through
issue network and advocacy coalition models in which bureaucracies are but one of many players
attempting to influence policy. (Sabatier and Pelskey, 1987).
How the Political Environment Affects Principal Agent Relations
The ability and willingness of institutional players such as Congress, the judiciary and the
executive branch to limit the discretion of bureaucratic agents appears to fluctuate depending
upon the political environment. Scholz, Twombly and Headrick (1992) found that local
politicians and their electoral coalitions have the power to influence the behavior of field offices
within their electoral districts. Shipan (2004) found that the extent of Congressional control over
bureaucracies in large parts depends upon the political environment of Congress. The
relationship between the ideology of an agency and the ideology of the oversight committee or
even Congress as a whole influences the extent that the agency behaves autonomously. When
agencies and Congress share ideology, agencies tend to behave more autonomously. When
agency ideology is opposite from the committee, the agency adheres more to the preferences of
the principal.
Similarly, Taratoot and Nixon (2011), examine how divided government influences the
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extent of discretion granted to bureaucracies. In those situations when legislation guiding agency
action is passed under a divided government, that legislation contains more restrictions on
agency discretion.
Top Down Approaches to the Study of Immigration Judge Behavior
Salehyan and Rosenblum (2004), applied a traditional top-down approach to the
examination of immigration judge behavior in asylum cases. Starting from the assumption that
principals in the executive and legislative branches would like to be able to use the grant or
denial of asylum for political gain, they examined whether petitioners from countries with close
ties to the United States were denied asylum a greater rate than petitioners from countries that
were ideological opponents. After examining factors such as economic ties, military support,
ideological differences, domestic policy and human rights records the authors debunked the
belief that the end of the Cold War signaled a shift in the nature of asylum policy in the United
States. They found that US interests play at least as significant a role in asylum grant rates as
normative/human rights concerns.
In a follow up article to their 2004 article, Salehyan and Rosenblum examined the impact
of domestic politics on immigration judge behavior (Salehyan and Rosenblum 2008). They
found that media and congressional attention to asylum issues has a range of effects on judicial
behavior depending upon the type of attention. When the media focused on asylum issues,
asylum judges pay more attention to the humanitarian records of the applicants home country
when making decisions as opposed to the policy goals of the executive. Congressional attention
on the issue of asylum has two possible effects. If the attention is focused on enforcement,
immigration judges focus more on the policy goals of the executive. When Congressional
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attention is focused on humanitarian issues then the human rights record of the petitioner’s
country of origin plays a greater role.
Both of these articles examined the behavior of immigration judges based upon top-down
notions of bureaucratic behavior. Neither approach examined the characteristics of the individual
judges making these decisions. Rather they focused on the goals of the principals, be they the
executive or the legislature, and the effects that these goals have on the behavior of these judges.
Neither of these studies adequately explain how the policy goals of the principals are conveyed
to the immigration judges. This reveals one of the primary weaknesses of the top-down
approach.
Problems with Applying the Top Down Approach to the Study of Immigration Judge
Behavior
One of the primary criticisms of the top-down approach to the study of bureaucracies lies
in its assumption of uniformity. Whereas the Principal Agent model makes assumptions
regarding the behavior of the agent bureaucracy as if it speaks and acts with one voice, in fact it
is an aggregate of thousands of people each making individual choices. Top down studies are
often based upon the erroneous assumption that street level bureaucrats can adequately be
controlled by the heads of these bureaucracies when in fact evidence points to a more
complicated relationship. Although scholars such as Kingdon (1985) have found that presidential
appointees have a substantial influence on the actions and agendas of agencies, scholars such as
Heclo (1977) and Kaufman (1981) have determined that political level appointees have very
little ability to influence the behavior of bureaucrats.
How one measures the attitudes of lower level bureaucrats might prove to be the
explanation for this apparent contradiction. Previous studies have relied upon the ideology of the
president as a proxy for determining the ideology of appointees. (See eg. Bailey 2007; Epstein et
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al., 2007; McCarty and Poole, 1995). However since the vast number of bureaucrats in any
agency are not appointed, this approach often provides little insight into the attitudes associated
with these street level employees. The difficulty in determining the policy preferences of
bureaucratic officials and their agencies was addressed by Clinton, et al. (2012). They developed
a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual
bureaucrats and agencies that are comparable with those of other political actors. By doing so
they were able to examine how the culture of a bureaucracy influences the decisions it makes as
well as its susceptibility to exogenous influence from other institutions. Clinton et al.
administered a survey to 7,448 federal executives asking their preferences on key votes in front
of Congress. From these surveys, the Clinton et al. were able to make determinations as to the
ideology of the various street level bureaucrats they surveyed. Using these scores they then
tested
Rather than examining the behavior of an agency as purely a reflection of the ideology of
the president who appointed the upper echelon of the bureaucracy, this method allows for an
understanding of the behavior of individual bureaucrats charged with making specific decisions.
It is in keeping with the general approach towards understanding bureaucratic behavior based
upon the study of “street level” bureaucrats.
Bottom Up Studies: Street Level Bureaucrats and Discretion
In his seminal work on the subject of street-level bureaucrats, Lipsky(1980) argued that
“public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top floor suites of high-ranking
administrators, because in important ways it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily
encounters of street-level workers.” (Lipsky 1980, p.xi)
Rather than focusing on policies and laws designed to control these lower level bureaucrats,
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Lipsky examined how the coping mechanisms they developed as well as their own goals
controlled policy. He discovered that in engaging with the public, street-level bureaucrats behave
in ways that are unsanctioned and which often contradict the policies of the higher ups in the
agency.
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) elaborated upon these conclusions of Lipsky
stating that "every aspect of street-level work is defined by rules and procedures ... yet rules and
procedures provide only weak constraints on the loose parameters around street-level judgments.
Street-level work is, ironically, rule saturated, not rule bound" (p. 334). Seminal to the work of
street level bureaucrats is the decision of what rules apply in each particular situation. When
agencies have high numbers of rules and where those rules are contradictory, discretion naturally
arises as workers at the street level must determine which rules to apply. If politicians or higher
ups in the agency attempt to circumscribe this discretion through new or more rules, discretion
does not disappear; it is merely shifted to a new area. (Riccucci 2005)
Subsequent scholars have examined a number of factors that influence the level of
discretion exhibited by street level bureaucrats. These studies suggest three basic categories of
factors which play a role in how street level bureaucrats exercise discretion: (1) the
characteristics of the organization; (2) the characteristics of the street level bureaucrat; and (3)
the personal characteristics of the client. (Hasenfeld and English (1974) .
How Agency Characteristics Influence Street-Level Exercise of Discretion
Studies have shown that organizational characteristics have the potential to limit or
modify the discretionary behavior of street level bureaucrats. Where the routines of an
organization are less flexible decisions of street level, bureaucrats tend to be tightly
circumscribed. (Peyrot, 1982). Similarly, high levels of formalization in the organization of an
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agency can result in limits to the exercise of discretion. (Aiken and Hage, 1966). Additionally,
scholars such as Kelly (1994) have argued that the values emphasized throughout an agency’s
culture can influence the level and type of discretion exercised by street-level bureaucrats.
In those situations where street level bureaucrats are faced with resource shortages and
high caseloads they may decide to ignore proper procedures and exercise personal discretion as a
coping mechanism. (Prottas, 1979). Rather than relying purely upon their professional judgment
in making decisions, street level bureaucrats often respond to the pressure and lack of resources
in their work place by routinizing their responses. (Taylor and Kelly, 2006).
How Personal Characteristics of Bureaucrats Influence the Type and Level of
Discretion they Exercise
A number of studies have revealed that the personal characteristics of bureaucrats
influence how they exercise their discretion. In particular, the exercise of discretion is often
directly related to how the bureaucrats view themselves. (Crozier, 1964; Kaufman, 1960;
Maynard, Moody and Mushero, 2003). Bureaucrats who identify themselves as sympathetic tend
to provide more benefits than those who self-identify as rule-oriented (Kroeger 1975). Those
bureaucrats who identify as being professionally oriented are more likely to follow agency
procedures as opposed to exercising discretion in handing out benefits. (Miller, 1967). Other
studies have shown that street level bureaucrats will use discretion in order to benefit those
whom they identify with. (Wilson and Keiser 2010)
Research has also shown that how bureaucrats identify with such subjective concepts
such as justice also influence their exercise of discretion. Kelly (1994) examined how the
frameworks through which workers evaluate the world shape their willingness to comply with
agency policy. According to Kelly, street level bureaucrats “orchestrate outcomes that are
compatible with their visions of justice.” (Kelly 1994, 119)
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How Personal Characteristics of Clients Influence the Exercise of Discretion
Evidence also points to a connection between the personal characteristics of different
clients and the discretionary behavior of street level bureaucrats. Some of these are relatively
innocuous such as the tendency to grant greater benefits to those clients who appear to have the
greatest level of need. (Goodsell 1980). Other are more problematic, such as decisions to grant
fewer benefits to clients who are considered to be particularly difficult or troublesome. (Weaver,
Hasenfeld and Steinmetz, 1997). Additionally, clients who are viewed as more articulate are
provided benefits at a greater rate than those who are not.
Even more troubling is the findings of studies which show that decisions to grant or deny
benefits are based upon pre-conceived notions of the moral character of the clients. Those who
are considered to be amongst the population of “abusers of the system” are treated differently
than those who are “truly in need.” (Maynard-Moody and Mushego 2003) Schram, Soss,
Fording, and Houser (2009), found evidence that clients with similar histories of rules infractions
are treated differently based upon their race. White rule breakers were less likely to be punished
for previous transgressions than African-American or Latina rule breakers.

Immigration Courts as Street Level Bureaucrats
Examining the behavior of immigration judges using models developed to understand the
behavior of street level bureaucrats might at first appear to be a bit of a stretch. The list of
bureaucratic positions that are considered to be street level usually includes social workers,
teachers and police officers rather than federal judges. In most cases the types of tasks
undertaken by federal judges would make them poor choices for models associated with workers
who have direct contact with the beneficiaries of governmental services. However, the huge
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numbers of cases handled by immigration judges, the often conflicting pressures placed upon
them and the relative inability of supervisors to monitor their application of discretion make
immigration judges in many ways similar to street level workers.
No extant studies have applied street level bureaucratic models to the study of asylum
decisions by immigration judges. However, I believe that any study of these decisions must
examine the same types of forces that impact the operation of discretion at the lowest levels of
bureaucracies.

Examining the Behavior of Immigration Judges Through the Lens of
Administrative Court Models
In her article “Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: the Déjà vu of
Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication,” Taylor (2007) argued that the study of
immigration judge behavior was deficient in that it had not included lessons learned through the
study of administrative courts. Taylor argued that previous studies which attempted to examine
immigration courts as either bureaucracies or courts failed to adequately consider the unique
situation faced by actors within an administrative court. Because, in most cases ALJs are
employees of the same agencies whose caseloads they adjudicate, it is impossible to examine
them in the same way as Article III courts. However attempts to examine the behavior of ALJs in
the same manner as one examines the behavior of bureaucrats ignores the fact that they are
supposed to be impartial adjudicators.
Given the nature of ALJs positions within the federal bureaucracy, their ability to act
impartially has often been questioned. The institutional and political constraints layered over
ALJs make would make it seem that they would have less independence than other judges.
However, despite these constraints it appears that ALJs have a great deal of freedom to act in
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accordance with their preferences. Unlike other civil servants, ALJs are not beholden to “agency
efficiency rating, promotions, or demotions or pay cuts.” (Ruhlen, 1982; Taratoot and Howard,
2011) It is also difficult to fire ALJs, requiring a lengthy hearing. (Taratoot and Howard, 2008).
The inability of agency higher ups to attempt to influence ALJ behavior through threats of
decreasing pay or termination of employment, provide a level of insulation for the ALJs beyond
what one would expect.
How ALJs exercise their discretion within the space afforded them by their unique
position has been an area of interest for decades. Studies throughout the years have consistently
revealed significant disparities between ALJ decisions. (Gifford, 1991; Wertkin, 2002; Lubbers,
1996). Much of the research conducted concerning these disparities has focused on attempts to
bring consistency to ALJ decisions. What little quantitative research that has been conducted on
these courts has generally centered around two different approaches to modeling their behavior.
One is the use of theories developed through the study of bureaucracies which focus on principal
agent and other institutionally based models. (See eg. Hudson et al., 2003) The other examines
ALJ decisions using models formed through the study of judiciaries in particular application of
attitudinal and strategic models. (See eg. Taylor 2009)
The results of both sets of approaches have been remarkably consistent in finding that
despite the large numbers of institutional constraints imposed both through bureaucratic
channels, as well as judicial supervision, judges presiding over similar cases reach different
decisions. (See eg. Green, 1966; Segal, Timpone & Howard, 2000). Studies have repeatedly
shown that the policy preferences of administrative law judges influence their decisions despite
the institutional structures set in place to limit their discretion. What is even more interesting is
that this variance, while being linked to the policy preferences of the judges, also seems to
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fluctuate over time (See eg. Meier and Bohte, 2007). Thus it appears that attitudes seem to matter
but they matter more so at some times than others. Unfortunately, studies of the behavior of
administrative judges rarely go beyond the first step of determining that individual characteristics
of judges influence their decisions. We are shown evidence that judges appointed by liberals
behave differently than judges appointed by conservatives in the aggregate, but such studies
rarely attempt to explain the time periods when attitudes alone do not adequately predict
decisions (Taratoot and Howard, 2011).
Taratoot and Howard (2011) expand upon the relatively simple models based upon
attitudinal approaches to develop a multifaceted approach to the study of administrative law
courts. Through an analysis of Administrative Law Judge decisions as they relate to the National
Labor Relations Board, Taratoot and Howard find that policy preferences, while playing a large
role in determining decisions, do not explain everything. They examine the behavior of ALJs as
being somewhat akin to that of Federal District Judges who, because of their place in the
bureaucracy , also face additional political constraints that do not generally control judicial
behavior. According to their research, the unique position of ALJ’s as quasi-judicial bodies
within a bureaucratic structure both allow for a large amount of attitudinally based discretion but
also temper the exercise of that discretion based upon a range of legislative, executive and
judicial factors. In addition, they found that exogenous factors such as unemployment rates and
public opinions towards unions also play significant roles in the behavior of these judges. A
number of subsequent works have applied variations of this model to explain how lower level
bureaucrats can influence the behavior of agency higher ups as well as appellate judges.
(Taratoot 2013; Taratoot 2014)
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Conclusion: Lessons Learned from Judicial, Bureaucratic and Administrative
Law Court Literature
The above discussion of the literature concerning the behavior of judges, bureaucrats and
ALJs reviews a number of commonalities. Despite differences in institutional arrangements,
layers of supervision and amounts of discretion, the judges and bureaucrats behave in similar
ways. In essence they behave rationally. Study after study has challenged the notion that
professional or legal norms will completely constrain behavior of individuals in any context.
Judges even those whose actions are supposed to be monitored and controlled by higher courts,
make decisions based upon their policy preferences rather than impartially following the law.
Bureaucrats, even in the most highly regulated and monitored agencies exercise discretion in
ways consistent with their preferences rather than following established agency procedures.
The story of judicial and bureaucratic behavior does not end with the realization that
these actors are seeking to maximize the achievement of their desired goals. History has shown
that political and social forces influence the behavior of judges and bureaucrats. The legislature
and executive respond to what they see as abuses by judges and bureaucrats with attempts to
limit the amount of discretion afforded to them. Sometimes these attempts to limit discretion
work, other times they do not. Historical events give rise to political and social forces that
sometimes change the way that judges and bureaucrats exercise their discretion.
Few studies have attempted to combine models based on personal preference with those
based upon exogenous constraints. To the extent this has been accomplished, it has not been
applied to the study of immigration courts. By examining the behavior of immigration judges in
adjudicating asylum claims through a model which embodies lessons learned from previous
research on the judiciary, bureaucracy and administrative law courts, I hope to be able to identify
and quantify the factors which influence their behavior. This research also has the potential to
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provide greater insight into the behavior of lower level judges, ALJs and bureaucrats whose
decisions are potentially subject to oversight from many sources, but whose everyday activity
largely goes unnoticed.
Chapter four builds upon this literature review in setting forth the theoretical
underpinnings of this research.
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CHAPTER IV -THEORIES AND APPROACHES

This chapter sets out the general theoretical propositions of my dissertation. The
following empirical chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 will set out the specific hypotheses for the ideas I
intend to test. While the models developed for this dissertation borrow from a number of subfields of political science, all are based upon the application of rational choice theory to explain
the behavior of individuals within an institutional context. This research first examines success
rates for asylum applicants in immigration courts for the past 15 years. It is based upon an
understanding of human behavior that is informed by rational choice models. Central to this
understanding is the assumption that absent constraints individuals will make decisions based
upon what will most likely produce the greatest level of utility for them. Rational choice theory
entered into the political science world through the seminal works of Mancur Olson and Anthony
Downs.
Olson (1965) looked at the fundamental problem of explaining why people seldom work
collectively towards public goals. He explained that large groups often do not have as much
influence as small groups largely because of their inability to overcome the collective action
problem. Applying theories from economics, he showed that in the absence of positive or
negative incentives, people would not expend resources to achieve a common goal.
Downs (1957) argued that one can predict the actions that a person will take by
calculating the most reasonable way for the decision maker to reach his goals and then assume
the decision maker is rational. His basic assumption is that one must reduce the ends of the
decision maker to a single goal. A number of basic assumptions form the heart of rational choice
theory. They include: (1) The individual is the level of analysis; (2) he/she is chiefly concerned
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with maximization of utility; (3) one can rank ones options; and (4) rational choice models can
“apply equally to all persons under study – that decisions, rules, and tastes are stable over time
and similar among people” (Downs 1957).

The Use of Rational Choice Models in the Study of Judges and Bureaucrats
The use of rational choice models have spread to a number of political sub-fields.
Bureaucratic models of behavior such as that presented by Downs (1966) argue that in essence
bureaucracies are systems designed to channel as well as control rational choices of their
members. Downs presents a theory of rational choice in the context of the institutional
constraints of a bureaucracy similar to that faced by ALJs (Downs 1966). Downs argued that
bureaucratic officials, like all other social agents, seek to obtain their goals rationally. By
rationally he meant that bureaucrats will respond to costs, obtaining more of their goal when
costs are low and less when costs are high. Downs argued that while bureaucratic officials have
complex arrays of goals, they will always be significantly motivated by their own self interest.
Every organization is influenced by the function it serves within society as a whole as well as the
expectations placed upon it both internally and externally.
Much of the bottom-up approach to the study of bureaucracies relies upon rational choice
approaches. (See e.g. Maynard-Moody and Mushego 2003; Soss, Fording, and Houser 2009).
These studies start from the premise that agents have their own objectives and that these
objectives influence the decisions that they make. Studies have shown that street level
bureaucrats take actions that violate established policy for any number of self serving reasons.
Street level bureaucrats provide more assistance to clients who are considered easier to deal with
(See e.g. Hasenfeld and Steinmetz 1981). They also make decisions in keeping with their policy
goals ( See e.g. Goodsell 1980)
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Attitudinal Approaches to the study of judges also are also based upon models of rational
choice. Segal and Spaeth (1993) examined an institution that has very few constraints, the US
Supreme Court, and found that amongst a certain subsection of their cases (the most politically
salient) Supreme Court decisions were almost entirely based upon the political preference of the
justices. It was assumed that other institutions that have more constraints would be less able to
purely express these preferences. As discussed above, this proved to be only partly accurate. In
subsequent studies of lower courts it was determined that a number of constraints, namely fear of
reversal and desire for higher office did not play as huge a role as Segal and Spaeth envisioned in
lower judicial institutions (See e.g. Rohde and Spaeth 1976, Hall 1992, Brace and Hall 2001).

Institutional Constraints Still Matter
Many critics of rational choice point out that pure rational choice situations rarely occur
in the real world. They argue that in every-day life people are rarely able to do exactly what
maximizes their utility. Rules govern individual behavior which in turn alters the calculus of
rational decision makers. However, such arguments are most often just straw men set up by those
who do not understand how rational choice models work.
Rational choice scholars have long recognized that institutional constraints limit the
extent to which individual actors are able to pursue their goals. North (1990) argues that the
major role of institutions in society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to
human interaction. North emphasizes the role of institutions together with economic constraints
determining the opportunities for people within society. Institutions change through the lock-in
that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organizations that have
evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by the institutions. Incremental
change comes from organizational entrepreneurs who perceive that hey have stuff to gain from
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altering the institution. North’s approach takes into consideration both the role of institutions in
setting the parameters for rational action as well as the role of history in shaping how the
institutions change (North 1990).
Studies of the Supreme Court which followed Segal and Spaeth examined how the
institutions of the court constrained the ability of justices to sincerely express their preferences.
The strategic model is a recognition that actors in every institution must conform their decisions
to certain institutional constraints. In the case of the Supreme Court the rules regarding the
granting of certiorari and authorship of majority decisions often lead to votes that appear to go
against the preferences of the judges making them. Only when one knows the rules of the
institution does one realize that judges are seeking to maximize long term utility even when they
make decisions that appear to go against their short term interests.

A Neo-Institutionalist Approach to Understanding Judicial Behavior
My research on the behavior of Immigration Judge’s in their decisions to grant or asylum
is cognizant of both the goals of the judges as well as the institutional constraints placed upon
them. Authors such as Elinor Ostrom would refer to this approach as rational choice
institutionalism, while others might label it as Neo-institutionalism (Ostrom, 1992). Neoinstitutionalism asserts that “political outcomes . . . result from actors’ seeking to realize their
goals, choosing within and possibly shaping a given set of institutional arrangements, and so
choosing within a given historical context” (Aldrich 1995, 6; citing Rohde and Shepsle 1978).
What it centers on is an understanding that institutions matter insofar as they provide incentives
and constraints to utility maximizing individuals. Thus in order to understand the behavior of
immigration judges, one starts from the assumption that each judge wants to make decisions that
coincide with his/her policy preferences. From this basis one then examines which rules or
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exogenous conditions make it difficult to express these preferences. The key to understanding
these decisions is to determine what these rules are and whether they actually modify behavior.
My investigation of these constraints is based upon an institutional approach similar to that used
by scholars of state supreme courts (See e.g. Brace & Hall 1997).
This research is also cognizant of the fact that immigration courts exist within the context
of society as a whole. Just as studies have shown that the Supreme Court is more deferential to
the executive branch during times of war (See eg. Epstein et al. 2005) and more likely to side
with the solicitor general (see eg. Bailey et al. 2005), there is a real possibility that exogenous
events and circumstances can play a role in immigration judge’s decisions to grant or deny
asylum.
In particular this research builds upon the multi-institutional model of bureaucratic
behavior formulated by Hammond and Knott (1996). It also relies upon the work of Taratoot and
Howard (2011) who examine a number of judicial, executive, legislative and historical events in
modeling the behavior of Administrative Law Judges. Both of these works recognize that
modeling the behavior of these types of bureaucrats is much more complicated than traditional
bureaucratic or judicial models would suggest. However, rather than ending with the conclusion
that sometimes these actors feel free to act in accordance with their attitudes and sometimes they
bow to the demands of the principal, both sets of authors take the next step and explain under
which combination of factors these different models of behavior apply. Building from the
assumption that, absent constraints, ALJs will act as other judges do, namely in an attitudinal
manner, one can then examine which series of variables most successfully constrains this
behavior. In addition, one can also examine the extent to which exogenous factors also play a
part in influencing the exercise of attitudinally based discretion. It is my belief that it is only
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through an examination of several institutions as well as historical and political factors that one
can adequately understand how Immigration Judges make decisions on asylum issues. The multiinstitutional model that I have developed will enable me to test a number of hypotheses, several
of which have never been tested in this context before.
In addition to helping to explain the behavior of immigration judges, this research has the
potential to provide insight into the behavior of a wide range of judges and bureaucrats. Since
immigration judges in particular, and ALJs in general, combine characteristics of both judicial
and bureaucratic actors, this study has the potential to further understanding of how rational
actors behave in environments of varying levels of institutional and societal constraint.
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CHAPTER V - RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter lays out the variables, data sources and models that will be tested in this
dissertation. The following empirical chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 will set out the specific hypotheses
for the ideas I intend to test

Data and Methods
The scope of the research in this study includes final decisions reached by immigration
judges in asylum claims from 1997-2013 for applicants for Asylum. There are a number of
reasons that I have chosen to concentrate on this time period. The years include applicants who
brought their claims under three different presidential regimes. Additionally, the data set includes
cases brought before and after the events of 9/11 as well as the significant changes to the asylum
process that followed. The decisions of immigration judges, as well as the country of origin of
the petitioner, date of decision and court location were gleaned from a FOIA request and include
over 235,000 petitions from 1997 to 2013.
Several potential difficulties arise from the time period involved in this research. Similar
studies have avoided attempting to model the behavior of immigration judges in time periods that
include both pre and post 9/11. Dramatic changes following 9/11 changed the scope of judicial
discretion and might have more of an influence on subsequent changes in judicial behavior than
the terrorist acts themselves. It will be important to vary the model in order to attempt to
ascertain whether changes to grant rates are the result of bureaucratic rules changes or changing
world conditions. Other potential problems arise from the inability to examine all of the
circumstances surrounding each petition. Because of privacy concerns, only a small number of
people are able to access the particulars of asylum claims. Thus, I will be forced to used proxies
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in order to attempt to differentiate between the relative strengths of asylum cases. Some of these
proxies such as human rights records of petitioner’s countries of origin should not be
problematic. Others, such as whether the petitioner hails from a country that produces large
numbers of fraudulent cases will be more so.

Control Variables
I have included a number of control variables which are present in every model tested in
this dissertation. These variables largely measure factors that are not linked with any of the
hypotheses that I intend to examine, but which have shown in previous studies to influence the
grant of asylum. These control variables can be broken down into those that measure individual
characteristics of an asylum petitioner and those that represent general factors that apply to all
petitioners during the year in which the petition was filed.

Individual Control Variables
Since the grant or denial of asylum is largely based upon how a petitioner’s country of
origin respects human rights, it is it is important to have a measure to represent the strength of a
petitioner’s claim. Information regarding potential changes in the human rights record in
petitioner’s countries of origin over the time period of this study has been taken from the
Political Terror Scale. (Gibney, Mark, Cornett, Wood, Haschke, and Arnon, 2015)
Due to the extended time periods that asylum claims often take, many people who face
deportation often file weak or fraudulent asylum claims in order to stall deportation. It is
assumed that petitioners who file claims after deportation proceedings have commenced would
have less of a chance to obtain a favorable asylum result. To capture whether the petition was
filed after deportation proceedings began, I have included a dummy variable to indicate whether
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the application for asylum was defensive. 24.
Success in asylum cases is often predicated on having adequate representation. For this
reason I have also included a dichotomous variable that records whether the petitioner was
represented by counsel.
A number of previous studies have shown that female judges are more likely to grant
asylum than male judges. As such I have coded Gender as a dummy variable.
In order to capture the effect of large numbers of economic immigrants from Mexico,
Central and South America, I have included a variable which records whether the immigration
court is located in a state with a southern border.
Some countries produce a large number of fraudulent asylum cases. This is largely
because these countries also produce a large number of people coming to the United States for
economic opportunity rather than fleeing persecution. In order to capture this characteristic I
have included a dummy variable which measures whether the petitioner is from a country that is
in the top ten of fraudulent petitions for a particular year.

General Control Variables
Opinions on immigration as well as immigration flows into the country are affected by
the economy. When the US economy is doing well, a larger percentage of immigration is based
upon economic needs rather than efforts to escape persecution. As a measure of the strength of
the US economy I have included unemployment rate as a variable. The belief is that as the
unemployment rate goes up, the more likely it is that the US economy is not doing well and the
less likely that an applicant is making a fraudulent asylum case.
The effect of the events of 9/11 caused a massive shift in the way that our country as a
24

Defensive applications generally coincide with efforts to remain in the United States at any
cost and are thus more often fraudulent.
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whole has looked at immigration issues. In order to capture this effect I have included a dummy
variable which divides the data into pre and post 9/11 periods.

Operant Variables
The variables that I use to test my hypotheses have been drawn from a number of
sources. Several have been used in studies which examine the behavior of immigration judges in
particular while others were drawn from general studies of bureaucracies and courts. Due to the
fact that the grant of asylum has historically served both human rights as well as political
purposes, I have grouped the operant variables as either human rights variables or political
variables.

Human Rights Variable
Perhaps the most important variable that I rely on in this dissertation is a measure of
judicial ideology. In coding judicial ideology I relied upon the scoring system developed by
Keith Holmes & Miller, 2013 & 2014. This scoring system examines the background of
immigration judges before they came to the bench. Judges who had certain types of backgrounds,
working for the INS, are scored as being more likely to be conservative. Judges who worked for
more pro-applicant causes are scored as more likely to be liberal. Each judge is then assigned
group based upon their ideology score in a categorical variable.

Political Variables
In order to test the influence of Congressional committees on Immigration Judge
behavior I measured Congressional influence by including the Poole and Rosenthal (1991)
common space score of the median member of the relevant committees in the House and the
Senate at the times that the immigration judge’s decision was rendered.
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In order to measure the ideology of the circuit courts to which asylum decisions are
appealed, I followed the approach of Taratoot and Howard (2011) and use the Giles, Hettinger,
and Pepper (GHP) scores (2001, 2002) in order to calculate the median nominate score. The
ideology scores of each member of a circuit were examined, the median score determined and
then used as a proxy for the ideology of the circuit. I obtained these court scores from work
conducted by Keele (2014).
In order to measure the ideology of each immigration court I took the mean ideology of
the other judges making asylum decisions in that court for the year of the decisions.
Following the approach favored by Salehyan and Rosenblum (2008) and Howell and
Pevehouse (2005) I examined the role of presidential ideology on immigration judge behavior.
Although Taratoot and Howard did not include presidential ideology as one of their variables,
Saleyhan and Rosenblum’s findings reveal that it potentially plays a factor. I have followed
Taratoot and Howard’s (2011) approach and used Poole and Rosenthal (1991) common space
scores for the three presidents who were in office during the course of the study, Clinton, Bush
and Obama.
In order to examine the level of Congressional attention being given to immigration
enforcement and humanitarian migration I have followed Salehyan and Rosenblum’s (2008)
method of counting Congressional hearings on each of these issues. A Boolean keyword search
of the Lexis-Nexis Congressional Database for congressional hearings on (1) “immigration” and
“refugee” or “asylum” and (2) “immigration” and “illegal” or “undocumented” were used 25.
These hearings were separated into two groups. The first contains those hearings in which human
rights factors related to asylum are discussed. The second group will include those hearings in
25

Saleyhan and Rosenblum argue that such searches will distinguish between refugee/asylum
hearings and immigration enforcement hearings.
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which immigration enforcement issues are discussed.
In order to model media interest in the issue I again followed Salehyan and Rosenblum’s
(2008) approach of conducting electronic keyword searches of the New York Times Index for
any references to “immigration” or “refugees” for each year. Raw counts were divided by the
total number of stories indexed per year to calculate the percentage of media attention towards
immigration.
I tested Saleyhan and Rosenblum’s (2008) findings that there are interaction affects
related to the types of Congressional and media attention being applied and the role of other
factors that may influence an immigration judges decision. Saleyhan and Rosenblum have
presented findings which indicate that congressional and media attention to different aspects of
immigration issues has effects on whether immigration judges are likely to follow human rights
concerns in relation to asylum decisions or whether they are likely to pay more attention to
political concerns. They argue that when attention is drawn towards enforcement issues,
immigration judges will be more influenced by the political ties of the petitioner’s country of
origin to the United States than they will the actual humanitarian conditions within the country of
origin. During those time periods where attention is drawn towards the humanitarian side of the
immigration, immigration judges are more likely to give more weight to the human rights
records within a petitioner’s country of origin.
I have examined the role of public opinion through an examination of media attention as
measured by searches of asylum and immigration articles in the New York Times data base with
a simple count being used as a proxy for level of interest.. This approach is in keeping with that
used by Taratoot and Howard (2012).
In modeling the role of changes to asylum law over this time period I will include dummy
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variables which follow changes to the level of discretion of immigration judges as well as
administrative changes as they relate to the Board of Immigration Appeals. These will include
such changes as those brought through the Real ID Act and the removal of the requirement that
the Board of Immigration Appeals submit a written decision in appeals. I have also included
dummy variables concerning actions taken by Attorney Generals Ashcroft and Gonzalez which
changed the nature of immigration proceedings.
In order to test whether economic ties to the United States influenced chances to obtain
asylum I included a variable that measured the total trade between the petitioner’s country of
origin and the United States. In order to measure whether close military ties between the
petitioner’s country of origin and the United States affected chances of gaining asylum I included
a dummy variable which indicated whether the country received military aid from the United
States. In order to test whether there were continuing effects from the Cold War, I included a
dummy variable which measured whether the petitioner is from a former or current communist
state was also coded.

Models
In order to test these hypotheses I developed a series of models. By examining the effects
that several different variables have on asylum grant rates I was able to test several models of
bureaucratic and judicial behavior and compare each to my multi-institutional model. Up until
this point, research on immigration judge behavior has failed to adequately consider the range of
variables that potentially influence their behavior. In approaching immigration judges purely
through judicial models, previous scholars have failed to examine how their place within the
structure of a bureaucracy constrains their exercise of discretion. Studies that examined
immigration judges as cogs within a bureaucracy, failed to recognize the influence played by
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their personal preferences in their decisions. By adapting models designed to explain the
behavior of administrative law judges to the unique characteristics of immigration judges, I hope
to fill in the gaps of previous research.
Since each of the cases I examined ended in either a grant or denial of asylum, I used a
MLE Logit model. Logit models are appropriate for these types models where the dependent
variable is dichotomous. Decisions by immigration judges are either to grant or deny and will be
expressed through a dichotomous variable of 0 or 1.
In Chapter Six, I examine my data through three separate models. The first model I tested
applies theories developed in judicial attitudinal studies. Outside the control variables it focuses
on how the ideology of the immigration judges influenced their decisions. The second model
applies theories developed through top down bureaucratic studies. It includes the Congressional
and Executive ideology variables, Congressional hearings variables as well as variables related
to connections between the petitioner’s home country and the United States. These include trade,
military aid and whether the country was or had been a communist state. The third model is a
multi-institutional model which includes the variables present in the first two models as well as
variables concerning case load, mean court ideology and a public opinion variable. I then
compare the results from each model in order to determine whether the multi-institutional model
better explains the behavior of immigration judges in asylum decisions.
In Chapter seven I apply the multi-institutional model set forth in chapter Six to examine
whether variables related to Congressional and public attention to areas related to asylum and or
other immigration related matters influence which factors immigration courts rely on in making
their decisions on asylum cases. I am interested in determining whether the hypotheses
developed by Salehyan and Rosenblum (2008), in their top-down study of immigration court
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decisions hold up when variables relating to attitudinal and bottom-up theories are present. I am
also interested in testing a number of other interaction effects on the probability of obtaining
asylum success.
The first model I test in chapter seven examines whether the interaction between
variables measuring the number of human rights hearings and the effect of human rights record
of petitioner’s home country significantly impacts a petitioner’s probability of asylum success..
The second tests whether the interaction of the variable which measures Congressional attention
to immigration enforcement related issues with a variable which measured whether a petitioner is
from a country that receives military aid has a significant effect on a petitioner’s probability of
obtaining asylum. The third model examines whether the interaction between the variable that
measures Congressional attention to immigration enforcement related issues with a variable
which measured whether a petitioner is from a current or former communist country significantly
affects a petitioner’s probability of obtaining asylum. The fourth model examines whether the
interaction of the variable that measures Congressional attention to immigration enforcement
related issues with a variable which measured the extent of trade with the United States
significantly changes a petitioner’s chance of obtaining asylum. The fifth model examines
whether the interaction of the variable which measures Congressional attention to immigration
enforcement related issues is integrated with a variable which measures whether a petitioner is
from a country that produces a large number of fraudulent asylum claims affects probability of
asylum success. The sixth model examines whether interaction of the variable which measures
public attention towards asylum related with the variable that measures the political terror score
of a petitioner’s country of origin is significant.
In chapter eight I again apply the multi-institutional model to examine whether the events
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of 9/11 resulted in immigration judges placing more emphasis on certain variables in making
their asylum decisions. In order to determine this, I interact the variable that measures whether a
petitioner’s claim was brought before or after 9/11 with variables that measure the human rights
record of the petitioner’s country of origin, the political ideology of the petitioner’s country of
origin, the level of trade between the United States and the petitioner’s country of origin,
whether the petitioner’s country of origin receives military aid from the United States and
whether the petitioner’s country of origin produces large numbers of fraudulent asylum claims.
In chapter nine I examine variations on the multi-institutional model in order to
determine whether immigration judges with liberal, moderate or conservative ideologies are
affected by variables differently. The variations to the multi-institutional model examined in this
chapter all replace the judicial ideology score with a variable which places judges into one of
three groups based upon their ideology scores. By separating judges into one of three categories I
am able to determine whether judges react to certain variables based upon their ideology.
Through an examination of various interaction effects I am able to develop answers to a number
of questions. When judges have high case loads are they more likely to grant asylum if they are
liberal and less likely if they are conservative? Do all types of judges respond the same way
when Congressional ideology shifts? Are all types of judges affected similarly in response to the
ideology of other members of their court? Do different types of judges rely on different factors in
making their decisions, i.e., are liberal judges more likely to rely on human rights factors and
conservative judges more likely to look at political factors.
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CHAPTER VI - A COMPARISON OF MODELS OF IMMIGRATION
JUDGE BEHAVIOR IN ASYLUM CASES
As of yet no study has attempted to examine the behavior of immigration judges through
an approach that includes theories developed in judicial, top-down and bottom-up bureaucratic
studies. In this chapter I compare the results produced by two models that have previous been
applied to asylum decisions by immigration judges to my multi-institutional model. In order to
examine whether this multi-institutional approach provides a better understanding of
immigration judge behavior I apply each of the models to the same data set. The first model that
I intend to compare examines the data through the variables commonly used in attitudinally
based judicial models, chiefly focusing on the impact of judicial ideology on likelihood of
success. The second looks at a traditional top-down bureaucratic approach which focuses on
variables associated with the various institutions that supervise the decision maker. The third
model, is my multi-institutional model which combines variables used in the first two with ones
gleaned from studies that examine street level or bottom-up bureaucratic behavior as well as
strategic models of judicial behavior. By examining each of these models I was able to test a
number of hypotheses related to immigration judge behavior. I also hope to determine whether
the multi-institutional model provides additional leverage in understanding the behavior of
immigration judges as compared to either attitudinal or top-down bureaucratic approaches.

Hypotheses
Judicial Ideology
Numerous studies have shown that judges of all levels make decisions that reflect their
own ideology. (Segal and Spaeth 1993) In previous studies it has been shown that immigration
judges who were appointed during a Democratic president’s term are more likely to grant
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asylum. (Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag, 2008). This is particularly important given
reports that political connections played a larger role in the appointment of immigration judges
under the Bush presidency than was previously the norm. (Goldstein and Eggan 2007). In this
study I used the scoring system developed by Keith Holmes & Miller, 2013 & 2014 to measure
immigration judge ideology. Rather than using the ideology of the nominating president, Keith,
Holmes & Miller, examined the pre-nomination backgrounds of the judges in order to determine
their likely ideology. For example, judges with INS or prosecutorial backgrounds were scored as
more conservative than judges with non-profit immigrant rights backgrounds. I hypothesize that
ideology will continue to play a significant role in how immigration judges behave.
Hypothesis #1: The likelihood that an immigration judge will rule on the side of a petitioner
increases the more liberal the judge’s ideology score
Home Country Factors
A Number of studies have found a link between certain political factors and a petitioner’s
chance of obtaining asylum. Salehyan and Rosenblum (2008), found that petitioners from
countries with close economic and or military ties with the United States were less likely to
receive asylum. This is in keeping with the long established policy of using asylum for political
purposes. Salehyan and Rosenblum (2008), also found that petitioners from countries that are
perceived to be ideologically opposed to the United States, in particular those from former or
current communist states, are more likely to obtain asylum
Hypothesis #2: The likelihood that an immigration judge will rule on the side of a petitioner
decreases as the level of trade between the petitioner’s home country and the United States
increases.
Hypothesis #3: The likelihood that an immigration judge will rule on the side of a petitioner
decreases if the petitioner’s home country has military ties with the United States
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Hypothesis #4: The likelihood that an immigration judge will rule on the side of a petitioner
increases if the petitioner’s home country is or has ever been a Communist country

Judicial Oversight
Although studies have shown that judges of all levels make decisions in accordance with
their own ideology, it is apparent that higher courts do exercise some control over lower courts.
(Songer, Ginn and Sarver, 2003). Similarly, studies have also shown that the judiciary has the
potential to exercise control over the behavior of lower level bureaucrats. Howard and Nixon
(2002) found that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) modified decisions to audit taxes based
upon the ideology of the federal court which had jurisdiction over that particular branch of the
IRS. It was shown that as the judicial ideology of an appellate court shifted along a
liberal/conservative spectrum, the types of audits conducted changed. IRS offices in areas with
liberal courts of appeals would be more likely to focus on the equitable aspects of tax policy by
auditing the taxes of more rich filers. In offices that were under the jurisdiction of conservative
courts of appeals, IRS agents tended to audit larger numbers of less affluent tax returns while
reducing the number brought against wealthier tax filers.
In her 2003 study of the behavior of Army Corps of Engineers, Canes-Wrone (2003)
found a similar relationship between judicial philosophy and bureaucratic behavior. She found
that the ideology of the lower federal courts influenced the behavior of the corps in relation to
the grant of permits to develop wetlands. Similarly, Taratoot and Howard (2012) hypothesized
that the behavior of ALJ’s was influenced by the ideology of the circuit court which has
jurisdiction over their decisions.
Since asylum decisions are eventually brought before circuit courts, I hypothesize that
circuit ideology will have an impact on the behavior of immigration judges.
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Hypothesis #5: The likelihood that an immigration judge will rule in favor of a petitioner
increases as the average ideological scores of the justices on the circuit court that has jurisdiction
over the immigration judge becomes more liberal

Executive & Congressional Oversight
Studies have shown that both the Presidency and Congress have the power to influence
the behavior of bureaucrats as well as judges. (See eg. Moe 1982; Stewart and Cromartie, 1982;
Weingast and Moran, 1983) Snyder and Weingart (2000) found that the process of nominating
and confirming members of the National Labor Relations Board, provided both the president and
Congress with the ability to influence agency behavior.
I test the influence of the executive branch by examining the ideology score of the
president in office at the time of the asylum decision. The belief is that presidential ideology will
be reflected in attitudes towards the grant or denial of asylum. Immigration Judges would be
more likely to grant asylum during liberal President’s term than during conservative ones.
Hypothesis #6: The likelihood that an immigration judge will rule in favor of a petitioner
increases during presidential terms that are more liberal

The influence of Congressional oversight on Immigration Judge’s decisions will also be
examined. I test the influence of Congress in a two different ways. The first examines the how
the mean ideology score of Congress influences immigration judge’s decisions regarding asylum
cases. Since Congress has oversight responsibilities over immigration issues, the ideology of the
congressional committees that cover immigration issues should influence the likelihood that a
petitioner is granted asylum. Taratoot and Howard (2012) found that the ideology of committees
with oversight over the court influenced the behavior of ALJs in labor issues. I hypothesize that
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judges who are overseen by more liberal committees will be more likely to grant asylum than
judges who are overseen by more conservative committees.
Hypothesis #7: The likelihood that an immigration judge will rule in favor of petitioners,
decreases as the House or Senate committees responsible for oversight becomes more
conservative and increases as those committees become more liberal.

The second method for testing the influence of Congressional oversight on immigration
judge behavior examines the role of Congressional attention on immigration related areas.
Saleyhan and Rosenblum (2008) found that legislative attention to different aspects of
immigration issues influence the likelihood that a petitioner receives asylum. I hypothesize that
the more attention that Congress plays towards human rights issues related to immigration, the
greater the likelihood that an asylum applicant will obtain success. When Congress pays more
attention to immigration enforcement issues, it decreases the likelihood that an applicant obtains
success.
Hypothesis #8: The likelihood that an immigration judge will grant asylum increases during
periods of increased legislative attention towards human rights issues.
Hypothesis #9: The likelihood that an immigration judge will grant asylum decreases during
periods of increased legislative attention towards immigration enforcement issues.
Panel/Agency Effects
Since most immigration judges make decisions in a particular court for their entire
careers, I hypothesize that their behavior will be influenced by the culture of the particular court.
Judicial scholars have examined how other judges who sit on the same appellate panels influence
behavior. This is generally referred to as panel effects. Scholars have found that the ideology of
the other judges sitting on a panel can make a judge more or less likely to decide a case in a
liberal direction. Although immigration judges do not sit on panels, I hypothesize that the
behavior of other judges in the same court will influence their likelihood to grant asylum.
81

Similarly, bureaucratic scholars have examined the role of organizational characteristics
in the exercise of discretion. Such factors as organizational flexibility or formalization can
influence bureaucratic behavior at the street level. (Aiken and Hage, 1967; Peyrot 1982)
Additionally, scholars such as Kelly (1994) have argued that the values emphasized throughout
an agency’s culture can influence the level and type of discretion exercised by street-level
bureaucrats. I hypothesize that the ideology of the other judges in an immigration judge’s court
will influence the probability that the judge grants asylum.

Hypothesis #10: The likelihood that an immigration judge will rule in favor of. petitioner
increases as the average ideology of the other judges in the same immigration court becomes
more liberal
Case Load
A number of studies of street level bureaucrats have revealed that work load plays a part
in the exercise of discretion. High case-loads have been shown to increase the role played by
bureaucrats personal preferences in making decisions to provide services. (Prottas 1979) When
work load is high, street level bureaucrats are more likely to ignore agency policy and make
decisions based upon their own preferences. (Taylor & Kelly, 2006). By measuring the total case
load handled by each immigration court, and comparing it to the ideology score of the
immigration judge making the decision, I hope to be able to gauge the role of work load on the
exercise of personal discretion. I hypothesize that as workload increases, judges will be more
likely to deny asylum.
Hypothesis #11: The likelihood that an Immigration Judge will grant asylum to a petitioner will
decrease the larger the case load assigned to the immigration judge.
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Table 1: List of Variables included in Each Model
Variable
Trade

Model A
Model B
(Attitudinal) (Bureaucratic)
✔
✔

Model C (MultiInstitutional)
✔

Unemployment %

✔

✔

✔

Human rts Score

✔

✔

✔

Communist State

✔

✔

✔

Represented

✔

✔

✔

Military Aid

✔

✔

✔

Pre/Post 9/11

✔

✔

✔

Gender of Judge

✔

✔

✔

Top Ten Fraud

✔

✔

✔

Defensive Case

✔

✔

✔

Border Court

✔

✔

✔

Imm Judge Ideology

✔

NA

✔

Congress Ideology

NA

✔

✔

Presidential Id

NA

✔

✔

Human rts hearings

NA

✔

✔

Enforcement hearings

NA

✔

✔

Ashcroft Revisions

NA

✔

✔

Gonzales Revisions

NA

✔

✔

Real ID Act

NA

✔

✔

Circuit Ideology

NA

✔

✔

Times Count

NA

NA

✔

Immigration ct mean

NA

NA

✔

Total Case

NA

NA

✔

Judicial ID Type

NA

NA

✔

✔=In Model

NA=Not Applied in Model
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This chapter examines three models. Model A is based upon attitudinal theories
concerning judicial behavior. Model B is based upon theories developed through top-down
studies of bureaucratic behavior. Model C is the multi-institutional model which incorporates
theories developed in both top-down and bottom-up bureaucratic studies as well as those
developed through attitudinally based judicial studies.
Each of the models contains the same control variables. The control variables include a
variable which measures whether the petitioner is represented by an attorney, the type of relief
sought by the petitioner, a dummy variable separating the data into pre and post 9/11 decisions, a
measure of nationwide unemployment, the human rights record of the petitioner’s country of
origin, the gender of the judge, whether the petitioner is from a country that produces a large
number of fraudulent asylum applicants, whether the petitioner brought the claim as a defense
against deportation and whether the immigration court is in a state that is adjacent to a border.
In addition to control variables, Model A includes a variable measuring the ideology of
immigration judges based upon their backgrounds.
Model B focuses on the role of other institutions as well as public opinion on the
behavior of immigration judges. In addition to the control variables, this top down approach
examines a number of variables which are designed to measure the goals and motivations of
institutional actors who exercise various levels of oversight over immigration judges. As
members of the federal bureaucracy, immigration judges are part of the executive branch and
have the potential to be influenced by presidential politics. In order to measure this, model B
includes a measure of presidential ideology. To further measure the influence of the executive
branch I have included variables which demarcate changes in policy brought about under the
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terms of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and John Ashcroft. In order to measure
Congressional influence, I have included a variable which measures mean Congressional
ideology during the year that each decision was made, as an additional measure of potential
Congressional influence model B includes variables which measure the number of Congressional
hearings held regarding immigration enforcement issues as well as hearings that focus on human
rights concerns related to immigration respectively. The influence of the passage of the RealID
Act, which dramatically changed what types of proofs that asylum applicants must provide is
included through the use of a dummy variable. In order to measure the effects of foreign policy
concerns, model B includes variables which measure the amount of trade the petitioner’s home
country has with the United States, whether military aid is exchanged between the countries and
whether the country petitioner is from a country that is or has been a traditional ideological
enemy of the United States.
Model C includes the control variables as well as the variables used in models A and B.
In addition it includes variables which were derived from bottom-up studies of bureaucratic
behavior as well as strategic judicial behavior theories. As a measure of case load, I have
included a variable which examines the total number of cases handled in each immigration court
foe each year. In order to examine whether immigration judges are influenced by the ideology of
other judges in the same court, I have included a variable which measures the mean ideology of
the other judges in that court who made decisions that year. The impact of public opinion is
measured in a variable which counts the number of stories related to asylum issues published in
the New York Times for each year.

Results
The results of each of the models are listed together in Table 5.2. The results from the
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Model A, the attitudinal model are presented in column A, the results from Model B, the topdown bureaucratic model, are listed in column B and the results from Model C, the multiinstitutional model are listed in column C.
Table 2: Results for Attitudinal, Top-down bureaucratic and Multi-Institutional Models
Dependent Variable Decision to deny or grant asylum Coded as 0 or 1
List of Marginal Effects on Possibility of Obtaining Asylum for Each Variable
across its range
Variable
Trade
Unemployment %
Human rts Score
Communist State
Represented
Military Aid
Pre/Post 9/11
Gender of Judge
Top Ten Fraud
Defensive Case
Border Court
Imm Judge Ideology
Congress Ideology
Presidential Id
Human rts hearings
Enforcement hearings
Ashcroft Revisions
Gonzales Revisions
Real ID Act
Circuit Ideology
Times Count
Immigration ct mean
Total Case
Judicial ID Type

Model A
(Attitudinal)
-.3114
-.00921
.1367
,1579
.229
-.1156
-.0084
.102
-.1454
-.0828
-.031
.1767
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

Model B
(Bureaucratic)
-.3256
.06
.1386
.159
.227
-.1117
-.065
.111
-.1348
-.05395
-.0432
NA
.000006
-.0165
.0438
-.0363
.02488
-.0020
.0835
-.1037
NA
NA
NA
NA

Model C
(Multi-Institutional)
-.3166
.087
.1305
.161
.225
-.1337
-.0934
.093
--.1296
-.0531
-.01920
.0992
.00001
-.00186
.0287
-.0233
.0841
-.043
.0955
-.0534
.051
.2234
-.0278

Due to the large sample size it is not surprising that a large number of the variables examined
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showed statistical significance. However, a number of the variables that show statistical
significance have very small marginal effects on the probability of obtaining asylum. Table 5.3
lists the marginal effects of each variable for each model in which it was applied.

Control Variables
In each model the control variables proved to be significant and in the direction previous
research would suggest. Female judges are more likely to grant asylum than male judges. The
marginal effect of gender ranges from 10% in the attitudinal model to 9.3% in the multiinstitutional model. Petitioners from countries with poor human rights records are 13% more
likely to achieve asylum than those from countries with good human rights records. Petitioners
from countries that produce large numbers of fraudulent asylum claims are between 13% and
14.5% less likely to gain asylum than those from other countries. Claims brought in courts that
are in southern border-states are between 2% and 4% less likely to be granted than those brought
in other states.
Petitioners from countries with which the United States have extensive economic ties are
less likely to obtain asylum than those from countries that do not have high levels of trade with a
difference in probability of obtaining asylum of over 30% in all three models between countries
that do little to no trade with the United States and those that conduct the most trade. Similarly,
petitioners from countries that have military ties with the United States are less likely to receive
asylum than petitioners from countries that do not. Petitioners from countries that receive
military aid from the United States have 9% less of a chance to obtain asylum than those that are
from countries that do not. The fact that political ideology still plays a role in asylum decisions
can be seen in the fact that petitioners from current or former communist states are more likely to
receive asylum than petitioners from other countries. The marginal effect of being from a
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country that is or was a communist country is 15%.
One interesting difference is that found in the variable that measures unemployment.
While Model A, which examines the attitudinal model, shows a rather small decrease in asylum
success as unemployment rates increase, Models B and C show a 6% to 8.7% increase. This is
somewhat surprising given that public attitudes towards immigration usually become less
welcoming when unemployment rates are high. Previous studies have suggested the same result
and hypothesized that the reason behind the uptick in success rates during periods of higher
unemployment reflects an increase in the quality of asylum claims brought about during times
when fewer applicants are filing asylum claims for economic purposes. Having the control
variables prove to be significant and largely in the hypothesized direction gives me confidence
that the models are correctly formulated.

Operant Variables
Judicial ideology is shown to be significant and in the direction predicted in models A
and C. The more liberal the judge the greater the chance that the judge decides on behalf of a
petitioner. The results of the Model A, the attitudinal model, show that across the range of
immigration judge ideology, there is an almost 18% difference in the probability of obtaining
asylum between the most conservative and liberal judges. Model C, the multi-institutional
model, shows an increase of 10%.
A large number of the top-down bureaucratic variables are also significant and in the
predicted direction. As Congress as an institution becomes more conservative, petitioners have
less of a chance to obtain asylum. However, in the models where this variable was included, the
marginal effect was actually quite small, less than .006%. The ideology of the president during
the time that a petitioner’s case is decided also proves to be significant but with a minor impact
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on the probability of asylum success with less than a 1% increase in the multi-institutional
model.
A couple of the bureaucratic variables are significant but in unforeseen directions. It was
assumed that the additional restrictions established through the Real ID Act and changes wrought
under Attorney General Ashcroft would result in a lower level of asylum success, yet both
variables show a positive impact on success with both having as high as an 8% increase in the
probability of obtaining asylum. The variables which measure the effect of Attorney General
Gonzales’ reforms proved to be significant in the direction anticipated. The marginal effect of
these reforms is shown to be over 4% in Model C but .2% in model B.
Variables associated with bottom-up bureaucratic and strategic judicial approaches also
are significant. As the total number of cases handled by an immigration court increase, the
chances that an asylum applicant is successful decreases. However, the marginal effect across the
range of cases heard by each court is relatively modest at 2.8%. Also, as the mean ideology of
the rest of the immigration court becomes more conservative the chances of asylum applicant
success decreases significantly. The difference in probability of asylum success between
immigration courts with the most conservative ideologies and the most liberal is 22%.
The variable that measures public attention towards asylum issues also proves to be
significant. In years where public opinion is focused on asylum related issues, immigration
judges are 5.1% more likely to grant asylum.
Table 5.2 sets forth the results of a number of the tests for fitness. The multi-institutional
model has higher pseudo-R squared than either of the other two models.
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Discussion
Through an analysis of these three models it is possible to draw a number of conclusions.
The first is that the results confirm a vast majority of the hypotheses. Liberal judges are more
likely to grant asylum than conservative judges. Petitioners from countries with ideological, trade
or military ties to the United States are less likely to obtain asylum than those from countries that
do not have these ties. During years in which immigration judges are overseen by a Congress
that is more concerned with human rights issue, immigration judges are more likely to grant
asylum, when focus is on enforcement they are less likely. The ideology of Congress and the
Presidency also play a statistically significant role. Judges who make decisions in courts where
the other judges are liberal are more likely to grant asylum. The busier that judges are, the more
likely they are to deny asylum.
A number of these findings have never been reported before. The large marginal effect on
probability of asylum success that mean immigration court ideology plays on chances to obtain
asylum is a novel finding. I do not believe that such effects have been shown in a non-collegial
court. Since immigration judges do not have to work with each other when they make their
decisions, like members of the courts of appeals where collegial behavior has been shown to
influence judicial behavior, it is not initially apparent what would cause such a significant impact
on the behavior of immigration judges. The effect of mean immigration court ideology may
reveal that immigration courts are more similar to street level bureaucracies than traditional
courts. Previous studies have shown that the behavior of street level bureaucrats can be
influenced by agency culture. When a judge makes decisions in an atmosphere surrounded by
judges who are either strongly liberal or conservative it appears that they are either more or less
likely to grant asylum respectively.
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This research is also the first to find a connection between case load and the probability
of obtaining asylum. Studies of street level bureaucracies have found that as case load increases,
agents are more likely to act in accordance with their personal preferences. The results from this
research reveal that immigration judges are also similar to bureaucrats in this manner as well.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that traditional approaches to
understanding immigration judge behavior are not sufficient. Past work on immigration judges
has shown that ideology plays a role in their decision making process. (Ramji-Nogales,
Schoenholtz, Schrag 2008). But such studies never examined how political, economic and social
factors influenced judicial behavior. Conversely, while previous bureaucratically centered
studies of immigration judge behavior examined a number political, economic and social factors,
they did not include the role of judicial ideology. Furthermore, no previous studies have
examined the role of case load and the ideology of other judges in the same court on IJ behavior.
The results of my multi-institutional model show that approaches which fail to examine the
totality of the factors influencing judicial behavior in asylum proceedings are deficient.
What is clear is that immigration judges do not behave entirely like other judges nor do
they behave entirely like bureaucrats. While the results show that these judges make decisions
based upon their judicial ideologies, it is apparent that models relying on ideology alone fail to
adequately explain the complexity of their decision making process. The attitudinal model,
model A, has a significantly lower pseudo-R squared than either of the other two models. Given
that ideology plays a significant part in immigration judge behavior, it is not appropriate to apply
top-down bureaucratic models either. Model B, the top=down bureaucratic model, has a lower
pseudo-R squared than Model C, the multi-institutional model.
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However, in order to truly grasp whether the multi-institutional model is a significant
advancement upon previous approaches to studying immigration judge behavior it is important to
go beyond merely looking at statistics like Pseudo R2. One way to determine the benefits
provided by the multi-institutional model can be seen examining how the marginal effects of
variables change in size as well as sign across the models. If the only model examined was the
attitudinal model (Model A) one would have been misled about the effects of both
unemployment as well as the importance of judicial ideology. In Model A, higher unemployment
rates have a negative effect on the probability of obtaining asylum. In both Models B & C,
higher unemployment has a positive correlation with asylum success. The results from Models B
& C are consistent with previous studies regarding the role of unemployment and asylum
success. The policy implications of this difference are significant. Rather than finding that judges
respond to economic situations in the country by granting asylum at a lower rate, we are left to
develop different hypotheses. Previous scholars who have found similar results have posited that
high unemployment rates coincide with a reduction in economically based immigration and thus
a decrease in the number of immigrants who fraudulently try to use the asylum system. (Keith
Holmes & Miller, 2013)
Additionally, the marginal effect of immigration judge ideology on probability of asylum
success is exaggerated in the attitudinal model. (Model A). With the addition of the other
variables in the multi-institutional model (Model C), the marginal effect goes from 18% in the
attitudinal model to 10% in multi-institutional model. While the effect is still quite large in multiinstitutional model, a reliance on the outcomes produced in attitudinal would dramatically
overstate the influence of judicial ideology on asylum decisions.
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An examination of the marginal effects also reveals that the multi-institutional model is a
significant improvement over the bureaucratic model (Model B). The most obvious improvement
is the inclusion of the judicial ideology variable. The bureaucratic model, does not include
judicial ideology which, as discussed above,. has a large marginal effect on the probability of
asylum success. Similarly, the inclusion of the variable which measures the mean ideology of the
other judges in the same immigration court in the multi-institutional model is a significant
improvement over the bureaucratic model. The large marginal effect that the ideology of the
other judges on an immigration court has on a petitioner’s probability of obtaining asylum could
not be ascertained under the bureaucratic model.
Another improvement seen in the multi-institutional model is the inclusion of a measure
of public interest in asylum related issues. The variable which measures the number of articles in
the New York Times that addressed asylum related issues in the year that a petitioner’s case was
decided proved the be both statistically significant as well as producing a relatively substantial
change in the probability of obtaining asylum. Petitioners who brought their claims in years with
the most public attention towards asylum related issues were 5% more likely to obtain asylum
than petitioners who brought their claims in years with the lowest level of interest.
While the results have answered a number of questions regarding the behavior of
immigration judges, a number of concerns remain. The first question relates to evidence that
seems to show that judges rely on different factors in making their decisions depending upon the
overall political and social environment. For example, are immigration judges more likely to
based their decisions on political factors, such as economic or military ties to a petitioner’s
country of origin during times when Congress is focusing on cracking down on illegal
immigration? When the country is focusing on the plight of refugees and have generally positive
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feelings towards asylum, are immigration judges more likely to focus on the human rights
aspects of a petitioner’s claim? I will examine these questions through the use of interaction
terms in chapter Seven.
An additional area of concern involves the potential for changes following the events of
9/11. While a number of studies have shown that judges granted asylum at a lower rate following
9/11, there has, as of yet, been no in-depth analysis into how these events changed the factors
judges rely upon in making decisions to grant or deny asylum. I attempt to address this concern
in chapter Eight.
Yet another concern that I have with this model is based upon what appear to be false
assumptions about the role that judicial ideology plays. The models assume that judges of
different ideological bents will respond to constraints or lack thereof in the same way. This is a
basic assumption of simple rational choice models. Thus we are to assume that a liberal judge
will respond to a conservative president in the same way as a conservative judge. Or that policies
that provide more discretion to judges will result in similar behavior regardless of judicial
ideology. Immigration judges do not appear to behave in this manner. I attempt to address these
questions in chapter Nine.
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CHAPTER VII -INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS ON
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BEHAVIOR
The results from the models examined in chapter Six suggest that immigration judges
respond to trends in political attention towards and public opinion on issues related to
immigration. The key appears to be that at different times, certain variables have more influence
on immigration judge behavior than others. Sometimes judges appear to give more weight to the
human rights records of a petitioner’s country of origin. During other periods, judges appear to
give more weight towards political concerns, such as the political, economic and military ties a
petitioner’s home country has with the United States. In this chapter I intend to extend upon the
work of Saleyhan and Rosenblum (2008) in order to determine whether immigration judges give
more weight to some variables based upon political or public focus. They found evidence that
when Congress and the public focus on different aspects of the immigration issue, immigration
judges give more weight towards either political or human rights variables. In this chapter I test
their hypotheses through the use of interaction effects in my multi-institutional model.
The hypotheses in this chapter delve into to dual role that asylum has played in the
United States for decades. The grant or denial of asylum continues to have political connotations
both domestically and internationally. During periods where public and political forces are
fixated upon immigration as a law enforcement issue, it is reasonable to expect that asylum grant
rates will go down. The results from the multi-institutional model in chapter six show this to be
true. During these periods, petitioners are still being granted asylum, but the factors that
determine likelihood of asylum success change. I hypothesize that during these enforcement
centered periods, immigration judges give more emphasis towards the political factors that
influence whether a person is granted asylum. When asylum becomes an issue that is tied up
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with law enforcement, judges are more likely to place more emphasis on political, economic and
military ties between a petitioner’s home-country than the human rights record of that country. I
also examine what occurs during public and Congressional attention towards issues related to
humanitarian aspects of the immigration issue. I hypothesize that during periods where political
and public concern focuses on human rights issues related to immigration, judges place more of
an emphasis on human rights records from petitioners’ countries of origin.
This research is building upon the work of Salehyan and Rosenblum (2008), who
examined immigration decisions through the lens of a principal-agent models developed through
research on bureaucracies. Salehyan and Rosemblum researched how changes in Congressional
attention towards different aspects of the immigration issue, lead to changes in the weight that
immigration judges placed upon certain characteristics of asylum applicants in making their
determinations of whether to grant protection. In their models, immigration judges were the
agents who responded to oversight by principals Congress and the Executive branch. Given the
role that asylum has traditionally played in foreign policy, Salehyan and Rosenblum assumed
that the executive branch would tend to emphasize immigration judges to focus more on political
factors when making decisions whether to grant or deny asylum. The Executive branch would be
more concerned with avoiding the grant of asylum to countries that had strong economic or
military ties to the United States, while at the same time encouraging the grant of asylum to
petitioners who were from countries that were ideologically opposed to the United States. The
Executive branch would also press immigration judges to control the flow of illegal immigration
by closely monitoring claims brought by people from countries that traditionally produce large
numbers of fraudulent claims. Congress, on the other hand would not naturally be focused on
emphasizing the political aspects of asylum at all times. Rather, it would be more likely to be
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subject to outside influences, such as pressure from the public and interest groups. During times
when public attention is drawn towards immigration enforcement problems, Congress would be
more likely to be in line with the Executive branch in encouraging their agents the immigration
judges to focus on political factors in granting asylum. However, when national attention is
drawn to human rights catastrophes, Congress would play a role that was counter to the natural
inclinations of the Executive. During these periods, Congress would send signals to immigration
judges that human rights concerns should be preeminent in making asylum decisions.
Salehyan and Rosenblum’s study was limited however, in the fact that it did not examine
any characteristics of immigration judges, the courts they sat on, or the Circuit Courts that had
jurisdiction over them. Rather they merely examined the rate at which petitioners from each
country were granted asylum. Since my data set includes information regarding the immigration
judge who decided each case, the mean ideology of the immigration court where the judge sat
and the mean ideology of the circuit that had jurisdiction over any appeal, his will be the first
time that these hypotheses will be examined within the context of a model that includes both topdown/principal agent and bottom-up/street level methodologies.
Each of the models contains the same control and operant variables examined in the
multi-institutional model as described in chapter Six. The only change in each is the inclusion of
an interaction between two variables. Interaction effects were then examined for significance and
marginal effect upon probability of success. I chose to examine each of these hypotheses using a
different model in order to remove any chance of problems associated with multi-collinearity.
Although I recognize that with my large sample size that such problems would most likely not be
significant.
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Hypotheses
Congressional Oversight
A number of top-down/principal-agent bureaucratic scholars have examined the role that
Congress plays in controlling the behavior of the bureaucratic agencies over which they had
oversight. (See eg. Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
Specifically, Saleyhan and Rosenblum (2008), argued that when Congress paid more attention to
human rights aspects of immigration, the human rights records of a petitioner’s country of origin
played a greater role in whether that petitioner received asylum. When Congress focused on
enforcement issues, immigration judges would give more concern to political issues, such as
military relationships, economic ties, whether the petitioner was from a country that produced a
large number of fraudulent claims or whether the petitioner was from a communist country. I
intend to examine these findings through interacting the variable that measures the number of
enforcement related hearings held in a particular year and variables associated with both the
political and human rights aspects of asylum.
Hypothesis #1: The likelihood that an immigration judge will make a decision based on human
rights factors increases during periods of increased legislative attention towards human rights
issues
Hypothesis #2: The likelihood that an immigration judge will make a decision based on political
factors increases during periods of increased legislative attention towards enforcement issues.

Public Opinion
Building upon the Rosenblum and Salehyan (2008) work and Taratoot and Howard
(2012), this research examines the extent that public opinion influences immigration judges’
decisions whether or not to grant asylum. Rosenblum and Salehyan (2008) found that when
public attention is focused on asylum issues, immigration judges are more likely to base asylum
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issues on human rights concerns than on political concerns. Through the interaction of the
variable which measures public attention towards asylum related issues and the variable which
measures the human rights record of the petitioner’s country of origin, I will test these findings
in the context of the multi-institutional model.
Hypothesis #3: The likelihood that an immigration judge will make a decision based on human
rights factors increases during periods of increased media attention towards asylum issues

Models
This chapter examines a number of models each of which is built upon the multiinstitutional model outlined in chapter Six. All of the models examine a dichotomous
independent variable which is scored as 0, if a petitioner is denied asylum and a 1 if the
petitioner is granted asylum. Each model is examined through a logistic regression using the
LOGIT command in STATA. Each of the models contains all of the variables present in the
multi-institutional model set forth in chapter Six.
The models examined in this chapter first examine how changes in the type and intensity
of Congressional attention towards asylum/immigration related issues impacts the weight that
political and human rights factors play in a petitioner’s probability of obtaining asylum. The next
model examines how public attention towards asylum related issues influences the extent that
immigration judges rely on the human rights records of a petitioner’s country of origin in making
determinations whether to grant or deny asylum

The Effect of Congressional Attention Towards Asylum Related Issues
Model D examines the interaction between Congressional attention towards human rights
issues during a particular year and the weight placed upon human rights records of a petitioner’s
country of origin. Congressional attention towards human rights issues is measured by counting
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the number of Congressional hearings in a year that had, as their main focus, humanitarian
concerns related to immigration. The number of human rights related hearings is then interacted
with the human rights/political terror index score for the petitioner’s country of origin.

The Effect of Congressional Attention Towards Immigration Enforcement
Related Issues
Model E examines the interaction between Congressional attention towards enforcement
based aspects of immigration and the weight immigration judges place on whether the United
States provides military aid to a petitioner’s country of origin. In order to determine the level of
Congressional attention being focused on enforcement related issues I measured the number of
Congressional hearings held in each year in which enforcement based aspects of immigration
were the primary focus. This was then interacted with a variable which measures whether the
petitioner’s country of origin received military aid from the United States during that particular
year.
Models F, G and H, also examine interactions between variables and Congressional
attention towards enforcement issues. Model F examines the interaction between Congressional
attention towards enforcement issues during a particular year and the weight immigration judges
place on whether a petitioner is from a current or former communist country. Model G examines
the interaction between the number of enforcement based hearings in Congress during a
particular year and the weight immigration judges place on the extent of trade a petitioner’s
home country has with the United States. Model H examines the interaction between the number
of enforcement based hearings in Congress during a particular year and the weight immigration
judges place on whether a petitioner is from a country that is one of the top ten in producing
fraudulent claims for asylum in the United States.
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Public Attention Toward Asylum Related Issues
Model I moves away from focusing on the role of Congress in order to examine the role
that public attention plays in shifting the calculus used by immigration judges in making
decisions on asylum cases. This model examines the interaction between public attention on
asylum related issues and the political terror score of a petitioner’s country of origin. Public
attention is gauged through a count of the number of New York Times articles which focused on
asylum related issues in that particular year. This interaction attempts to determine whether
immigration judges place greater weight on human rights factors during periods where the public
pays greater attention to asylum related issues.
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Results
I.

Results for Model D: Interaction of the number of human rights hearings and the effect of

human rights record of petitioner’s home country on probability of asylum success.
Table 3: Model D: Human Rights Hearings/Human Rights Score
Logistic regression
LR chi2(31). . =. 31990.75
Prob > chi2. . =. . 0.0000
Log likelihood = -120574.09
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commie
judicialide~y
gender
toptenimmig~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
humanrights~s
humanrights~ 2
humanrights~ 3
humanrights~ 4
humanrights~5
_cons
* P< 0.05

Coef.
.421
1.091034
-1.92702
.0004362
-.000523
-.278977
.0051932
.0895207
-.005970
.0532523
.2830214
-.155523
.3955889
.0888762
-3.12e-06
-.482899
.6454272
.138929
.3913848
-.601204
-5.69e-06
-.310145
-.213129
-.052160
|
-.133026
-.03129
-.061696
-.114994
-.378796
** P< 0.01

Number of obs. =. . 201674

Pseudo R2. . . =. . 0.1171
Std. Err.
.020716
.0242267
.0186165
.0001086
.0002982
.0318026
.0179835
.0444164
.0022
.0116448
.0495767
.0241975
.0238343
.0840839
5.87e-08
.0140435
.0134767
.0090754
.0103091
.0153521
8.14e-07
.0465547
.0181413
.0130349

z
20.32
45.03
-103.5
4.02
-1.75
-8.77
0.29
2.02
-2.71
4.57
5.71
-6.43
16.60
1.06
-53.15
-34.39
47.89
15.31
37.97
-39.16
-6.99
-6.66
-11.75
-4.00

P>|z|
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.079
0.000***
0.773
. 0.044*
0.007***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.291
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3803974
.4616026
1.043551
1.138517
-1.96351
-1.890534
.0002234
.0006491
-.001107
.0000615
-.341309
-.2166455
-.030053
.0404402
.0024661
.1765752
-.010282
-.0016589
.0304289
.0760757
.1858529
.3801899
-.202949
-.108097
.3488746
.4423032
-.075925
.2536776
-3.23e-06
-3.00e-06
-.510424
-.4553748
.6190134
.671841
.1211416
.1567164
.3711793
.4115902
-.631294
-.571115
-7.28e-06
-4.09e-06
-.401391
-.2189002
-.248686
-.1775733
-.077708
-.0266123

.0463204
-2.87
.0448356
-0.70
.0448567
-1.38
.0468661
-2.45
.1382627
-2.74
***P< 0.001

0.004**
0.485
0.169
. 0.014*
0.006

-.223812
-.119166
-.149613
-.206850
-.649786
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-.0422403
.0565862
.0262212
-.0231389
-.1078061

The results of model D in which the number of human rights hearings held by Congress
during the year that a petitioner’s claim was adjudicated were interacted with the human rights
record of the petitioner’s home country are mixed. The interaction is significant only for
petitioners who come from countries that score 2 and 5 on the political terror scale. Countries
that receive a 2 on the political terror scale are generally respectful of human rights. Countries
with a political terror score of 5 are considered to be the worst human rights violators. In regards
to countries with scores of 2 and 5 , the more hearings that are held in a year regarding human
rights, the less the immigration judges rely on human rights in making decisions.
While it is true that the model shows that this interaction is significant, the marginal
effect on the probability of obtaining asylum is relatively small. There is only a change of three
percent for petitioners from countries that received a political terror score of five and 4% for
those whose home country received a score of 2.
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Figure 1: Effect On Probability Of Asylum Success By Human Rights Hearings/ Human Rights
Record Interaction With All Other Variables At Mean.
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II.

Results for Model E: Interaction of the number of Congressional Enforcement. hearings

and the effect of whether the petitioner is from a country that receives U.S Military aid on
probability of asylum success.
Table 4: Model E: Enforcement Hearings by Military Aid
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(28) = 32098.81
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1175

Log likelihood = -120520.06
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
toptenimmig~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
militaryaid#/
hearingsenf~t
_cons
* P< 0.05

Coef.
.4204422
1.091885
-1.93326
.000458
-.000532
-.301052
.0114524
.0276888
.0116117
.051797
.2925534
-.163326
.400962
-.11794
-3.09e-0
-.218452
.6611893
.1376064
.3914899
-.591287
-5.59e-0
-.321534
-.213075
-.058644
-.023749

Std. Err.
.0207226
.0242107
.0186333
.0001088
.0002971
.031737
.0179299
.0070278
.0025409
.0116351
.0496334
.0242336
.0238999
.0473833
5.86e-08
.024783
.0134745
.0090763
.0103129
.0153359
8.14e-07
.0465714
.0181387
.0130402
.0018676

z
20.29
45.10
-103
4.21
-1.79
-9.49
0.64
3.94
4.57
4.45
5.89
-6.74
16.78
-2.49
-52.8
-8.81
49.07
15.16
37.96
-38.5
-6.87
-6.90
-11.7
-4.50
-12.7

P>|z
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.073
0.000***
0.523
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.013*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

-.454688 .1225782 -3.71
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

0.000
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[95% Conf. Interval]
.3798265 .4610578
1.044433 1.139337
-1.96978
-1.89674
.0002449 .0006712
-.001114 .0000498
-.363256
-.238849
-.023689 .0465943
.0139147
.041463
.0066317 .0165918
.0289927 .0746013
.1952737 .3898331
-.210823
-.115829
.3541191 .4478049
-.210809
-.025070
-3.21e-06
-2.9e-06
-.267026
-.169878
.6347797 .6875988
.1198172 .1553957
.371277 .4117029
-.621345
-.561229
-7.18e-06
-3.9e-06
-.412812
-.230256
-.248626
-.177523
-.084202
-.033086
-.027409
-.020089
-.694937

-.214439

The results of model E in which Congressional attention to immigration enforcement
related issues is integrated with a variable which measured whether a petitioner is from a country
that receives military aid from the United States show that the interaction is both statistically
significant as well as producing a rather large change in the marginal effect on the probability of
asylum success. As Congress gives more attention to immigration enforcement related issues,
whether a petitioner is from a country that receives military aid from the United States plays a
more significant role in an immigration judge’s decision to grant or deny asylum. Additionally,
as the number of enforcement hearings per year increase, the change in probability of success for
petitioners from countries that receive military aid decreases by 11%. Across the same range of
enforcement hearings, the probability of achieving success for petitioners from countries that are
not military allies to the United States increases by 12%.
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Figure 2: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Enforcement Hearings/
Military Aid Interaction
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Results for Model F: Interaction of the number of Congressional Enforcement. hearings

and the effect of whether the petitioner is from a country that was or is currently a communist
state.
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Table 5: Model F: Enforcement Hearings by Commie
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(28) = 32112.58
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1176

Log likelihood = -120513.18
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
toptenimmig~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
commienocom~e
/hearingsenf~t
_cons
* P< 0.05

Coef.
.4242596
1.092854
-1.93506
.0004906
-.000558
-.311116
.0141247
.0276503
-.012655
.052263
.3071515
-.161879
.4049719
-.103440
-3.10e-06
-.488465
.3863623
.1378731
.390062
-.599357
-5.47e-06
-.312045
-.214624
-.057886
.0253369

Std. Err.
.0207257
.0242137
.0186454
.0001089
.000297
.0317714
.0179347
.0070349
.0022652
.0116359
.0497064
.024253
.0239337
.0473652
5.86e-08
.0140483
.0241402
.0090765
.0103137
.0153182
8.14e-07
.0465682
.0181401
.0130407
.0019162

z
20.47
45.13
-103.7
4.50
-1.88
-9.79
0.79
3.93
-5.59
4.49
6.18
-6.67
16.92
-2.18
-52.89
-34.77
16.00
15.19
37.82
-39.13
-6.73
-6.70
-11.83
-4.44
13.22

P>|z
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.060
0.000***
0.431
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.029*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

-.248844
.1219063
-2.04
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

0.041

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3836381
.4648812
1.045396
1.140312
-1.971609
-1.89852
.000277
.0007041
-.0011403
.0000239
-.3733872
-.2488454
-.0210266
.049276
.0138622
.0414384
-.0170948
-.0082154
.0294571
.0750689
.2097288
.4045743
-.209414
-.1143442
.3580627
.451881
-.1962749
-.0106067
-3.21e-06
-2.98e-06
-.5159991
-.4609309
.3390484
.4336762
.1200835
.1556627
.3698476
.4102765
-.6293808
-.5693347
-7.07e-06
-3.88e-06
-.4033171
-.2207731
-.2501779
-.1790701
-.0834457
-.032327
.0215811
.0290926
-.4877764

-.0099126

The results of model F in which Congressional attention to immigration enforcement
related issues is integrated with a variable which measured whether a petitioner is from a current
or former communist country show that the interaction is both statistically significant as well as
producing a sizable change in the marginal effect on the probability of obtaining asylum. As
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Congress gives more attention to immigration enforcement related issues, whether a petitioner is
from a current or former communist state country plays a more significant role in an immigration
judge’s decision to grant or deny asylum.
The results also show a substantial change in the marginal effect on the probability of
asylum success when these variables are examined through an interaction. As the number of
Congressional enforcement hearings increases from the lowest year of 1 to the highest of 41, the
probability of success for petitioners from current or former communist countries increases by
12%. Across the same range of numbers of enforcement hearings, petitioners from noncommunist countries decreased by 10%.
Figure 3: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Enforcement Hearings/
Communist Interaction
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Results for Model G: Interaction of the number of Congressional Enforcement hearings

and the effect of the level of trade a petitioner’s country has with the United States has on the
probability of success of asylum.
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Table 6: Model G: Enforcement Hearings by Trade
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(28) = 32018.98
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1172

Log likelihood = -120559.98
courtapplnd~c

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

mean5
.422977
.020722 20.4
represented
1.09814
.024241 45.3
asylum1tort~2
-1.91522
.018620 -102
timescount
.000433
.000108 4.00
congresside~y
-.000518
.000296 -1.7
nineelevenn
-.301827
.031746 -9.5
presidentia~y
.009665
.017935 0.54
humanrights~s
.031349
.007000 4.48
hearingsenf~t
-.009237
.002237 -4.1
unemployment
.062292
.011673 5.34
ashcroftrev~s
.289813
.049501 5.85
gonzales
-.161706
.024112 -6.7
realid
.387567
.023759 16.3
humanrtster~r
-.099652
.047288 -2.1
trade
-3.7e-06 8.73e-08
-42
1.militaryaid
-.487696
.014044
-35
1.commienoc~e
.653091
.013437 48.6
judicialide~y
.140787
.009083 15.5
gender
.390916
.010310 37.9
toptenimmig~n
-.594786
.015325
-39
totalcase
-5.7e-06 8.14e-07 -7.0
circuitideo~y
-.311556
.046543 -6.6
i0e1casetype
-.214805
.018131
-12
Border
-.055421
.013028 -4.2
c.trade#/hearingsenf~t
4.83e-08 5.30e-09 9.11
_cons
-.307309
.121649 -2.5
* P< 0.05
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

P>|z
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.080
0.000***
0.590
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.035*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.012

[95% Conf.
Interval]
.38236
.463592
1.0506
1.14565
-1.951 -1.87872
.0002
.000645
-.0010
.000062
-.3640 -.239606
-.0254
.044818
.01762
.045070
-.0136 -.004853
.03941
.085171
.19279
.386833
-.2089
-.11444
.34100
.434134
-.1923 -.006968
-4e-06
-3.5e-06
-.5152 -.460169
.6267
.679428
.1229
.15859
.37070
.411124
-.6248 -.564750
-7e-06
-4.1e-06
-.4027 -.220334
-.2503 -.179269
-.0809 -.029885
4e-08
5.87e-.5457 -.068881

The results of model G in which Congressional attention to immigration enforcement
related issues is integrated with a variable which measured the extent of trade with the United
States show that the interaction is statistically significant. As Congress gives more attention to
immigration enforcement related issues, immigration judges give more weight towards economic
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connections between a petitioner’s country of origin and the United States in making asylum
decisions.
V.

Results for Model H: Interaction of the number of Congressional Enforcement hearings

and the effect of whether a petitioner is from a country that produces a large number of
fraudulent asylum claims has on the probability of success of asylum.
Table 7: Model H: Enforcement Hearings by Top Ten Immigration
Logistic regression

Log likelihood = -120580.22
Courtapplnd~c
Coef.
Std. Err.
mean5
.4230638
.0207265
represented
1.094554
.0242349
asylum1tort~2
-1.922767
.0186038
timescount
.0004404
.0001083
congresside~y
-.000525
.0002966
nineelevenn
-.2979722
.0317512
presidentia~y
.0085111
.0179352
humanrights~s
.0286364
.0069846
hearingsenf~t
-.0094698
.0022968
unemployment
.0577819
.0116546
ashcroftrev~s
.2880019
.0494665
gonzales
-.1597692
.0241177
realid
.3912275
.0237662
humanrtster~r
-.0991417
.0473073
trade
-3.13e-06
5.87e-08
1.militaryaid
-.4895245
.0141083
1.commienoc~e
.6533793
.0134423
judicialide~y
.139213
.009077
gender
.3918911
.0103092
1.toptenimm~n
-.7205772
.0235715
totalcase
-5.63e-06
8.14e-07
circuitideo~y
-.3123375
.0465478
i0e1casetype
-.2143848
.0181319
Border
-.0563014
.0130337
toptenimmig~n/
.0111735
.0017128
hearingsenf~t
_cons
-.2692018
* P< 0.05
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001
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Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(28) = 31978.51
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1171
z
P>|z
[95% Conf. Interval]
20.41
0.000***
.38244
.4636869
45.16
0.000***
1.0470
1.142053
-103.3
0.000***
-1.952
-1.88630
4.07
0.000***
.00022
.0006526
-1.77 . 0.077
-.0010
.0000563
-9.38
0.000***
-.3600
-.235741
0.47 . 0.635
-.0264
.0436635
4.10
0.000***
.01494
.0423261
-4.12
0.000***
-.0137
-.004968
4.96
0.000***
.03493
.0806244
5.82
0.000***
.19104
.3849544
-6.62
0.000*** -.20703
-.112499
16.46
0.000***
.34464
.4378083
-2.10
0.036*
-.1916
-.006421
-53.31
0.000***
-3e-06 -3.01e-06
-34.70
0.000***
-.5177
-.461872
48.61
0.000***
.62703
.6797256
15.34
0.000***
.12142
.1570035
38.01
0.000***
.37168
.4120968
-30.57
0.000***
-.7667
-.674377
-6.92
0.000***
-7e-06 -4.03e-06
-6.71
0.000***
-.4036
-.221105
-11.82
0.000***
-.2492
-.178847
-4.32
0.000*** -.08184
-.030755
6.52
0.000***
.00781
.0145305
-2.21

0.027

-.50762

-.030773

The results of model H in which Congressional attention to immigration enforcement
related issues is integrated with a variable which whether a petitioner is from a country that
produces a large number of fraudulent asylum claims to the United States, shows that the
interaction is statistically significant but partially in a direction that was not anticipated. As
Congress gives more attention to immigration enforcement related issues, immigration judges are
significantly less likely to grant asylum to petitioners from countries that are not top, with a 9%
reduction in probability of asylum success. That is in keeping with the predictions in the
hypothesis. However, there is actually a small increase of 2% in the probability during these
periods for those petitioners from countries that are in the top ten fraud producers. This relatively
small increase in marginal effect on the probability of asylum success can be explained in a
number of ways. Perhaps the results reflect the fact that immigration judges grant asylum at low
rates to petitioners from countries that produce large numbers of claims regardless of the type of
attention that Congress is paying towards immigration issues.
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Figure 4: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Enforcement Hearings/ Top Ten Fraud
Interaction all other variable at mean.
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Results for Model I: Interaction of variable measuring the number of articles on the New

York Times and the effect of the human rights record of the petitioner’s country of origin on the
probability of success of asylum petition.
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Table 8: Model I: Times Count by Human Rights Terror Score
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 31994.63
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1171

Log likelihood = -120572.16

courtapplnd~c
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z
represented
1.092854
.0242301
45.10 0.000***
asylum1tort~2
-1.92454
.0186326
-103.2 0.000***
timescount
.0003042
.0002579
1.18 0.238
congresside~y
-.000493
.0003012
-1.64 0.101
nineelevenn
-.301134
.0318025
-9.47 0.000***
presidentia~y
.0157975
.0179962
0.88 0.380
humanrights~s
.0303598
.0070039
4.33 0.000***
hearingsenf~t
-.003832
.0021899
-1.75 0.080
unemployment
.0587874
.01168
5.03 0.000***
ashcroftrev~s
.2739696
.0495123
5.53 0.000***
gonzales
-.164255
.0241576
-6.80 0.000***
realid
.3879305
.0238144
16.29 0.000***
humanrtster~r .2577968
.17644521.460 .144
trade
-3.12e-06
5.97e-08
-52.22 0.000***
1.militaryaid
-.471280
.0141311
-33.35 0.000***
1.commienoc~e
.6489751
.0135516
47.89 0.000***
judicialide~y
.1388212
.0090751
15.30 0.000***
gender
.3911222
.0103095
37.94 0.000***
toptenimmig~n
-.603822
.0154035
-39.20 0.000***
totalcase
-5.50e-06
8.14e-07
-6.76 0.000***
circuitideo~y
-.308650
.0465613
-6.63 0.000***
i0e1casetype
-.213790
.0181422
-11.78 0.000***
mean5
.4212259
.0207186
20.33 0.000***
Border
-.052064
.0130377
-3.99 0.000***
humanrtster~r#/c.t
.0002353
.0002498
0.94 0.346
imescount 2
humanrtster~r#/c.t
.0000943
.0002388
0.39 0.693
imescount 3
humanrtster~r#/c.t
-.000087
.0002386
-0.37 0.713
imescount 4
humanrtster~r#/c.t
.0005475
.0002457
2.23 0.026*
imescount 5
_cons
-.256688
.2007729
-1.28 0.201
* P< 0.05
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001
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[95% Conf. Interval]
1.045364
1.140344
-1.961062
-1.888023
-.0002013
.0008098
-.001084
.0000966
-.3634665
-.2388031
-.0194743
.0510693
.0166324
.0440872
-.0081245
.0004597
.035895
.0816798
.1769273
.3710119
-.2116039
-.1169077
.3412551
.4346059
-.603623
.0880294
-3.23e-06
-3.00e-06
-.4989767
-.443584
.6224146
.6755357
.1210344
.1566081
.370916
.4113284
-.6340128
-.5736322
-7.10e-06
-3.91e-06
-.399909
-.2173922
-.2493487
-.1782325
.3806181
.4618336
-.0776176
-.0265109
-.0002544
.0007249
-.0003738

.0005624

-.0005553

.00038

.000066

.001029

-.6501963

.1368191

The results of model I, in which public attention towards asylum related issues is
integrated with the political terror score of a petitioner’s country of origin is statistically
significant only for petitioners from countries that have received a human rights score of 5
during the year that the petitioner seeks asylum. The marginal effects on the probability of
asylum success for petitioners from countries that have received a score of 5 on the
Political/Terror scale are quite substantial. Countries that receive a human rights score of 5 are
considered to have the largest number of human rights violations. As the public pays more
attention towards asylum related issues, petitioners from these worse offending countries have a
13% greater chance of obtaining asylum across the range of enforcement hearings.

Figure 5: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Timescount/ Human Rights
Record Interaction
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Discussion
The results confirm my concerns about potential shortcomings with the multi-institutional
model set forth in chapter 6. As Congressional and public attention towards different aspects of
asylum related issues changes, the marginal effects of political and human rights factors on the
probability of asylum success often change in dramatic ways. These interactions reveal that more
is going on then shown in the basic multi-institutional model. Table 10 presents a comparison of
the variables with the largest marginal effects in the basic multi-institutional model with the
effects revealed through the interaction effects tested in models D-I.

Table 9: Comparison Of Marginal Effects Of Most Significant Variables Between Interaction
Models And The Basic Multi-Institutional Model
Variables

Model. C

Model D

Model E

Model F

Model G

Model H

Enforcement
Hearings by
Military Aid

Enforcement
Hearings by
Commie

Enforcement

Enforcement Times
Hearings by Count by
Human
Top Ten
Rts.
Immigration Score

.302

.31

.34

.302

.303

.302

.102

.101

.101

.103

.102

.102

-.0934

-.066

-.072

-.074

-.072

-.071

-.072

.1305

.112

.105

.109

.107

.106

.1107

Trade

-.3166

-.352

-.35

-.352

-.356

-.352

-.352

Military

-.1337

-.1169

-.115

-.118

-.118

-.118

-.114

Original

Human
rts
Multihearings
Institutional
by human
Model
rts score
Immigration .2234

Hearings by
Trade

Model I

Ct. Mean
Immigration .0992
Judge ID
9/11
Dummy
Human
rts/Terror

Aid
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These results confirm my second hypothesis regarding the role of Congressional attention
towards enforcement issues and the weight immigration judges give towards political factors in
making their asylum decisions. As Congressional attention focuses on enforcement related
issues, immigration judges place more emphasis on military ties, political ideology and trade in
making their decisions. The only political variable that did not produce the results expected when
interacted with increased Congressional attention towards enforcement related issues was the one
that measured whether a petitioner was from a country that produced a large number of
fraudulent asylum claims. Perhaps the results showing in an increase in the probability can be
explained by the fact that petitioners from these countries already have such a low probability of
success that when focus is shifted to more enforcement related issues it results in immigration
judges being focused on other aspects of the petitioner’s claim.
The results do not confirm my first hypothesis however. When Congressional attention is
drawn towards human rights related issues, there is a significant effect on immigration judges,
but that effect in is the opposite direction for the two groups for which it is significant.
Petitioners from countries that have human rights scores of 2 and 5, actually see a reduction in
the chances of obtaining asylum when increased attention is paid towards human rights related
issues. It is difficult to explain this, but perhaps it speaks to other characteristics that are not
modeled which are in common with countries that receive these human rights scores. That is to
say that there might be something in common with countries that receive certain human rights
scores that do not directly correspond to the types of factors that immigration judges look at
when they are making asylum decisions during times of increased Congressional attention
towards human rights issues. Further research is needed in order to explore this possible
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The results confirm my third hypothesis, regarding the role of public attention to asylum
related issues and increased attention towards human rights issues in making asylum decisions.
Public attention significantly increases the weight immigration judges place on human rights
conditions for petitioners from countries with the worst human rights records.
The findings from each of the models examined in this chapter provide additional insight
into the efficacy of the multi-institutional model laid out in chapter 5. Each adds credence to my
central assertion that immigration judges are susceptible to a multitude of societal and
institutional forces when making their decisions. outside influence from political institutions that
have oversight over their activities as well as public attention towards asylum related issues.
Specifically, these results reveal that at different times, it is easier for different sorts of
petitioners to obtain asylum. When attention is drawn to the enforcement side of immigration
issues, immigration judges are less likely to grant asylum to petitioners from countries that have
close ties to the United States. During these same periods, immigration judges are more likely to
grant asylum to petitioners fleeing countries that have been or are currently ideologically
opposed to the United States. When public attention is drawn to human rights aspects of the
immigration issue, immigration judges look more closely at the human rights records of a
petitioner’s country of origin when making a decision to grant or deny asylum.
The results have several primary impacts on previous research. The first concerns how
these judges respond to different pressures placed upon them. Rather than responding uniformly
to increased oversight, these results show that the focus of the oversight changes the cues that the
judge relies upon in making a decision. It is not as simple as judges granting asylum at a lower
rate when Congress focuses on enforcement. Instead, it appears that the type of Congressional
attention impacts the way that these judges exercise their discretion. While previous studies have
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revealed that a principal can have an impact on how agents perform their duties, it has never
been shown that this oversight has resulted in so fundamental a shift in how an agent interprets
the legal factors which determine whether an applicant obtains the sought after relief.
The results also confirm that these judges are influenced by the political institutions that
have oversight over them. While these results confirm the findings of Salehyan and Rosenblum
(2008) and Taratoot and Howard (2009), they go beyond in a number of ways. The first is
through an increased understanding of the behavior of Immigration Judges in particular. No
previous study has examined these interactions through a model that includes the ideology of the
presiding judge as well as the individual characteristics of the petitioner that are included in this
model. The results of my model show that even though the ideologies of the individual judges, as
well as the mean ideologies of the courts where they sit and the circuits which have jurisdiction
over them play a significant role in how these judges make decisions, Asylum decisions are still
influenced by the goals of the Executive and Congress. My multi-institutional model is thus able
to increase our understanding of how immigration judges behave in a case by case basis. It also
helps to better explain how the conflicting aspects of asylum, as both a political tool as well as a
method to protect human rights, play out through the actions of immigration judges. During
times when the agenda of Congress coincides with the foreign policy and political concerns of
the executive, immigration judges largely respond by granting asylum in ways that support these
goals.
Additionally, these results speak to the role that the public plays in the decisions of
immigration judges as well as potentially shedding light on the behavior of other lower level
judges. As the public pays more attention to asylum related issues, immigration judges place
more emphasis on human rights in making their decisions. While this apparent connection

119

between judicial behavior and public opinion has been shown in the context US Supreme Court
to state courts (see e.g. Giles et. Al 2008, Barnum 1985), it has never been shown in the context
of a court that operates almost exclusively outside of direct public control or attention.
The interaction models examined in this chapter also have the potential to shed light on
the behavior of other administrative law judges. The fact that, through the use of the human
rights records of a petitioner’s country of origin, these models were able to provide a degree of
control for saliency is a major step forward in understanding ALJ behavior. Previous studies
have found it difficult to adopt a measure that controls for the strength of a petitioner’s case. It is
difficult, for example, to determine the relative strengths of a petitioner’s social security claim
without undertaking the type of in-depth case by case analysis that would be impossible when
undertaking a large-n quantitative analysis of judicial behavior. Since the grant or denial of
asylum is largely based upon the types of state actions which are compiled in human rights
reports, the models tested in this dissertation are able to examine ALJ behavior more precisely. It
therefore cannot be argued that variations in the rate that immigration judges grant asylum is
based more on the types of petitioners they are seeing. Rather, as each case examined includes a
human rights score, the analysis can begin with a baseline probability of success. If an
immigration judge hears an inordinate number of cases from petitioners fleeing from the
Netherlands or other country in which human rights are largely protected, his/or her low grant
rate can be explained by the fact that the type of persecution which forms the basis of asylum
claims rarely ever occurs in the Netherlands. Conversely, an immigration judge who hears cases
almost exclusively from the Congo or North Korea might grant asylum at a very high rate
regardless of other factors that might influence these decisions because both of those countries
have extremely poor human rights records. Because of this characteristic of asylum claims,
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studies of immigration judge decisions in asylum cases provide perhaps a unique situation in
examining ALJ behavior.
The results lead to further questions regarding the complexity of factors that influence the
behavior of immigration judges. Chapter 8 examines whether the events of 9/11 lead to changes
in how immigration judges made decisions in asylum cases. The intent is to go beyond merely
determining whether immigration judges granted asylum at a different rate following 9/11,
instead the chapter will consider whether the events lead to an essential change in how
immigration judges made decisions.
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CHAPTER VIII: THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BEHAVIOR
In this chapter I examine whether the events of 9/11 brought about any changes in how
immigration judges make decisions. Building upon research which has examined the extent of
Supreme Court deference towards the executive branch during times of war, I examined whether
similar deference was shown by immigration judges following 9/11. The marginal effect of the
variable that measures whether a petitioner’s case was decided before or after 9/11 is -9.3% in
the multi-institutional model set forth in in chapter 6. Since the grant or denial of asylum is often
tied to the political concerns of the executive, immigration judges are in the position of making
decisions every-day that have potential foreign policy implications. The events of 9/11 brought
these foreign policy considerations to the fore as the United States sought allies to help fight the
war on terror.
The models in this chapter consider the effects of the interaction of variables measuring
political and economic ties between the United States and the petitioner’s home country with the
variable that measures whether a case was decided before or after 9/11. The interaction between
the 9/11 variable and the variable which measures the human rights record of the petitioner’s
country of origin was also examined. Additionally, the interaction between the variable that
measures the level of public attention towards asylum issues and the 9/11 variable was included
into the multi-institutional model. What I discovered was that the events of 9/11 resulted in
immigration judges placing greater emphasis on the political aspects of the asylum process as
opposed to human rights concerns.
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The Effect of 9/11
Studies have found that judges behave differently during times of war or when national
security is an issue. (Fix & Randazzo 2010) Fix and Randazzo presented evidence that all levels
of federal courts showed increased levels of deference in regards to political questions and the
act of state doctrine during times of national security crises. In making decisions post 9/11,
immigration judges were acting in a climate where other federal judges usually show increased
deference to the executive branch. I hypothesize that in doing so, a return was made to a more
Cold War approach to asylum issues, in which asylum was granted in lower numbers to
petitioners from countries with close military and/or economic ties to the United States and
granted in greater numbers to ideological enemies. I also hypothesize that this reduction in the
probability of obtaining asylum was not equally felt across all types of asylum petitioners and
that after 9/11, human rights concerns became less relevant than political concerns in the grant of
asylum. After 9/11 immigration judges placed more emphasis on political factors such as
military aid, whether the petitioner was from a country that was ideologically opposed to the
United States as well as the extent of trade between with United States. After 9/11 immigration
judges placed less emphasis on the human rights records of petitioners’ countries of origin than
before.
Hypothesis #1: The likelihood that an immigration judge will make a decision based on human
rights factors decreased after 9/11
Hypothesis #2: The likelihood that an immigration judge will make a decision based on political
factors increases after 9/11

Models
In this chapter I examine five variations to my multi-institutional model which interact a
number of variables with the variable that measures whether a petitioner filed for asylum before
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or after 9/11. Aside from the inclusion of these interaction terms, each of the models use the
same variables as those set forth in the multi-institutional model set forth in chapter 5. All of the
models examine a dichotomous independent variable which is scored as 0, if a petitioner is
denied asylum and a 1 if the petitioner is granted asylum. Each model is examined through a
logistic regression using the LOGIT command in STATA. The models examined in this chapter
are labeled J, K, L, M and N.
Each of these models examine whether judges placed more emphasis on political rather
than human rights related aspects of petitioners’ claims following the events of 9/11. Model J
examines the interaction between the human rights records of the petitioner’s country of origin
and the variable that measures whether the decision was handed down before or after 9/11.
Model K examines the interaction between whether a petitioner is from a current or former
communist country and the variable that measures whether the decision was handed down before
or after 9/11. Model L examines the interaction between the amount of trade a petitioner’s
country of origin has with the United States and the variable that measures whether the decision
was handed down before or after 9/11. Model M examines the interaction between military ties
to the United States and a variable that measures whether the decision was handed down before
or after 9/11. Model N examines the interaction between the variable that measures whether a
petitioner is from a country that produces a large number of fraudulent claims and the variable
that measures whether the decision was handed down before or after 9/11.

Results
Results for Model J: Interaction of variable measuring whether the petition was brought before or
after 9/11 with the variable which measures the human rights record of the petitioner’s home
country on the probability of success of asylum.
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Table 10: 9/11 by Human Rights Terror
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(32) = 32116.95
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1176

Log likelihood =-120511
courtapplnd~c
mean5
1.represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
1.nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
1.ashcroftr~s
1.gonzales
1.realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
1.gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
nineelevenn#/huma
nrtster~r .1 2
nineelevenn#/huma
nrtster~r 1 3
nineelevenn#/huma
nrtster~r 1 4
nineelevenn#/huma
nrtster~r 1 5
_cons
* P< 0.05

Coef.
.4211209
1.097138
-1.941217
.0003725
-.0004628
.0309511
.0410753
.031654
-.0025553
.0681081
.2654556
-.1708395
.3790327
.0933127
-3.11e-06
-.4709316
.6394702
.1392179
.3906509
-.6224483
-5.28e-06
-.3015231
-.2120001
-.0440505
-.2280073

Std. Err.
.0207218
.0242449
.019005
.0001085
.0002972
.1191542
.0181816
.0070098
.002198
.0117382
.04955
.0241909
.0238486
.109046
6.00e-08
.0141039
.0135163
.0090783
.0103125
.0154406
8.15e-07
.046636
.0181587
.0130956
.1208328

-.4383135

.1164275

-3.76 0.000***

-.666507

-.210119

-.2494796

.1164186

-2.14

-.477655

-.021303

-.6035658

.1182033

-5.11 0.000***

-.8352401

-.3718916

-.974864

-.372155

-.67351
** P< 0.01

.1537551
***P< 0.001
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z
20.32
45.25
-102.14
3.43
-1.56
0.26
2.26
4.52
-1.16
5.80
5.36
-7.06
15.89
0.86
-51.83
-33.39
47.31
15.34
37.88
-40.31
-6.48
-6.47
-11.67
-3.36
-1.89

-4.38

P>|z
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.001**
0.119
0.795
0.024*
0.000***
0.245
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.392
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.001**
0.059

0.032*

0.000

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3805069
.4617348
1.049618
1.144657
-1.978466 -1.903968
.0001597
.0005852
-.0010453
.0001196
-.2025868
.264489
.0054401
.0767105
.0179151
.045393
-.0068633
.0017527
.0451017
.0911146
.1683394
.3625719
-.2182528 -.1234262
.3322903
.4257751
-.1204135
.3070388
-3.23e-06
-2.99e-06
-.4985747 -.4432886
.6129788
.6659616
.1214248
.157011
.3704388
.4108629
-.6527112 -.5921853
-6.88e-06
-3.68e-06
-.392928 -.2101182
-.247590
-.176409
-.069717
-.018383
-.464835
.0088207

The results of model J in which a variable measuring the human rights record of a
petitioner’s home country and a variable which measures whether the asylum decision was made
before or after the events of 9/11, show a statistically significant interaction for petitioners from
countries with human rights scores of 2,3,4 and 5. After 9/11 immigration judges placed less
emphasis on human rights conditions when making their decisions. The marginal effect on the
probability of success was substantial for petitioners from countries that received certain scores
while non-existent for others. Petitioners from countries that are scored as a 1 in the human
rights/terror scale, those with the best record on human rights issues,. see no change in the rate of
success in asylum claims before or after 9/11. The most significant change in probability post
9/11 was for petitioners from countries with the worst human rights records. Petitioners from
countries with scores of 5 had a reduction of 14.5% in their probability of obtaining asylum.
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Figure 6: Model J: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by 9/11
Human Rights Record Interaction
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II. Results for Model K: Interaction of variable measuring whether the petition was brought
before or after 9/11 with the variable which measures whether the petitioner was from a
communist country on the probability of success of asylum.
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Table 11: Model K: 9/11 by Commie No Commie
Logistic regression
Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(29) = 32061.56
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -120538.69
Pseudo R2 = 0.1174
courtapplnd~c
Coef.
Std. Err.
mean5
.4244241
.0207282
1.represented
1.099785
.0242354
asylum1tort~2
-1.958533
.0190538
timescount
.0004304
.0001085
congresside~y
-.0005143
.0002976
1.nineelevenn
-.4011054
.0336663
presidentia~y
.0154857
.0179276
humanrights~s
.0291623
.0070078
hearingsenf~t
-.0044664
.0021848
unemployment
.05707
.0116466
1.ashcroftr~s
.2890546
.0495865
1.gonzales
-.156616
.024185
1.realid
.395188
.0238488
humanrtster~r 2
-.1160575
.0473825
trade
-3.11e-06
5.90e-08
1.militaryaid
-.4905652
.0140703
1.commienoc~e
.5067821
.0199496
judicialide~y
.1381059
.0090769
1.gender
.3895692
.0103124
1.toptenimm~n
-.6044292
.0153288
totalcase
-5.51e-06
8.14e-07
circuitideo~y
-.3162199
.0465602
i0e1casetype
-.2114509
.0181422
Border
-.0568006
.0130396
nineelevenn#/commien
.2240291
.0225991
ocom~e 1 1
_cons
-.220573
.121907
* P< 0.05
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

z
20.48
45.38
-102.79
3.97
-1.73
-11.91
0.86
4.16
-2.04
4.90
5.83
-6.48
16.57
-2.45
-52.76
-34.87
25.40
15.22
37.78
-39.43
-6.77
-6.79
-11.66
-4.36
9.91
-1.81

P>|z
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.084
0.000***
0.388
0.000***
0.041*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.014*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.00***
0.000***
0.000***

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3837976
.4650507
1.052284
1.147285
-1.99587 -1.921188
.0002177
.0006431
-.001097
.0000689
-.46709 -.3351207
-.019651
.0506231
.0154272
.0428974
-.008748 -.0001843
.0342431
.079897
.1918668
.3862424
-.204017 -.1092144
.3484452
.4419307
-.208925 -.0231895
-3.23e-06
-3.00e-06
-.518142 -.4629879
.4676816
.5458826
.1203154
.1558964
.3693573
.4097811
-.634473 -.5743853
-7.11e-06
-3.92e-06
-.407476 -.2249635
-.247008 -.1758929
-.082357 -.0312434
.1797357
.2683226

0.070

-.459506

.0183603

The results of model K in which a variable measuring whether a petitioner is from a current or
former communist country is interacted with a variable which measures whether the asylum
decision was made before or after the events of 9/11 proves to be statistically significant. The
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marginal effect of this shift was relatively small. Before 9/11 the marginal effect of whether a
petitioner was from a communist or former communist country was 13%, after 9/11 the marginal
effect was 17%, a difference of 4%.
Figure 7: Model K: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Communist Ideology Interaction

Communist/Former Communist
Non-Communist

Pre 9/11
.54
.41

Post 9/11
.49
.32

Results for Model L: Interaction of variable measuring whether the petition was brought
before or after 9/11 with the variable which measures the level of trade between
petitioner’s country of origin and the United States on the probability of success of asylum.
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Table 12: Model L: 9/11 by Trade
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(29) = 31969.38
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1170

Log likelihood = -120584.78

courtapplnd~c
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
mean5
.4216834 .0207209
20.35
1.represented
1.097344 .0242542
45.24
asylum1tort~2 1
-1.940373
.019062 -101.79
timescount
.0004189 .0001083
3.87
congresside~y
-.0005083 .0002969
-1.71
1.nineelevenn
-.3078715 .0327182
-9.41
presidentia~y
.0086333
.017958
0.48
humanrights~s
.0283883 .0069979
4.06
hearingsenf~t
-.0047084 .0021851
-2.15
unemployment
.0554977 .0116454
4.77
1.ashcroftr~s
.276858 .0494606
5.60
1.gonzales
-.157304 .0241295
-6.52
1.realid
.3893977 .0237828
16.37
humanrtster~r 2
-.1008219 .0473116
-2.13
trade
-3.31e-06
9.07e-08
-36.46
1.militaryaid
-.482436 .0140575
-34.32
1.commienoc~e
.6538426 .0134506
48.61
judicialide~y
.1392328 .0090754
15.34
1.gender
.3913593 .0103084
37.97
1.toptenimm~n
-.6016121 .0153378
-39.22
totalcase
-5.60e-06
8.14e-07
-6.89
circuitideo~y
-.3154577 .0465628
-6.77
i0e1casetype
-.2144272 .0181399
-11.82
Border
-.0567563 .0130373
-4.35
nineelevenn#/c.trade 1
2.14e-07
8.74e-08
2.45
_cons
-.2705898
.121699
-2.22
* P< 0.05
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001
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P>|z
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.087
0.000***
0.631
0.000***
0.031*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.033*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.014*
0.026

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3810711
.4622957
1.049807
1.144882
-1.97773
-1.903012
.0002067
.0006312
-.001090
.0000737
-.371998
-.243745
-.026563
.0438303
.0146726
.0421039
-.008991
-.0004257
.0326732
.0783223
.1799169
.3737991
-.204597
-.110011
.3427841
.4360112
-.193551
-.0080928
-3.48e-06
-3.13e-06
-.509988
-.4548838
.62748
.6802052
.1214453
.1570203
.3711552
.4115634
-.631673
-.5715505
-7.20e-06
-4.01e-06
-.406719
-.2241963
-.249980
-.1788737
-.082309
-.0312036
4.31e-08
3.86e-07
-.509115
-.0320641

The results of model L in which a variable measuring the extent of trade that a
petitioner’s home country has with the United States is interacted with a variable which measures
whether the asylum decision was made before or after the events of 9/11 proves to be statistically
significant but with little real impact upon the probability of asylum success. Both before and
after 9/11, as the amount of trade increases, the probability of asylum success decreases along
the same curve. Any difference in the probability of asylum success tracks the general decrease
that has occurred in the years following 9/11.
Figure 8: Model L: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by 9/11/ Trade Interaction
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IV. Results for Model M: Interaction of variable measuring whether the petition was brought
before or after 9/11 with the variable which measures whether petitioner’s country of origin
receives military aid from the United States on the probability of success of asylum.
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Table 13: Model M: Nine Eleven by Military Aid
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(29) = 32158.57
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1177

Log likelihood = -120490.18

courtapplnd~c
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
mean5
.4246806 .0207298
20.49
1.represented
1.098874 .0242255
45.36
asylum1tort~2
-1.95369 .0190115 -102.76
timescount
.0004372 .0001086
4.03
congresside~y
-.000512 .0002978
-1.72
1.nineelevenn
-.112828 .0340866
-3.31
presidentia~y
.0167671
.017917
0.94
humanrights~s
.0293344
.007009
4.19
hearingsenf~t
-.004456 .0021852
-2.04
unemployment
.058878 .0116479
5.05
1.ashcroftr~s
.2900872
.049596
5.85
1.gonzales
-.157378 .0241975
-6.50
1.realid
.3972517 .0238612
16.65
humanrtster~r 2
-.086034 .0473957
-1.82
trade
-3.09e-06 5.90e-08
-52.36
1.militaryaid
-.269492 .0205577
-13.11
1.commienoc~e
.6605235 .0134759
49.02
judicialide~y
.1373183 .0090797
15.12
1.gender
.3909562 .0103138
37.91
1.toptenimm~n
-.598199 .0153303
-39.02
totalcase
-5.57e-06 8.14e-07
-6.85
circuitideo~y
-.331465 .0465916
-7.11
i0e1casetype
-.210855 .0181462
-11.62
Border
-.058310 .0130406
-4.47
nineelevenn#/
-.319236
.022847
-13.97
militaryaid 1 1
_cons
-.446281 .1224146
-3.65
* P< 0.05
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

P>|z
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.085
0.001**
0.349
0.000***
0.041*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.069
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3840509 .4653103
1.051393 1.146355
-1.99095 -1.91643
.0002244 .0006499
-.001095 .0000713
-.179636 -.046019
-.018349 .0518837
.0155971 .0430718
-.008739 -.000173
.0360486 .0817074
.1928809 .3872936
-.204804 -.109951
.3504846 .4440188
-.178927 .0068597
-3.2e-06 -2.97e-06
-.309785 -.229200
.6341112 .6869358
.1195225 .1551141
.3707415 .4111709
-.628246 -.568153
-7.1e-06 -3.98e-06
-.422783 -.240147
-.246421 -.175289
-.083869 -.032751
-.364015 -.274456

0.000

-.686209

-.206353

The results of model M in which a variable measuring whether the petitioner is from a
country that received military aid from the United States is interacted with a variable which
measures whether the asylum decision was made before or after the events of 9/11 also proves to
be statistically significant. It also proves to have resulted in a sizable marginal effect on the
probability of asylum success. Before 9/11, petitioners from countries that received military aid
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had 6% less of a probability of asylum success than those whose countries did not receive
military aid. After 9/11, petitioners from countries that received military aid were 14% less likely
to obtain asylum success than those who were from countries that did not.
Figure 9: Model M: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by 9/11 Military Aid Interaction
Variables
Military Aid
No Military Aid

Pre 9/11
.44
.50

Post 9/11
.34
.48

V. Results for Model N: Interaction of variable measuring whether the petition was brought
before or after 9/11 with the variable which measures whether petitioner’s country of origin is
one of the top ten producers of fraudulent asylum claims on the probability of success of asylum.
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Table 14: Model N: 9/11 by Top Ten Fraud
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(29) = 31996.75
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1171

Log likelihood =-120571.1
courtapplnd~c
mean5

Coef.
.4226345

Std. Err.
.0207219

z
20.40

1.represented

1.099066

.0242559

45.31

asylum1tort~2

-1.943154

.0189926

-102.31

timescount

.0004284

.0001083

3.96

congresside~y
1.nineelevenn

-.0005176
-.3498991

.0002971
.0334791

-1.74
-10.45

presidentia~y
humanrights~s

.0102134
.0282932

.0179511
.0069938

0.57
4.05

hearingsenf~t
unemployment

-.0047807
.0563924

.0021853
.0116466

-2.19
4.84

1.ashcroftr~s

.2820296

.0494529

5.70

1.gonzales

-.1569785

.0241245

-6.51

1.realid

.390593

.0237791

16.43

humanrtster~r 2
trade

-.0974611
-3.18e-06

.0473252
5.94e-08

-2.06
-53.58

1.militaryaid

-.4858728

.0140601

-34.56

1.commienoc~e

.653583

.0134521

48.59

judicialide~y

.1388172

.0090763

15.29

1.gender

.3919051

.0103091

38.02

1.toptenimm~n

-.6808956

.0203546

-33.45

totalcase

-5.56e-06

8.14e-07

-6.83
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P>|z
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.081
0.000**
*
0.569
0.000**
*
0.029*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.039*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**

[95% Conf. Interval]
.382020 .4632486
1.05152

1.146606

-1.9803

-1.905929

.000216

.0006406

-.00109
-.41551

.0000646
-.2842814

-.02497
.014585

.045397
.0420008

-.00906
.033565

-.0004977
.0792193

.185103

.3789556

-.20426

-.1096954

.343986

.4371992

-.19021
-3.3e-06

-.0047054
-3.06e-06

-.51343

-.4583155

.627217

.6799487

.121027

.1566065

.371699

.4121107

-.72078

-.6410013

-7.1e-06

-3.96e-06

circuitideo~y

-.318983

.0465724

-6.85

i0e1casetype

-.2128688

.0181407

-11.73

Border

-.0573036

.0130391

-4.39

nineelevenn#/
toptenimmig~n 1 1
_cons
* P< 0.05

.1277091

.022106

5.78

-.2550283
.1217253
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

-2.10

*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.000**
*
0.036*

-.41026

-.2277028

-.24842

-.1773137

-.08285

-.0317475

.084382

.171036

-.49360

-.0164511

The results of model N in which a variable measuring whether the petitioner is from a
country that produces large numbers of fraudulent asylum claims is interacted with a variable
which measures whether the asylum decision was made before or after the events of 9/11 also
proves to be statistically significant. The marginal effect of this shift proves to be relatively
small. Before 9/11, petitioners from countries that produced large numbers of fraudulent claims
had an 8% less of a probability of obtaining asylum than petitioners from other countries. After
9/11, petitioners from countries that produced large numbers of fraudulent claims had 5% less of
a probability of success.
Figure 10: Model N: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by 9/11 / Top-Ten Fraud
Interaction
Variables
Top Ten Fraud
Not Top 10 Fraud

Pre-9/11
. .36
. .52

Post 9/11
.31
.44

Discussion
The results of these models confirm my hypotheses regarding how the events of 9/11
changed how immigration judges made their decisions. After 9/11, immigration judges placed
less emphasis on the human rights records of petitioners’ home countries in making their
decisions than before. As immigration judges relied less upon human rights concerns in making
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their decisions following 9/11, they relied more heavily on political variables.
However, while all of the interaction effects were statistically significant, only some had
substantively meaningful effects. Only two interactions, the one interacting the 9/11 variable and
the variable measuring human rights record of the petitioner’s home country and the one
interacting 9/11 with the variable measuring whether the petitioner is from a country that
receives military aid from the United States, had substantial marginal effects. The remainder
while being statistically significant were not substantial.
The effect of 9/11 on how immigration judges respond to petitioner’s from countries with
the worst human rights records does appear to reveal a shift in how immigration judges were
making decisions. One would assume that petitioners from countries with the worst human rights
records would have the greatest probability of success. However, after 9/11, immigration judges
were less likely to grant asylum to petitioners from countries that received a score of 5 than of
those that received a 4. One could imagine that one cause of this is that as the events of 9/11
shifted immigration judge’s focus towards more political aspects of the asylum process, that
focus showed up as a lower probability of asylum success for persons fleeing the worst human
rights violations.
Table 16 lists how the marginal effects that were the largest in the original multiinstitutional model changed under the models used to examine the 9/11 interaction effects.
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Table 15: Comparison of Marginal Effects Of Most Significant Variables Between Interaction
Models J-N And The Basic Multi-Institutional Model
Variables

Model C
Original
MultiInstitutional
Model
Immigration Ct. .2234

Model J
9/11 by
human
rts.
score
.302

Model K
Model L
9/11 by
9/11 by
Communist/Non- Trade
Communist

Model M
9/11 by
Military
Aid

Model N
9/11 by
Top Ten
Fraud

.304

.302

.304

.302

.0992

.102

.101

.102

.101

.101

9/11 Dummy

-.0992

-.082

-.078

-.069

-.079

-.070

Human

.1305

.123

.105

.107

.108

.108

Trade

-.3166

-.352

-.353

-.356

-.357

-.357

Military Aid

-.1337

-.114

-.118

-.116

-.118

-.117

Mean
Immigration
Judge ID

rts/Terror

These findings are consistent with previous studies which have examined how judges
change their behavior during periods when the United States is engaged in conflict. (Fix and
Randoazzo, 2010). It has been shown that during times of conflict, judges are more likely to
show deference to the executive branch. When immigration judges placed more weight upon
political factors in making asylum decisions they were in effect showing deference to the
concerns of the executive branch. Following 9/11, the executive branch placed even more
emphasis on using the asylum process for political ends. It appears that immigration judges
responded in the same manner as Supreme Court justices. This is the first study to find such an
effect on judges at the trial level.
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This is also the first study to examine how the events of 9/11 changed the manner in
which immigration judges make their decisions on asylum issues. The findings go beyond
showing that judges granted asylum at a lower rate following 9/11. Rather they reveal that the
calculus that judges relied upon in their decision making process changed. Judges generally
relied more on political ties, or lack thereof, following the attacks. This shift back to a more cold
war approach to the asylum process reveals a responsiveness to administrative as well as public
fears that has been significant and lasting.
The results of these models provide a valuable addition to the literature regarding judicial
behavior during times of conflict. In making decisions to grant or deny asylum, immigration
judges are in the unique position of making decisions every-day that have foreign policy
considerations. They are perhaps the only trial judges who are so often faced with making
decisions that have these types of implications. This research shows that judges at every level are
susceptible to changes in behavior when the country is facing conflict.
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CHAPTER IX - EXAMINING IMMIGRATION JUDGE
BEHAVIOR BY JUDGE TYPE
The results of the models in chapters Seven and Eight show us that immigration judges
act differently depending upon how the public and Congress viewed issues related to
immigration at the time that the judges made their decisions as well as before and after the events
of 9/11. This chapter examines the interaction of judicial ideology with a number of variables. It
first builds upon a number of judicial and bureaucratic studies which examined the role of case
load on how judges and bureaucrats exercise discretion. Previous work such as Taylor & Kelly
(2006) has found that as case load increases, judges and bureaucrats are less likely to follow
formal rules and more likely to make decisions based upon their own personal preferences. In
order to determine whether immigration judges behave similarly when faced with high case
loads, I created an additional variable which places judges into one of three categories broadly
based upon their judicial ideology scores. Those immigration judges with backgrounds which
suggest that they were the most conservative were placed into one category, those that have
backgrounds that were the most liberal were placed in another category. Judges whose
backgrounds did not include strong indicators of a conservative or liberal bent were placed into a
third category. I hypothesize that as case load increases judges will be more likely to exercise
their discretion in a manner in keeping with their own ideologies. I hypothesize that as case load
increases Conservative judges, who are more likely to favor law and order issues, are less likely
to grant asylum. I also hypothesize that when case load increases for liberal judges, who are
more likely to support issues related to human rights concerns, the judges will be more likely to
grant asylum. As to the third group, judges that are neither liberal nor conservative, I hypothesize
that case load will have little or no effect upon the rate at which the judges grant asylum.
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This chapter also examines whether categories of judges respond differently to variables
set forth in the multi-institutional model set forth in chapter 5. Building upon the work of Keith
Holmes & Miller (2013 & 2014) I examine the extent that liberal judges respond differently to
certain characteristics of asylum applicants than conservative judges. Keith Holmes & Miller
argue that the difference between the behavior of liberal and conservative judges lies primarily in
how they interpret “legally relevant” and “legally irrelevant” facts concerning an asylum
applicant’s case. “legally relevant” facts about an applicant’s case are largely the human rights
record of the petitioner’s country of origin. “Legally irrelevant” facts are all of the political,
economic and social variables that have been addressed in previous chapters. They found that
liberal judges will focus on some “irrelevant” facts while conservative judges will focus on other
“irrelevant” facts in making decisions to grant or deny asylum. My multi-Institutional model
departs from their work in that, as I have shown in chapters Six and Eight, the focus on what
types of facts that immigration judges focus on is in large part a function of political pressure
placed upon them from the executive, Congress and the judiciary. As discussed in previous
chapters, the ability of immigration judges to act in accordance with their own policy preferences
are often constrained by influence from the executive, Congress and the judiciary. In this chapter
I intend to examine the findings of Keith Holmes & Miller in the context of my multiinstitutional model. Like them, I hypothesize that immigration judges with different ideologies
will respond differently to political and human rights characteristics of the petitioner’s home
country.
However, I expand upon their work to include factors that may influence the behavior of
immigration judges as members of the federal bureaucracy. As such, I hypothesize that liberal
judges will respond differently to changes in Congressional ideology, ideology in circuit courts,
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the executive and amongst the judges who preside in the same court than conservative judges. I
also hypothesize that immigration judges with different ideologies will respond differently to the
level and type of attention Congress plays towards immigration issues.
My hypotheses are a shift from a purely rational choice approach to the understanding of
judicial behavior. This is in large part a function of the unique circumstances that immigration
judges face in making decisions regarding asylum applicants. Decisions to grant or deny asylum
might on their face first appear to be based upon traditional assumptions about the behavior of
liberal or conservative judges. It is assumed that liberal judges will grant asylum at a greater rate
than conservative judges. These assumptions are based upon findings throughout the literature
which show that conservative judges tend to be less likely to side with petitioners or defendants
than liberal judges in a wide range of cases. In general, this is true in asylum cases as well.
Judicial ideology does have a significant impact upon a petitioner’s chance of obtaining asylum.
The first model I examine in this chapter considers how case load affects the probability of
immigration judges to grant asylum. I hypothesize, that as case load increases, the role of
ideology in asylum decisions also increases.
However, the dual nature of the asylum process, in that it serves both political and human
rights goals, complicates this issue. Since decisions to grant asylum often have political
ramifications, it might often be the case that a decision to grant asylum is in keeping with the
goals of a conservative judge. If a petitioner is seeking asylum from a country that is an
ideological enemy of the United States, would a decision to grant asylum be a liberal one? What
about cases that involve allegations of religious persecution by a liberal democratic ally of the
United States such as the situation presented in the Romeike’s case?
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One might argue that rational choice based models do not provide a good fit in such
situations. I argue, however, that rational choice is still appropriate with only a relatively small
alteration. Rather than assuming that all judges will generally respond to the same stimuli in a
similar manner, I hypothesize that liberal judges will generally respond to the same stimuli
similarly, moderate judges will respond in the same way as moderate judges and conservative
judges will respond in the same way as conservative judges. Building upon assumptions based
upon the backgrounds of judges one can then form and test assumptions about how each judge
type responds to changes in social, economic and political variables.
Central to these hypotheses is the belief that immigration judges will respond to political
economic and social variables differently based upon their ideology. For example, I hypothesize
that faced with a conservative president and a conservative Congress, liberal judges will respond
differently than conservative judges. Liberal judges will respond by taking their role as
protectors of human rights more seriously, while conservative judges will be more likely to place
more emphasis on the political aspects of a particular asylum decision.

Case Load
A number of studies of street level bureaucrats have revealed that work load plays a part
in the exercise of discretion. High case-loads have been shown to increase the role played by
bureaucrats’ personal preferences in making decisions to provide services. (Prottas, 1979) When
work load is high, street level bureaucrats are more likely to ignore agency policy and make
decisions based upon their own preferences. (Taylor & Kelly, 2006) By measuring the total case
load handled by each immigration court, and comparing it to the ideology score of the
immigration judge making the decision, I hope to be able to gauge the role of work load on the
exercise of personal discretion. I hypothesize that as workload increases, liberal judges will be
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more likely to grant asylum and conservative judges will be less likely.
Hypothesis #1: The likelihood that an Immigration Judge will follow his/her individual policy
preferences for the grant or denial of asylum will increase the larger the case load assigned to the
immigration judge.

Institutional Ideology
A number of studies have shown that people with different ideological backgrounds
respond differently to the same stimuli. Randazzo, Waterman and Fine (2006) found that
liberal judges responded differently to federal legislation than conservative judges. In
examining legislation designed to constrain judicial behavior, they found that judges
appointed by Democrats were constrained by statutes concerning criminal cases, while
Republican appointed judges were constrained by statutes regarding civil rights. In the
context of this study, I hypothesize that liberal immigration judges will be more strongly
influenced, and more likely to grant asylum, by the liberal leanings of Congress, the
executive and the other members of their own immigration court than conservative judges.
I also believe that that converse will also be true in that conservative judges will be more
influenced by conservative leanings of these dame institutions and thus less likely to grant
asylum.
Hypothesis #2: As the ideology of the executive branch becomes more conservative, the
probability that conservative immigration judges will deny asylum will increase to a
greater extent than the probability of liberal immigration judges denying asylum
Hypothesis #3: As the ideology of Congress becomes more conservative, the probability
that conservative immigration judges will deny asylum will increase to a greater extent
than the probability of liberal immigration judges denying asylum
Hypothesis #4: As the mean ideology of immigration court on which they sit becomes
more conservative, the probability that conservative immigration judges will deny asylum
will increase to a greater extent than the probability of liberal immigration judges denying
asylum
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Hypothesis #6: As the ideology of the executive branch becomes more liberal, the
probability that liberal immigration judges will grant asylum will increase to a greater
extent than the probability of conservative immigration judges granting asylum

Hypothesis #7: As the ideology of Congress becomes more liberal, the probability that
liberal immigration judges will grant asylum will increase to a greater extent than the
probability of conservative immigration judges granting asylum

Hypothesis #8: As the mean ideology of the immigration court on which they sit becomes
more liberal, the probability that liberal immigration judges will grant asylum will increase
to a greater extent than the probability of conservative immigration judges granting asylum

Additionally, I hypothesize that conservative and liberal judges will respond differently to
the political and human rights aspects of the asylum process. As conservative judges are
more likely to envision asylum as a law enforcement issue, it is more likely that they will
place more emphasis on the political factors that influence asylum decisions. Liberal
judges, who tend to be more concerned with the human rights implications of asylum will
be more likely to emphasize human rights concerns. I further hypothesize that during times
with increased Congressional attention towards enforcement issues, the probability that a
conservative judge will grant asylum will decrease at a greater rate than the probability that
a moderate or liberal judge will grant asylum. During times of increased Congressional
attention on human rights issues, I argue that the probability of liberal judges granting
asylum will increase to a greater extent than moderate or conservative judges.

Hypothesis #9: Conservative judges will place more weight on political factors in making
decisions to grant or deny asylum than liberal judges
Hypothesis #10:. Liberal judges will place more weight on human rights factors in making
decisions to grant asylum than conservative judges
Hypothesis #11:. During periods of increased Congressional attention towards enforcement
related immigration issues, the probability that conservative judges will grant asylum will
144

decrease at a greater rate than moderate or liberal judges.
Hypothesis #12:. During periods of increased Congressional attention towards human
rights related immigration issues, the probability that liberal judges judges will grant
asylum will increase at a greater rate than moderate or conservative judges.

Models
This chapter examines a number of models each of which are built upon the multiinstitutional model outlined in chapter Six. All of the models examine a dichotomous
independent variable which is scored as 0, if a petitioner is denied asylum and a 1 if
granted asylum. Each model is examined through logistic regression through the use of the
LOGIT command in STATA. In total there are 12 models examined in this chapter, labeled
O to Y.
Model O, examines the interaction of a variable that measures whether a
petitioner’s case was decided by a judge who was one of three judicial types and a variable
that measures overall case load for the immigration court. I chose to measure overall case,
rather than just asylum cases because I believed that it provided a more accurate
approximation of how busy the immigration judges were.
Model P examines an interaction between the judicial ideology type variable and a
variable that measures the ideology of the president at the time the case was decided.
Model Q examines an interaction between the judicial ideology type variable and a
variable that measures the mean ideology of Congress at the time the case was decided.
Model R examines an interaction between the judicial ideology type variable and a variable
that measures the mean ideology of the immigration court that the deciding judge sat on at
the time the case was decided.
Model S examines the interaction between the judicial ideology type variable and
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the weight immigration judges place on whether the United States provides military aid to
a petitioner’s country of origin. Model T examines the interaction between the judicial
ideology type variable and the weight immigration judges place on whether a petitioner is
from a current or former communist country. Model U examines the interaction between
the judicial ideology type variable and the weight immigration judges place on the extent
of trade a petitioner’s home country has with the United States. Model V examines the
interaction between the judicial ideology type variable and the weight immigration judges
place on whether a petitioner is from a country that is one of the top ten in producing
fraudulent claims for asylum in the United States. Model W examines the interaction
between the judicial ideology type variable and the weight immigration judges place on the
human rights record of the petitioner’s country of origin.
Models X and Y examine interactions between judicial ideology type and the
number and types of Congressional hearings being held in that particular year. Model X
looks at the interaction between judicial ideology type and a variable measuring the
number of enforcement related immigration hearings held by Congress in the year that the
petitioner applied for asylum. Model Y looks at the interaction between judicial ideology
type and a variable measuring the number of human rights related immigration hearings
held by Congress in the year that the petitioner applied for asylum.
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Results
Results for Model O: Interaction of Judicial Type and the total number of cases in a
particular immigration court on probability of asylum success
Table 16: Model O: Judicial Type by Total Case
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32734.49
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1198
z
P>|z
[95% Conf. Interval]
24.11 0.000*** .4881242 .5745138
45.01 0.000*** 1.043887 1.138943
-103.32 0.000*** -1.96261 -1.88954
3.96 0.000*** .0002165 .0006418
-1.73 . 0.083
-.001094 .0000676
-9.73 0.000*** -.371986 -.247303
0.30 . 0.764
-.029832 .0406008
4.30 0.000*** .0163829 .0438586
-1.64 . 0.101
-.007887
.000698
5.56 0.000*** .0419853 .0877202
5.72 0.000*** .1865857 .3808748
-7.49 0.000*** -.231316 -.135338
16.85 0.000*** .3553391 .4489055
-2.16 . 0.031*
-.195267 -.009482
-53.24 0.000*** -3.2e-06 -3.01e-06
-33.37 0.000*** -.496219 -.441164
48.46 0.000*** .6263512 .6791546
-12.41 0.000*** -.259201 -.188501
38.03 0.000*** .3724928 .4129752
-39.19 0.000*** -.631264 -.571135
-14.63 0.000*** -.000018 -.000014
-5.27 0.000*** -.338467 -.154964
-10.76 0.000*** -.231585 -.160237
0.03 0.980
-.025969 .0266586
-1.00 0.320
-.089232 .0291355
8.32 0.000*** .0000112 .0000182

Log likelihood = -120202.22
courtapplnd~c
Coef.
Std. Err.
mean5
.531319 .0220386
represented
1.091415 .0242494
asylum1tort~2
-1.92607 .0186411
timescount
.0004291 .0001085
congresside~y
-.000513 .0002964
nineelevenn
-.309644 .0318076
presidentia~y
.005384 .0179681
humanrights~s
.0301208 .0070092
hearingsenf~t
-.003594 .0021902
unemployment
.0648528 .0116673
ashcroftrev~s
.2837302 .0495645
gonzales
-.183327 .0244844
realid
.4021223 .0238694
humanrtster~r 2
-.102374 .0473949
trade
-3.13e-06 5.88e-08
1.militaryaid
-.468691
.014045
1.commienoc~e
.6527529 .0134705
judicialide~y
-.223851 .0180359
gender
.392734 .0103273
1.toptenimm~n
-.601200 .0153394
totalcase
-.000016 1.11e-06
circuitideo~y
-.246715 .0468129
i0e1casetype
-.195911 .0182013
Border
.0003444 .0134259
threeID 2
-.030048 .0301965
threeID#/
.0000147 1.77e-06
c.totalcase 2
threeID#/
.0000409 1.94e-06
21.07 0.000*** .0000371
c.totalcase 3
_cons
-.212524 .1219591
-1.74 . 0.081
-.451559
* P< 0.05
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

.0000447
.0265114

The results from model O, in which the judicial ideology type variable is interacted
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with the amount of cases handled in the immigration court in which the judge presides
during the year that the case was decided shows a significant interaction. For all three
judicial ideology types, conservative, moderate and liberal, the difference in grant rates is
very small in the courts that have small numbers of cases. However as the number of cases
increases to the encompass the busiest courts, the difference is profound. In the busiest
courts, the difference between the probability of asylum success between liberal and
conservative judges is 28%. That means that in the busiest courts liberal judges are 28%
more likely to grant asylum than conservative judges. Over the same range of court
caseloads, moderate judges see only a 3% change in probability of asylum success.
Figure 11: Model O: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Total Case
Interaction
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Results for Model P: Interaction of Judicial Type and presidential ideology on
probability of asylum success.
Table 17: Model P: Judicial Type by Presidential Ideology
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32316.46
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1183

Log likelihood = -120411.24
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID#/
c. presidentia~y 2
threeID#/c.
presidentia~y 3
_cons
* P< 0.05

Coef.
.3878707
1.095891
-1.91789
.0004214
-.000517
-.3019069
-.0542214
.0294634
-.0034994
.0571601
.2838287
-.1956046
.4046664
-.100157
-3.11e-06
-.4803803
.6540924
-.1219282
.3928979
-.6015331
-2.92e-06
-.247774
-.2194653
-.0545181
-.0367853
.1161857

Std. Err.
.0208997
.0242547
.0186165
.0001084
.000298
.0317656
.020964
.007003
.0021895
.0116539
.0495175
.0246795
.0238752
.0473678
5.87e-08
.0140293
.0134625
.0172966
.0103194
.0153254
8.27e-07
.0467214
.0181633
.0131049
.0390118
.0245208

z
18.56
45.18
-103.02
3.89
-1.73
-9.50
-2.59
4.21
-1.60
4.90
5.73
-7.93
16.95
-2.11
-52.96
-34.24
48.59
-7.05
38.07
-39.25
-3.54
-5.30
-12.08
-4.16
-0.94
4.74

P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.083
0.000
0.010
0.000
0.110
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.034
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.346
0.000

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3469081 .4288332
1.048353
1.14343
-1.954378 -1.881402
.0002089 .0006338
-.001101 .0000671
-.3641663 -.2396476
-.0953102 -.0131327
.0157377 .0431892
-.0077908 .0007919
.0343188 .0800014
.1867762 .3808812
-.2439756 -.1472337
.3578719
.451461
-.1929962 -.0073178
-3.22e-06 -2.99e-06
-.5078772 -.4528834
.6277063 .6804784
-.1558289 -.0880276
.3726722 .4131235
-.6315703
-.571496
-4.54e-06 -1.30e-06
-.3393463 -.1562017
-.2550646
-.183866
-.0802032 -.0288331
-.113247 .0396764
.0681258 .1642457

.1118271

.0249581

4.48

0.000

.0629101

.1607441

-.1513091 .1227258
-1.23
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

0.218

-.3918472

.089229

The results from model P, in which the judicial ideology type variable is interacted with
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the ideology score of whomever was president during the year that the case was decided shows a
significant interaction. For both liberal and moderate judges, as presidential ideology becomes
more conservative, the probability of asylum success actually increases. This increase in
probability is relatively minor for judges in both the liberal and moderate groups. (A total of
1.2% for liberal judges and 3.5% for moderate judges.) Judges in the conservative group saw a
reduction in the probability of granting asylum as presidential ideology becomes more
conservative. The total reduction in probability for conservative judges over the course of
presidential ideologies present in the sample was 2.2%.
Figure 12: Model P: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Presidential
Ideology Interaction
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1.75

Results for Model Q: Interaction of Judicial Type and Congressional ideology on
probability of asylum success.
Table 18: Model Q: Judicial Type by Congressional Ideology
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32287.52
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1182

Log likelihood = -120425.71
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID# c./
congresside~y 2
threeID# c./
congresside~y 3
_cons
* P< 0.05

Coef.
.3845002
1.092521
-1.918347
.0004225
-.0001862
-.3025926
.0061695
.0293908
-.0039602
.0591249
.2832063
-.1768459
.3970062
-.1010634
-3.11e-06
-.480143
.6541852
-.120921
.3943182
-.6020523
-2.92e-06
-.2506888
-.2168545
-.0546401
.1326389
-.0009588

Std. Err.
.0208876
.0242492
.0186176
.0001083
.0003864
.0317636
.0179484
.0070011
.0021883
.0116539
.0494976
.0244365
.0238267
.0473621
5.87e-08
.0140263
.0134586
.0172951
.0103143
.0153262
8.27e-07
.0467151
.018158
.0131038
.0159376
.0007208

z
18.41
45.05
-103.04
3.90
-0.48
-9.53
0.34
4.20
-1.81
5.07
5.72
-7.24
16.66
-2.13
-53.00
-34.23
48.61
-6.99
38.23
-39.28
-3.54
-5.37
-11.94
-4.17
8.32
-1.33

P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.630
0.000
0.731
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.183

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3435613
.425439
1.044993 1.140048
-1.954837 -1.881857
.0002101 .0006348
-.0009435 .0005712
-.3648481 -.2403371
-.0290087 .0413477
.015669 .0431127
-.0082492 .0003287
.0362836 .0819661
.1861928 .3802198
-.2247405 -.1289512
.3503067 .4437056
-.1938914 -.0082353
-3.23e-06 -3.00e-06
-.5076341 -.4526519
.6278069 .6805635
-.1548188 -.0870233
.3741026 .4145338
-.6320911 -.5720135
-4.55e-06 -1.30e-06
-.3422487
-.159129
-.2524435 -.1812655
-.0803232
-.028957
.1014017 .1638761
-.0023716
.000454

-.0004414

.0007288

-0.61

0.545

-.0018697

.0009869

-.2376843 .1217522
-1.95
** P< 0.01
***P< 0.001

0.051

-.4763143

.0009456

The results of model Q which examined an interaction between the judicial ideology type
variable and a variable that measures the mean ideology of Congress at the time the case was
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decided shows a significant interaction. There was no significant interaction between
Congressional ideology and the probability of asylum success for judges in the moderate and
liberal groups. However, for judges in the conservative group there was a 26% reduction in
probability between cases decided during years with the most liberal and most conservative
congressional terms.
Figure 13: Model Q: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Congressional
Ideology Interaction

.25

Probability of Asylum Success
.3
.35
.4
.45
.5

Effect of Congress mean Ideology on Asylum grant by Judge Type

0

.01

.02

.03
.04
.05
.06
Congressional Ideology
Conservative
Liberal

152

.07

Moderate

.08

.09

Results for Model R: Interaction of Judicial Type and mean immigration court
ideology on probability of asylum success.
Table 19: Model R: Judicial Type by Mean Ideology
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32841.97
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1202

Log likelihood = -120148.49
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID/c. mean5 2
threeID/c. mean5 3
_cons

Coef.
.0377031
1.102635
-1.92566
.000395
-.000483
-.303361
.0151321
.0316019
-.004012
.0598675
.2703414
-.1648344
.3935243
-.1047543
-3.13e-06
-.4737815
.6532837
-.1234522
.3922367
-.5962341
-1.48e-06
-.2752724
-.1996494
-.0091187
-.9237748
.958112
.7393478
.0767558

Std. Err.
.0259532
.0242719
.0186259
.0001086
.0002998
.0318354
.0179845
.0070139
.0021903
.0116701
.0496013
.0244676
.0238422
.0474183
5.88e-08
.0140454
.0134751
.0173654
.0103352
.015349
8.34e-07
.0470217
.0182035
.0133144
.0550571
.046577
.0441711
.1230956

z
1.45
45.43
-103.3
3.64
-1.61
-9.53
0.84
4.51
-1.83
5.13
5.45
-6.74
16.51
-2.21
-53.33
-33.73
48.48
-7.11
37.95
-38.85
-1.78
-5.85
-10.97
-0.68
-16.78
20.57
16.74
0.62

P>|z
0.146
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.107
0.000
0.400
0.000
0.067
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.027
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.076
0.000
0.000
0.493
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.533

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0131642
.0885703
1.055063
1.150207
-1.962171 -1.889159
.0001823
.0006078
-.0010706
.0001047
-.3657572 -.2409649
-.0201169
.0503812
.0178549
.045349
-.008305
.0002808
.0369944
.0827405
.1731245
.3675582
-.2127901 -.1168787
.3467943
.4402542
-.1976926 -.0118161
-3.25e-06
-3.02e-06
-.50131 -.4462531
.6268731
.6796944
-.1574878 -.0894166
.3719801
.4124932
-.6263176 -.5661507
-3.12e-06
1.52e-07
-.3674332 -.1831116
-.2353276 -.1639711
-.0352144
.0169771
-1.031685 -.8158649
.8668228
1.049401
.6527741
.8259215
-.1645071
.3180186

The results of model R, where the interaction between the judicial ideology type variable
and a variable that measures the mean ideology of the immigration court that the deciding judge
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sat on at the time the case was decided proved to be significant. As the mean ideology of the
other judges on a judge’s immigration court becomes more liberal, the probability of asylum
success increases from 20% to 80% over the range of immigration court ideology. The
probability of success for cases brought before conservative judges does not significantly change
across the range of mean court ideology.
Figure 14: Model R: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Mean Immigration
Court Ideology Interaction
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Results for Model S: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring whether
country of origin received military aid from the United States on probability of
asylum success.
Table 20: Model S: Judicial Type by Military ID
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32292.73
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1182

Log likelihood = -120423.11
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID#/militaryaid
21
threeID#/militaryaid
31
_cons

Coef.
.3869087
1.092259
-1.91905
.0004227
-.000522
-.301635
.0056963
.0292423
-.004037
.0587487
.2835835
-.176466
.397188
-.099863
-3.11e-06
-.479409
.6536304
-.121683
.3944468
-.603809
-3.02e-06
-.253640
-.216589
-.054977
.1091945
.0355451

Std. Err.
.0209102
.0242485
.0186198
.0001083
.0002991
.0317654
.0179483
.0070004
.0021886
.0116541
.0494962
.0244404
.0238277
.0473645
5.87e-08
.0175148
.0134648
.0173095
.0103204
.0153422
8.29e-07
.0467294
.0181577
.0131239
.0231872
.0253514

z
18.50
45.04
-103.07
3.90
-1.75
-9.50
0.32
4.18
-1.84
5.04
5.73
-7.22
16.67
-2.11
-52.97
-27.37
48.54
-7.03
38.22
-39.36
-3.64
-5.43
-11.93
-4.19
4.71
1.40

P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.080
0.000
0.751
0.000
0.065
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.035
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.161

-.040966

.0253202

-1.62

0.106

-.090592

.0086605

-.232396

.121946

-1.91

0.057

-.471406

.0066133
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[95% Conf. Interval]
.3459254
.427892
1.044733
1.139786
-1.95554
-1.88255
.0002104
.0006351
-.001109
.0000633
-.363894
-.239376
-.029481
.0408744
.0155218
.0429628
-.008326
.0002524
.0359071
.0815904
.1865727
.3805943
-.224369
-.128564
.3504866
.4438895
-.192696
-.007031
-3.22e-06 -2.99e-06
-.513738
-.445081
.6272398
.680021
-.155609
-.087757
.3742191
.4146744
-.633879
-.573739
-4.64e-06 -1.39e-06
-.345228
-.162052
-.252177
-.181000
-.080699
-.029254
.0637484
.1546406
-.014142
.085233

The results of model S which examined the interaction between the judicial ideology type
variable and the weight immigration judges place on whether the United States provides military
aid to a petitioner’s country of origin was not significant.
Results for Model T: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring whether
country of origin was a communist state on probability of asylum success.
Table 21: Model T: Judicial Type by Communist
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32295.20
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1182

Log likelihood = -120421.87
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID#/commienoc
om~e 2 1
threeID#/commienoc
om~e 3 1
_cons

Coef.
.3873126
1.092194
-1.920258
.0004231
-.0005229
-.3021213
.0055761
.0292351
-.0040273
.0588633
.2836055
-.1763058
.396678
-.1005431
-3.11e-06
-.4795304
.6443813
-.1215273
.3948737
-.6038283
-3.06e-06
-.254305
-.2166112
-.0545854
.1404331
-.0216616

Std. Err.
.0209124
.0242484
.0186267
.0001083
.0002993
.0317652
.0179511
.0070003
.0021884
.0116545
.0494979
.0244541
.023828
.0473522
5.87e-08
.0140303
.016943
.0173163
.0103222
.0153348
8.29e-07
.0467344
.0181549
.0131302
.0183177
.0249916

z
18.52
45.04
-103.09
3.91
-1.75
-9.51
0.31
4.18
-1.84
5.05
5.73
-7.21
16.65
-2.12
-53.02
-34.18
38.03
-7.02
38.25
-39.38
-3.69
-5.44
-11.93
-4.16
7.67
-0.87

P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.081
0.000
0.756
0.000
0.066
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.034
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.386

.0616273

.0249395

2.47

0.013

.0127468

.1105077

-.22742

.121832

-1.87

0.062

-.4662064

.0113664
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[95% Conf. Interval]
.346325
.4283002
1.044668
1.13972
-1.956765
-1.88375
.0002107
.0006354
-.0011095
.0000637
-.36438
-.2398626
-.0296073
.0407595
.0155149
.0429554
-.0083164
.0002618
.036021
.0817056
.1865914
.3806196
-.224235
-.1283766
.3499759
.44338
-.1933517
-.0077346
-3.23e-06
-3.00e-06
-.5070293
-.4520315
.6111737
.677589
-.1554666
-.0875881
.3746427
.4151048
-.6338839
-.5737727
-4.68e-06
-1.43e-06
-.3459028
-.1627072
-.2521941
-.1810282
-.0803202
-.0288506
.104531
.1763352
-.0706441
.027321

The results of model T examines the interaction between the judicial ideology type
variable and the variable that measures whether a petitioner is from a current or former
communist country shows statistical significance. All three judge types show a significant
increase in probability for petitioners from current or former Communist countries. The increase
in probability for petitioners in front of liberal judges was 18% , for moderate judges 16% and
for conservative judges 15%.
Figure 15: Model T: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/
Communist Interaction
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Results for Model U: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring extent of
trade between petitioner’s country of origin and the United States on probability of
asylum success.
Table 22: Model U: Judicial Type by Trade
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32366.78
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1185

Log likelihood = -120386.08
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID#/c.trade 2
threeID#/c.trade 3
_cons

Coef.
.3985776
1.093804
-1.91860
.0004305
-.0005243
-.3089386
.0052926
.0301816
-.003643
.0621992
.2884398
-.1828424
.4015525
-.1015934
-3.39e-06
-.4770898
.6512843
-.130124
.388025
-.6033226
-2.65e-06
-.2632873
-.2145979
-.0535433
.0715294
6.74e-07
4.78e-07
-.2315937

Std. Err.
.0210363
.0242451
.0186116
.0001084
.000299
.0317746
.0179572
.0070092
.0021898
.0116658
.0495223
.024463
.0238538
.0473236
6.71e-08
.0140237
.0134546
.0173391
.0103454
.0153302
8.27e-07
.0467462
.018153
.0131139
.0175809
8.02e-08
8.21e-08
.1217612

z
18.95
45.11
-103.0
3.97
-1.75
-9.72
0.29
4.31
-1.66
5.33
5.82
-7.47
16.83
-2.15
-50.58
-34.02
48.41
-7.50
37.51
-39.36
-3.20
-5.63
-11.82
-4.08
4.07
8.41
5.82
-1.90

P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.079
0.000
0.768
0.000
0.096
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.032
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.057

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3573471
.439808
1.046284
1.141323
-1.955086
-1.88213
.000218
.000643
-.0011104
.0000617
-.3712157 -.2466615
-.0299028
.040488
.0164438
.0439195
-.0079348
.0006489
.0393348
.0850637
.1913779
.3855018
-.230789 -.1348958
.3547999
.4483051
-.1943459 -.0088409
-3.52e-06 -3.26e-06
-.5045756 -.4496039
.6249138
.6776548
-.1641081 -.0961399
.3677485
.4083016
-.6333693 -.5732759
-4.27e-06 -1.03e-06
-.3549082 -.1716664
-.250177 -.1790187
-.0792461 -.0278405
.0370715
.1059873
5.17e-07
8.32e-07
3.17e-07
6.39e-07
-.4702412
.0070539

The results from model U where judicial ideology type was integrated with the variable
that measured the extent of trade the petitioner’s home country has with the United States shows
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significance for all judge ideology types. As the amount of trade increases, the probability of
asylum success decreases from 55% to 19% for petitioners in front of liberal judges, from 46%
to 16% for moderate judges and from 44% to 10% for conservative judges..
Figure 16: Model U: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Trade Interaction
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Results for Model V: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring whether
petitioner’s country of origin is a top ten producer of fraudulent asylum claims on
probability of asylum success.
Table 23: Model V: Judicial Type by Top Ten
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32329.56
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1184

Log likelihood = -120404.69
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID#/
toptenimmig~n 2 1
threeID#
/toptenimmig~n 3 1
_cons

Coef.
.3997954
1.092878
-1.920571
.0004264
-.0005255
-.3034032
.00569
.0293314
-.0039624
.0598631
.2849956
-.1773933
.3983699
-.1009634
-3.12e-06
-.4771142
.6516302
-.1277308
.3918248
-.668917
-2.84e-06
-.2559521
-.2170705
-.0518409
.0868933
.108548

Std. Err.
.0210154
.0242377
.0186247
.0001084
.0002989
.0317656
.0179512
.007003
.0021887
.0116562
.0495021
.0244456
.0238382
.0473268
5.89e-08
.014032
.0134559
.0173112
.0103218
.0186482
8.27e-07
.0467199
.0181585
.0131121
.019126
.0240742

z
19.02
45.09
-103.12
3.94
-1.76
-9.55
0.32
4.19
-1.81
5.14
5.76
-7.26
16.71
-2.13
-52.98
-34.00
48.43
-7.38
37.96
-35.87
-3.43
-5.48
-11.95
-3.95
4.54
4.51

P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.079
0.000
0.751
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

.1516062

.024658

6.15

0.000

.1032774

.1999351

-.2209744

.1217635

-1.81

0.070

-.4596265

.0176777
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[95% Conf. Interval]
.3586059
.4409848
1.045373
1.140383
-1.957075 -1.884068
.000214
.0006388
-.0011113
.0000604
-.3656626 -.2411438
-.0294936
.0408737
.0156058
.043057
-.0082522
.0003273
.0370174
.0827088
.1879733
.3820179
-.2253057 -.1294809
.3516479
.4450918
-.1937222 -.0082045
-3.23e-06 -3.00e-06
-.5046164
-.449612
.6252571
.6780034
-.1616601 -.0938015
.3715946
.4120551
-.7054668 -.6323672
-4.46e-06 -1.22e-06
-.3475213 -.1643828
-.2526606 -.1814805
-.0775402 -.0261416
.049407
.1243796
.0613634
.1557326

The results from model V in which the judicial ideology type variable was interacted with
the variable that measures whether the petitioner is from a country that is one of the ten highest
producers of fraudulent claims are statistically significant for each judicial type.
Figure 17: Model V: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Top Ten
Fraud Interaction

.3

Probability of Asylum Success
.35
.4
.45
.5
.55

Top Ten Fraud Producing by Judge Type

1

0
toptenimmigration
Conservative
Liberal

161

Moderate

Results for Model W: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring the human
rights record of. petitioner’s country of origin on probability of asylum success.
Table 24: Model W: Judicial Type by Human Rights Terror
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(37) = 32347.38
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1184

Log likelihood = -120395.78
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID#/humanrtster~r 2 2
threeID#/humanrtster~r 2 3
threeID#/humanrtster~r 2 4
threeID#/humanrtster~r 2 5
threeID#/humanrtster~r 3 2
threeID#/humanrtster~r 3 3
threeID#/humanrtster~r 3 4
threeID#/humanrtster~r 3 5
_cons

Coef.
.3866592
1.091783
-1.918775
.000429
-.0005285
-.2991515
.0022102
.0287715
-.004247
.0565988
.2861283
-.1787742
.4024027
-.1197052
-3.11e-06
-.4812722
.6530764
-.1238812
.3912323
-.6001133
-2.95e-06
-.264442
-.212357
-.0580935
.1701594
-.000042
.0464208
-.0842015
-.1269112
.0881012
.101894
.1127942
-.0924255
-.1985919

Std. Err.
.020913
.0242519
.0186202
.0001084
.0002994
.0317771
.0179829
.0070074
.0021905
.0116558
.0495211
.0244784
.0238512
.0681626
5.87e-08
.0140505
.0134692
.0173294
.0103262
.0153485
8.28e-07
.0467663
.0181691
.0131301
.1054993
.1116539
.106862
.1068748
.1086713
.1165523
.1120371
.1118744
.1152174
.1300941

z
18.49
45.02
-103.05
3.96
-1.77
-9.41
0.12
4.11
-1.94
4.86
5.78
-7.30
16.87
-1.76
-52.89
-34.25
48.49
-7.15
37.89
-39.10
-3.56
-5.65
-11.69
-4.42
1.61
-0.00
0.43
-0.79
-1.17
0.76
0.91
1.01
-0.80
-1.53

P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.078
0.000
0.902
0.000
0.053
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.079
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.107
1.000
0.664
0.431
0.243
0.450
0.363
0.313
0.422
0.127

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3456704
.427648
1.04425
1.139316
-1.95527
-1.882281
.0002166
.0006415
-.0011153
.0000583
-.3614334
-.2368696
-.0330356
.037456
.0150372
.0425058
-.0085402
.0000463
.0337539
.0794438
.1890688
.3831878
-.226751
-.1307973
.3556553
.4491502
-.2533014
.0138909
-3.22e-06
-2.99e-06
-.5088107
-.4537336
.6266773
.6794755
-.1578462
-.0899162
.3709934
.4114712
-.6301957
-.5700308
-4.57e-06
-1.33e-06
-.3561023
-.1727818
-.2479678
-.1767462
-.083828
-.0323591
-.0366154
.3769341
-.2188796
.2187956
-.1630249
.2558665
-.2936722
.1252692
-.3399031
.0860807
-.140337
.3165395
-.1176947
.3214826
-.1064755
.3320639
-.3182474
.1333964
-.4535716
.0563878

The results from model W where the judicial type variable was interacted with the human
rights record of the petitioner’s country of origin are not significant.
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Results for Model X: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring the number
of Congressional hearings regarding enforcement related issues on probability of
asylum success
Table 25: Model X: Judicial Type by Enforcement Hearings
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32321.20
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1183

Log likelihood = -120408.87
courtapplnd~c

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID# c./
hearingsenf~t 2
threeID# c./
hearingsenf~t 3
_cons

.3856429
1.094482
-1.918962
.0004521
-.0005379
-.3104376
.0024389
.0284277
-.0077888
.060774
.2992157
-.2212039
.4174773
-.1004167
-3.11e-06
-.4798066
.6539576
-.1224175
.3951771
-.6015996
-2.92e-06
-.2488857
-.2203068
-.0551049
.064712
.0065798

.0208945
.0242506
.0186188
.0001086
.0002996
.0317965
.0179711
.0070259
.0023057
.0116541
.0496421
.0257135
.0241381
.0473651
5.87e-08
.0140297
.0134605
.0173018
.0103172
.0153266
8.27e-07
.0467192
.0181796
.0131086
.0266194
.0020039

18.46
45.13
-103.07
4.16
-1.80
-9.76
0.14
4.05
-3.38
5.21
6.03
-8.60
17.30
-2.12
-52.98
-34.20
48.58
-7.08
38.30
-39.25
-3.53
-5.33
-12.12
-4.20
2.43
3.28

.0129414

.0022085

-.2238707

.1219423
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P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.073
0.000
0.892
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.034
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.015
0.001

[95% Conf.
Interval]
.3446904
1.046952
-1.955454
.0002392
-.0011251
-.3727575
-.0327837
.0146571
-.0123078
.0379325
.201919
-.2716014
.3701674
-.1932505
-3.22e-06
-.5073043
.6275754
-.1563283
.3749558
-.6316392
-4.54e-06
-.3404536
-.2559382
-.0807972
.0125389
.0026522

.4265954
1.142013
-1.882469
.0006651
.0000493
-.2481177
.0376615
.0421983
-.0032697
.0836156
.3965125
-.1708064
.4647871
-.0075829
-2.99e-06
-.452309
.6803397
-.0885067
.4153985
-.5715601
-1.30e-06
-.1573179
-.1846754
-.0294126
.1168851
.0105075

5.86

0.000

.0086128

.0172699

-1.84

0.066

-.4628732

.0151318

The results from Model X, where the Judicial Ideology type variable is interacted with
the variable measuring the number of Congressional enforcement hearings show a significant
interaction. As enforcement hearings increase, the probability that moderate and conservative
judges grant asylum decreases. The reduction for moderate judges is rather minor at 1%. The
number of enforcement hearings has a much larger effect on the probability of asylum success
for conservative judges at 7%. For liberal judges, as the number of enforcement hearings
increases, the probability of success actually increases by 6%.
Figure 18: Model X: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Number of
Enforcement Hearings Interaction
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Results for Model Y: Interaction of Judicial Type and variable measuring the number
of Congressional hearings regarding human rights related issues on probability of
asylum success.
Table 26: Model Y: Judicial Type by Human Rights Hearings
Logistic regression

Number of obs = 201674
LR chi2(31) = 32320.05
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1183

Log likelihood = -120409.44
courtapplnd~c
mean5
represented
asylum1tort~2
timescount
congresside~y
nineelevenn
presidentia~y
humanrights~s
hearingsenf~t
unemployment
ashcroftrev~s
gonzales
realid
humanrtster~r 2
trade
1.militaryaid
1.commienoc~e
judicialide~y
gender
1.toptenimm~n
totalcase
circuitideo~y
i0e1casetype
Border
threeID 2
threeID# c./
humanrights~s 2
_cons

Coef.
.3846448
1.093285
-1.917875
.0004447
-.0005308
-.3123924
.0019788
.0590051
-.0022884
.0627415
.2969872
-.2296742
.4171494
-.0992985
-3.11e-06
-.4798391
.6540282
-.1190078
.3932129
-.6016901
-2.98e-06
-.250986
-.2145932
-.0537278
.2056372
-.0517709

Std. Err.
.0208922
.0242471
.018617
.0001086
.0003007
.0318669
.0180164
.0087388
.0022109
.0116714
.0495921
.0260911
.0241133
.0473452
5.87e-08
.0140283
.0134599
.0172977
.0103176
.0153279
8.27e-07
.0467211
.0181668
.0131074
.0226665
.0116225

z
18.41
45.09
-103.0
4.10
-1.77
-9.80
0.11
6.75
-1.04
5.38
5.99
-8.80
17.30
-2.10
-53.03
-34.21
48.59
-6.88
38.11
-39.25
-3.60
-5.37
-11.81
-4.10
9.07
-4.45

P>|z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.077
0.000
0.913
0.000
0.301
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.036
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3436969
.4255926
1.045761
1.140808
-1.954364
-1.881387
.0002319
.0006576
-.0011201
.0000585
-.3748503
-.2499344
-.0333326
.0372903
.0418773
.0761328
-.0066216
.0020449
.0398659
.085617
.1997885
.394186
-.2808118
-.1785366
.3698883
.4644106
-.1920934
-.0065035
-3.23e-06
-3.00e-06
-.5073341
-.4523441
.6276472
.6804092
-.1529108
-.0851049
.3729908
.4134351
-.6317322
-.5716479
-4.60e-06
-1.36e-06
-.3425576
-.1594144
-.2501994
-.178987
-.0794179
-.0280377
.1612116
.2500627
-.0745506
-.0289913

-.3243296

.1226586

-2.64

0.008

-.5647361

-.0839231

The results from Model Y, where the Judicial Ideology type variable is interacted with
the variable measuring the number of Congressional human rights hearings show a significant
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interaction. As human rights hearings increase, the probability that liberal judges grant asylum
decreases slightly from 48% to 47%. For moderate judges the model produces a very small
increase from 39.5% to 40.00%. For conservative judges the number of human rights hearings
has a much larger effect on the probability of asylum of 6%.
Figure 19: Model Y: Effect on Probability of Asylum Success by Judge Type/ Human rts
hearings Interaction
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Discussion
The results confirm the central hypothesis of this chapter and dissertation that
immigration judges are rational actors situated in an institutional and social framework that
limits but does not totally control how and when they exercise discretion in furtherance of
political goals. Despite evidence that a variety of factors influence the rate at which immigration
judges grant asylum, at their core, immigration judges are political actors. By separating the
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judges into liberal, moderate and conservative judge types, I was able to examine how judges
with different ideologies respond to change in a range of variables. Consistent with scholarship
on the role of case load and the exercise of bureaucratic discretion, I found that as the overall
caseload of immigration judges increases, they are more likely to make decisions in keeping with
their ideological preferences. As case load increases, conservative judges are much less likely to
grant asylum, liberal judges are much more likely and moderate judges probability rates do not
change much at all. There are a number of possible explanations for these results. A number of
bureaucratic scholars have argued that high caseloads cause agents to ignore agency policy and
rely on their own policy preferences as a method of dealing with limited time and resources.
Others argue that high case load limits the ability of principals to exercise actual control over the
actions of their agents thus allowing them to act in accordance with their ideological preferences.
Whatever the explanation the results from this chapter show that immigration judges behave in
ways that are similar to bureaucrats when faced with high case-loads. Despite the large number
of institutions and factors that have been shown to influence immigration judge behavior,
underneath they are political actors. When political actors are faced with lessor constraints, they
are more likely to behave in ways that are consistent with their own policy preferences.
The results also confirm that judges with different ideologies will respond differently to
the same factors. As political actors, immigration judges will place more emphasis on the
characteristics that coincide with their policy preferences and less to those that do not.
Conservative judges respond to the presence of conservative presidents and conservative
majorities in Congress by significantly reducing the number of petitioners granted asylum.
Moderate judges respond to the same changes with little to no change in the rate that they grant
asylum. Liberal judges respond to the same changes by actually increasing the rate at which they
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grant asylum. Similar results were shown when examining the role of Congressional hearings in
the rate that immigration judges grant asylum. Conservative judges respond to increased
Congressional attention to enforcement issues by reducing the numbers of petitioners granted
asylum, while moderate and liberal judges do not change their behavior. Conservative judges
also respond differently than moderate and liberal judges to the mean ideology of other judges
who preside in the same immigration court. While moderate and liberal judges provide asylum at
a higher rate as mean ideology becomes more liberal, conservative judges do not seem to be
affected at all.
The results did not confirm all of the hypotheses however. It does not appear that judicial
ideology has any bearing upon whether judges place more emphasis on human rights factors in
making decisions to grant or deny asylum. Nor does it appear that judicial ideology type has any
influence on the weight immigration judges place on whether a petitioner is from a country that
receives military aid from the United States.
Overall, the results are consistent with my general hypotheses regarding the role of
ideology in immigration judge behavior. It is not simply the case that liberal judges grant asylum
more than conservative judges. Rather, it appears that something more complex is going on.
Liberal judges are responding to both endogenous and exogenous forces differently than
moderate or conservative judges and vice versa. They are essentially different types of actors
than their moderate or conservative colleagues. This does not mean that the behavior of
immigration judges cannot be examined using models that are based upon rational choice theory.
Rather, it adds a level of complexity to the analysis. In a way it is no different from the manner
in which the attitudinal model is applied to the behavior of the United States Supreme Court.
Critics of the attitudinal model often argue that the model cannot explain unanimous decisions on
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salient issues such as those involving the First Amendment right to free speech. However, this
ignores the aspect of the attitudinal model which examines in a manner that is more complex
than the political party of the president who nominated them. Rather, each judge is scored upon
her or his positions on each issue. Thus, although Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Antonin Scalia differ
significantly on a number of issues, they have the same policy positions regarding certain free
speech related issues. Thus they can still behave attitudinally while agreeing with each other on
the results of certain cases.
It would be next to impossible to examine the positions of immigration judges on every
aspect of the asylum process in the same manner that as Supreme Court judges. However, by
applying the background based ideological scoring system set up by Keith Holmes & Miller
(2013 & 2014), I have been able to place judges into categories that more accurately predict their
behavior than simply relying on the ideology of the president who appointed them. Judges who
were placed in the conservative category are predominantly comprised of persons who have
worked for the INS, Department of Justice or the Military. These judges are not just more
conservative, they also have a different idea about immigration enforcement in general and
asylum adjudication in particular. The judges placed in the liberal category come from
employment backgrounds where they represented individual immigration petitioners, non-profits
that aid immigrants and academia. They are not just more liberal but also look at the process
from a different prospective. The judges placed in the moderate category either have mixed
backgrounds or backgrounds that are not directly immigration based. Not surprisingly,
conservative justices are not merely less likely to grant asylum, they are actually looking at and
responding to variables differently than their moderate and liberal colleagues.
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This is an important advance not only in the understanding of immigration judge
behavior but also in the behavior of all street level judges and bureaucrats. It moves the
discussion past the simple notion that liberal officials are more generous in making decisions
than conservative ones. It also raises questions regarding the efficacy of efforts to constrain
lower level bureaucratic and judicial discretion. If, as the above results appear to reveal, ideology
not only shapes how judges make decisions, but also how they respond to attempts to control that
behavior, it. has the potential to undermine previous assumptions about the function and efficacy
of efforts at oversight.

Conclusion
This dissertation began with a simple question: why did the Romeikes get asylum when
the legal facts and political environment seemed to point to a denial. One simple answer would
have been that Judge Burman merely made an idiosyncratic decision based upon facts that were
particular to that case. However, once the disparity in asylum grant rates between judges across
the country was examined, it appeared that something else was going on. In a reality where two
judges sitting in the same court, seeing the same type of petitioners, have a 60% difference in the
rate that they grant asylum, it appeared that decisions like the Romeikes are not anomalies. Thus
the question shifted to how can one explain why some immigration judges grant asylum at
extremely high rates while others grant at extremely low rates.
In order to answer this question I believed that it was necessary to examine a number of
factors that could potentially influence judicial behavior. Building upon the literature of judicial
behavior, I examined how the ideology of immigration judges influenced their behavior. From
top-down bureaucratic approaches I examined how pressure from political institutions which
have oversight over immigration judges influence their behavior. Additionally, I examined
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variables developed through studies of street level bureaucrats, such as case load and agency
characteristics impact decisions to grant or deny asylum. Finally, I examined how judges with
different ideologies responded to shifts in variables from the judicial behavior and bureaucratic
models.
The results that I have obtained not only provide valuable insight into the behavior of
immigration judges and other Administrative Law Judges but potentially all lower level courts
and bureaucracies.

Summary of Results
The scope of the research in this study includes final decisions reached by immigration
judges in asylum claims from 1997-2013 for applicants for Asylum. The decisions of
immigration judges, as well as the country of origin of the petitioner, date of decision and court
location were gleaned from a FOIA request and include over 235,000 petitions from 1997 to
2013.
Chapter VI: A Comparison of Models of Immigration Judge Behavior in Asylum
Cases
In Chapter Six, I compared the results produced by two models that have previous been
applied to asylum decisions by immigration judges, attitudinal and top-down bureaucratic
models, to a multi-institutional model which combined aspects of both as well as variables
developed in studies of street level bureaucracies. In order to examine whether this multiinstitutional approach provided a better understanding of immigration judge behavior I applied
each of the models to my data set of 235,000 asylum petitions. The comparison of these three
models produced a number of important findings. The first is that the results confirm a vast
majority of my hypotheses regarding immigration judge behavior. Liberal judges are more likely
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to grant asylum than conservative judges. Petitioners from countries with ideological, trade or
military ties to the United States are less likely to obtain asylum than those from countries that
do not have these ties. During years in which immigration judges are overseen by a Congress
that is more concerned with human rights issue, immigration judges are more likely to grant
asylum, when focus is on enforcement they are less likely. The ideology of Congress and the
Presidency also play a statistically significant role. Judges who make decisions in courts where
the other judges are liberal are more likely to grant asylum. The busier that judges are, the more
likely they are to deny asylum.
Several of these findings have never been reported before. Perhaps the most novel result
was the influence that mean-judicial ideology of a particular immigration court played in a
petitioner’s probability of success. There has as of yet been no study which shows such an effect
in non-collegial courts. The large marginal effect on probability of asylum success that mean
immigration court ideology plays on chances to obtain asylum is a novel finding. Judges who are
surrounded by liberal judges are more likely to grant asylum than those surrounded by
conservative judges. I do not believe that such effects have been shown in a non-collegial court. I
believe that the effect of mean immigration court ideology reveals that immigration court are
more akin to street-level bureaucracies then previously assumed. The behavior of street-level
bureaucrats has been shown to be influenced by agency culture. The findings from this chapter
appear to reveal that the culture of each immigration court influences the behavior of the
individual immigration judges.
The results from the models examined in chapter Six are also the first to find a
connection between caseload and the probability of obtaining asylum. Studies of street level
bureaucracies have found that as caseload increases, agents are more likely to act in accordance
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with their personal preferences. The results from this research reveal that immigration judges are
also similar to bureaucrats in this manner as well.
Another important conclusion that can be drawn from the findings in chapter Six is that
traditional approaches to understanding immigration judge behavior are not sufficient. Past work
on immigration judges has shown that ideology plays a role in their decision making process.
(Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, Schrag, 2008). But such studies never examined how political,
economic and social factors influenced judicial behavior. Conversely, while previous
bureaucratically centered studies of immigration judge behavior examined a number political,
economic, and social factors, they did not include the role of judicial ideology. Furthermore, no
previous studies have examined the role of case load and the ideology of other judges in the
same court on IJ behavior. The results of my multi-institutional model show that approaches
which fail to examine the totality of the factors influencing judicial behavior in asylum
proceedings are deficient.
The results from chapter six reveal that immigration judges do not behave entirely like
other judges nor do they behave entirely like bureaucrats. While the results show that these
judges make decisions based upon their judicial ideologies, it is apparent that models relying on
ideology alone fail to adequately explain the complexity of their decision making process.
Similarly, models that ignore the role of ideology in decision making, such as top-down
bureaucratic models, fail to adequately capture the extent to which judicial ideology plays a part.
Chapter VII: Influence of Political and Social Factors on Immigration Judge
Behavior
In this chapter I intend to extend upon the findings of Salehyhan and Rosenvlum (2008)
in order to determine whether immigration judges give more weight to some variables based
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upon political or public focus. They found evidence that when Congress and the public focus on
different aspects of the immigration issue, immigration judges give more weight towards either
political or human rights variables. In this chapter I tested their hypotheses through the use of
interaction effects in my multi-institutional model. Salehyan and Rosenblum’s study was limited
however, in the fact that it did not examine any characteristics of immigration judges, the courts
they sat on, or the Circuit Courts that had jurisdiction over them. My study is the first to examine
these effects through models that include variables drawn from attitudinal, top-down
bureaucratic and street level bureaucratic models. The results show that the grant or denial of
asylum continues to have political connotations both domestically and internationally. During
periods where public and political forces are fixated upon immigration as a law enforcement
issue the rate at which immigration judges grant asylum is reduced. During periods where
attention is focused on asylum as a human rights issue, the rate of success increases. What is
most interesting, however, is not only that asylum success rate is influenced by the type of
political and social attention drawn to asylum related issues, but how that attention affects the
way immigration judges make decisions. The results from chapter 7 reveal that during periods of
heightened attention towards either enforcement or human rights concerns, petitioners are still
being granted asylum, but the factors that determine likelihood of asylum success change.
During enforcement centered periods, immigration judges give more emphasis towards the
political factors that influence whether a person is granted asylum. Thus, when asylum becomes
an issue that is tied up with law enforcement, judges are more likely to place more emphasis on
political, economic and military ties between a petitioner’s home country than the human rights
record of that country. During periods where political and public concern focuses on human
rights issues related to immigration, judges place more of an emphasis on human rights records
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from petitioners’ countries of origin. These findings are the first to show this impact in a model
that includes variables measuring characteristics of each individual case as well as the ideology
of the immigration judge making the decision.
Chapter VIII: The Effects of 9/11 on Immigration Judge Behavior
Chapter Eight examined how the events of 9/11 changed how immigration judges made
decisions on asylum cases. Building upon research which has looked at the Supreme Court
deference towards the executive branch during times of war, I examined whether similar
deference was shown by immigration judges following 9/11. The marginal effect of the variable
which measures whether a petitioner’s case was decided before or after 9/11 is -9.3% in the
multi-institutional model set forth in chapter 6. Since the grant or denial of asylum is often tied to
the political concerns of the executive, immigration judges are in the position of making
decisions every day that have potential foreign policy implications. The results from chapter
eight reveal that the events of 9/11 brought foreign policy considerations to the fore in asylum
decisions as the United States sought allies to help fight the war on terror.
The models in this chapter consider the effects of the interaction of variables measuring
political and economic ties between the United States and the petitioner’s home country with the
variable that measures whether a case was decided before or after 9/11. The interaction between
the 9/11 variable and the variable which measures the human rights record of the petitioner’s
country of origin was also examined. Additionally, the interaction between the variable that
measures the level of public attention towards asylum issues and the 9/11 variable was included
into the multi-institutional model. What I discovered was that the events of 9/11 resulted in
immigration judges placing greater emphasis on the political aspects of the asylum process as
opposed to human rights concerns. After 9/11, immigration judges placed less emphasis on the
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human rights records of petitioners’ home countries in making their decisions than before. As
immigration judges relied less upon human rights concerns in making their decisions following
9/11, they relied more heavily on political variables.
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CHAPTER X - EXAMINING IMMIGRATION JUDGE
BEHAVIOR BY JUDGE TYPE
Chapter Nine examined the interaction of a variable that placed immigration judges into
one of three ideology categories; Liberal, Moderate or Conservative with political and human
rights variables. It builds upon a number of judicial and bureaucratic studies which have
examined the role of case load on how judges and bureaucrats exercise discretion. Previous work
such as Taylor & Kelly (2006) has found that as case load increases, judges and bureaucrats are
less likely to follow formal rules and more likely to make decisions based upon their own
personal preferences. The results from Chapter Nine reveal that immigration judges behave
similarly to street level bureaucrats and lower level judges in the face of rising caseloads. As
case load increased, judges are more likely to exercise their discretion in a manner in keeping
with their own ideologies. Conservative judges granted asylum less, moderate judges largely
granted asylum at the same rate and liberal judges granted asylum at a greater rate.
This chapter also examined whether categories of judges respond differently to variables
set forth in the multi-institutional model set forth in chapter 6. Building upon the work of Keith
Holmes & Miller (2013 & 2014) I examined the extent that liberal judges respond differently to
certain characteristics of asylum applicants than moderate or conservative judges.
The results from chapter nine also revealed that judges in different ideology groups
respond in significantly different ways to the same stimuli. Conservative judges responded to the
presence of conservative presidents and conservative majorities in Congress by significantly
reducing the number of petitioners granted asylum. Moderate judges respond to the same
changes with little to no change in the rate that they grant asylum. Liberal judges respond to the
same changes by actually increasing the rate at which they grant asylum. Similar results were
shown when examining the role of Congressional hearings in the rate that immigration judges
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grant asylum. Conservative judges respond to increased Congressional attention to enforcement
issues by reducing the numbers of petitioners granted asylum, while moderate and liberal judges
do not change their behavior. Conservative judges also respond differently than moderate and
liberal judges to the mean ideology of other judges who preside in the same immigration court.
While moderate and liberal judges provide asylum at a higher rate as mean ideology becomes
more liberal, conservative judges do not seem to be affected at all.

Policy Implications
The results from the empirical chapters provide several important lessons for policy
makers. The first involves the balance between independence and accountability. While the
results show that immigration judges have a level of independence in their decision making, a
number of political and social factors also play significant roles in these decisions. A simple
analysis of the wide discrepancy in the rate that asylum is granted might lead one to conclude
that efforts need to be made in order to curb the independence of immigration judges. During the
almost 20 year time period that forms the basis of this study, Congress, the judiciary as well as
the executive branch have all taken steps to reign in this independence. While these steps have
been shown to affect the overall rates at which immigration judges grant asylum, there has been
little to no reduction in the level of variance between judges. Thus policy makers can make
changes which make it more or less likely on average for asylum seekers to succeed, they have
not been able to use policy to make judges decide cases in a more uniform manner. This study
helps to explain why policy changes have not made the asylum process more standard.
Immigration judges from different ideological backgrounds look at the asylum process in
substantially different ways. They respond to the same stimuli in different ways as well. Efforts
to constrain the independence of judges may have a different effect on a liberal judge than a
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conservative one. Any subsequent policy proposals designed to address discrepancies in asylum
grant rates must be cognizant of the complexity of this system.
The second lesson is a natural off-shoot of the first, the type of immigration judge that is
appointed means a great deal. It turns out that the professional background of an immigration
judge is much more telling of how they will make decisions than the political affiliations of the
president who appointed them. Immigration judges with backgrounds working for the INS or the
military will decide cases differently than those who worked in academia or for immigration
based non-profits. Because of this, policy makers need to scrutinize the backgrounds of
nominees more carefully if they expect to obtain a judiciary that will act the way that they wish.
The third lesson is that, despite the difficulty in getting judges to behave more uniformly,
policy makers do indeed have significant impact on the behavior of these judges. While the
influence may not always go in the direction intended, immigration judges do respond to shifts in
the makeup of Congress, the judiciary and the executive branch. They also respond when
Congress shifts its area of focus from treating asylum as an enforcement issue to treating it as a
human rights problem.
The fourth lesson concerns the role of asylum as a foreign policy issue. Despite efforts to
remove the asylum process from the realm of the political, politics still play a huge role in who
gets asylum. Whether these are the political goals of the judges making the decisions, the
political goals of the principals who have oversight over them or the prevailing political mood of
the citizenry, immigration judges are influenced by politics. It is difficult to see how the
influence of politics can be entirely curbed. One could argue that changing the nature of the
immigration judge position might remove a portion of this political influence. If these judges
were firmly entrenched as Article III judges, with the same protections as Federal district and
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circuit judges, the pressure to bow to outside political pressures would certainly diminish.
However, this would not remove politics entirely from the equation as these judges would then
be more free to follow their own political predispositions.
The fifth lesson speaks to how immigration judges are viewed. Rather than looking at
these actors as either agents in a principal agent relationship, or street level bureaucrats in a
bottom-up model, we must look at them as both. Their status as judges in some way
differentiates them from case workers deciding who gets social security disability benefits.
However, the vast number of cases they handle, and the relatively little to no real oversight they
face, place them in situations that are more like a case worker than a district court judge. Policy
makers concerned with obtaining more uniform results for asylum seekers across the country
need to realize that as immigration judge’s case loads increase, they will most likely respond in
similar ways as case workers do, namely relying on their own policy preferences to a greater
degree. It is not a surprise that the largest differences in asylum grant rates can be seen between
judges in the busiest immigration courts.

Future Areas of Inquiry
A number of possible future areas of study are opened up by this research. A number of
questions still remain regarding the behavior of immigration judges. In particular I am interested
in the extent to which the US State Department has influenced asylum decisions. Until relatively
recently, the US State Department was required to weigh in on every asylum case that was
brought before immigration judges. There is anecdotal evidence that their input was almost
always dispositive. In the past it has been impossible to study the effects of these
recommendations due to privacy concerns. I believe that a more narrowly construed FOIA
request will take care of previous problems and allow me to pursue this avenue of inquiry.
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Another possible future course of research would be to see if the multi-institutional
model can work outside the context of asylum decisions. Although it would present some
difficulties, I am interested to see the extent that the same variables that affect immigration judge
behavior in asylum cases apply to other immigration related decisions.
I also hope to determine whether my multi-institutional model can be applied to other
administrative courts. While a number of the variables used in this model are unique to
immigration judges, the overall approach in which ALJ judges are examined through a
combination of attitudinal, top-down bureaucratic and street-level bureaucratic approaches would
seem to be applicable to a large array of administrative law courts.
Perhaps the most far reaching ongoing application of this model and my research would
be to examine whether this model helps explain the behavior of state lower court judges. I intend
to use a variation of this model to examine sentencing decisions in felony cases in Michigan. It is
my belief that these judges often face similar pressures as those faced by immigration judges,. I
also believe that their behavior can best be examined through models that include variables
developed through attitudinal, top-down bureaucratic and street level bureaucratic studies.

Concluding Remarks
Judges of all levels are often tasked with doing the impossible. On one hand they are
supposed to use their expertise to make sound legal decisions. We put them into positions of
power and authority precisely because they have expertise that we lack. However, we want them
to make decisions that correspond to what we think are just and fair. We pretend that we want
judges who are impartial and insulated from public pressure, but in reality we want them to make
decisions that conform to this pressure. Politicians who are tasked with establishing policies that
govern the behavior of judges are in a similar situation as the citizenry as a whole. They like the
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idea of impartial learned judges who dispense law from an insulated position. They set up
institutional arrangements that allow for judicial autonomy. However, they often do not like the
reality that such a level of autonomy produces. Thus they pass laws that attempt to constrain this
autonomy. This dissertation is largely an attempt to understand how actors behave when they are
placed into such a contradictory situation. The intense scrutiny that has been levied on
immigration related issues after 9/11 has only brought about new efforts to constrain judicial
discretion. At the same time, the environment of fear and political posturing that characterizes
much of our current discourse concerning immigration highlights the need for a judiciary that has
the independence necessary to make sound legal decisions. Immigration judges are far from
unique in this manner. In many ways this situation is faced by all ALJs as well as bureaucracies
of all levels.
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